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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
Abstract
CONTEMPORARY ARCHAEOLOGICAL LOOTING: A CRIMINOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF ITALIAN TOMB ROBBERS
by
Marc Balcells Magrans
Chair: Dr. Jana Arsovska
Looters (in Italian, tombaroli), whether underground or underwater, have preyed on the
Italian archaeology for centuries. The literature on both archaeological looting and, more
specifically, the Italian case, has been widely developed by other disciplines, mostly
archaeology. In spite of this body of literature, the number of studies discussing issues related
to tombaroli is minimal, and the criminological contribution is nonexistent. After examining
important gaps in the literature, this study explains the nature of the relationship between
tombaroli and organized crime and how organized criminals learn and adapt during their
careers. These topics have been both misrepresented and sporadically dealt with in the
existing literature. Drawing on a multidisciplinary body of literature on Italian archaeological
looting and interviews with looters, law enforcement officials, archeologists, prosecutors,
journalists, criminologists, and authors, this study demonstrates that although Italian
archaeological looting is a crime that is organized, it is not a problem of organized crime. In
fact, its relationship to traditional Italian criminal organizations seems sporadic and anecdotal
at best. Looting, an eminently group activity, is mostly perpetrated in teams, who perfectly fit
the definition, albeit simply, of organizations. As such, tombaroli can learn as a whole group
from the interactions among their members and adapt to the actions of law enforcement and
other challenges. Through practice, tombaroli acquire and orally share a great deal of
practical knowledge; this is different from the scientific knowledge of archaeologists.
iv

Tombaroli change their ways of committing their crimes and learn new modus operandi, such
as changing their timing when offending, adapting their work to rural areas, changing how
they store and transport looted antiquities, and adopting new technologies. This study
includes an historical analysis of Italian archaeological looting across centuries. This research
project might interest law enforcement agencies, policymakers, archaeologists, NGOs, civil
society and scholars. Because it offers in-depth insights about tombaroli, one of the most
important risks archaeologists have to face in order to protect their future discoveries, it is
expected that this study and its recommendations might potentially have significance in
several fields such as archaeology, criminology, and policing.
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To my father; to my mother; to Toni
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We live on an island surrounded by a sea of ignorance. As our island of knowledge grows, so
does the shore of our ignorance.
John Archibald Wheeler
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PREFACE

I do not know the number of researchers that can pinpoint the moment their interest in
researching a topic began. I do know, however, that my story begins with a journal article I
was reading on a sunny July afternoon in Umbria, Italy while I was completing a certificate
program in cultural heritage. In the article, Proulx (2011a) states:

Additionally, since the activity of looters and traffickers is necessarily furtive, such
actors make difficult subjects to reach for interview about the social organization of
their criminal endeavors. To date, few if any criminologists have been able to
penetrate the underlying social dynamics of the illicit antiquities trade, making the
collection of microlevel, contextual information on looting a challenge (p. 2).

From that day on, I fell in love with the understudied topic of Italy’s tombaroli, and I set my
goals deciphering, through criminology, as much as I could. Tombarolo (or in plural,
tombaroli) is the Italian term that designates archaeological looters, which derives from the
Italian word tomba, meaning tomb. It refers primarily to tomb robbers operating in Italy,
although the term clandestine, translated as illegals, has also been used to describe them
(Thomas, 2012).
I arrived without any knowledge to the field of cultural heritage crime through
combining my degrees in law, criminology, and human sciences with my love for the
classical world, its history and its art. That first summer in Italy I was able to roam its fields
and archaeological sites and see firsthand the problems illicit diggings pose for archeologists.
Since that summer of 2011, I have visited the country every summer and established a base of
relationships with many people who are passionate about preserving Italy’s cultural heritage.
viii

Even as I write these lines today, I remain surprised by the amount of emails, calls,
and connections needed to locate and speak with a tombarolo. Indeed, as readers will see in
the introduction to this dissertation, researching populations align themselves on the supply
side of the spectrum, such as drug producers or tombaroli, , can be daunting.
But knowledge about tombaroli is badly needed: Italy is, in the words of one of my
interviewees, the land of the gratta e vince, the “scratch and win,” because buried under each
layer of soil is an uncountable cultural heritage just waiting to be found. In fact, as I managed
to observe during fieldwork, pieces were not as deeply buried, as many would imagine.
Tombaroli know it, and that is exactly their raison d’être. Just read the following case, which
illustrates precisely how tomb raiders have been pivotal co-conspirators in selling Italy’s past.
In 1980 in Arpi, in the region of Puglia, which forms the heel of the Italian peninsula,
tomb raiders found a tomb later nicknamed by archaeologists the tomb of the Medusa. The
tombaroli, using a bulldozer, found the frontal part of the tomb, which remained unearthed,
and stole most of the valuables. They stole all the significant pieces that they found in this
exceptional, third-century-BC tomb. It was so thoroughly emptied that the organization in
charge of cataloguing it, the Italian ministry for cultural heritage, only found fragments which
lacked archaeological relevance.
Furthermore, although the organ in charge of the site decided in 1989 to build a
protective structure around the tomb, tombaroli have broken into the precinct many times,
damaging the archaeological remnants (Graeppler & Mazzei, 1996; Pastore, 2001) with brute
force or imagination. They even managed to excavate a tunnel from a neighboring vineyard
straight to the tomb. The most important pieces from this site were not found by
archaeologists, but by police officers in the trunk of a car. The case of the tomb of the
Medusa is illustrative of the phenomenon of archaeological looting.
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FIGURE 1. An illegal excavation perpetrated by tombaroli at the necropolis of Cerveteri.
Source: the author (2017)
This research project is another step towards achieving a body of empirical
knowledge in the field of cultural heritage crimes, and more specifically, on the broader topic
of antiquities looting. As such, this doctoral dissertation uses a criminological approach to
demystify the tombaroli by accurately depicting them and analyzing their specific role in
looting Italy’s archaeological heritage. This is different from the media’s tendency to
romanticize the tomb raiders. I only hope the project helps bringing some light to such an
obscure field and contributes to bridging the gap between fact and fiction.
I am proud that I have been able to reach out to tombaroli and ask them about their
criminal activities with the intention of analyzing their responses and obtaining scholarly
knowledge from them devoid of the sensationalism that often impregnates the discourse of
tombaroli in the media. Over the years of working on this project, it has become clear to me
x

that although researchers and tombaroli devote our time to very different projects, we both
“dig” to uncover something. Skilled, old tombaroli will tell you that they do it to save
antiquities from the darkness of Earth’s hidden confines. My justification? To boldly go
where no criminologist has gone before, hoping that at the same time that this helps preserve
our ancient cultural heritage . That is why I consider this research project as a metaphor for
an excavation. After a proper introduction, a literature review and a section on the methods
used, we will also uncover some results to analyze as if we were raiders entering a tomb that
has been long hidden, awaiting our visit. I only hope you enjoy this experience as much as I
have.
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CHAPTER 1
IL FASCINO DELLA NOSTRA AVVENTURA:1
INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROJECT

I grew aware of the plague of tombaroli, but even I had never imagined the clandestine trade
dealt in such quantity-and quality. From what I could see, Crustumerium was just then being
raped, as Cerveteri was raped in 1970s.
(Watson & Todeschini, 2007)

On September 13, 1995, a Swiss and Italian police joint operation raided the Freeport of the
city of Geneva. This zone is a contested area when it comes to antiquities looting, as goods
can be stored without being officially in Swiss territory; therefore, taxes do not need to be
paid until a commercial transaction has been performed, the moment in which the good enters
the country (Watson & Todeschini, 2006). Inside the warehouse the agents found many
archaeological items which had clearly been raided, as they still had dirt attached to them.
They also found, a collection of Polaroid photographs, invoices, shipping documents, among
others, that proved the relationship between the dealer and his buyers. These would which
would prove crucial to the prosecution of the warehouse owner, the art dealer Giacomo
Medici. The totality of these documents proved that Medici had been conducting an illicit
operation for decades.
Yet probably the investigation’s most unusual finding was at the home of the thendeceased Pasquale Camera. Camera had written an organogram of the entire criminal
structure, ranging from the lowest tombaroli to the top world museum and collectors in
Europe and the United States. This chain linked tombaroli, middlemen, couriers, restorers,
1

The enchantment of our adventure.
1

dealers, museums, collectors, and auction houses (Chappell & Polk, 2011; Watson &
Todeschini, 2006). Because this dissertation focuses on the supply side of the illicit
antiquities trade in Italy, its main characters are the tombaroli, the ones that anonymously
appeared in the lowest levels of Pasquale Camera’s organogram. But who are these
tombaroli? What do they do? What is their history? This chapter will introduce the reader to
this dissertation’s object of study by answering these questions.

1. Archaeological looting and antiquities trafficking
Archaeological looting, as a criminal activity, is the threshold to other crimes within the
cultural heritage sphere, such as antiquities trafficking, the infiltration of looted art into the
legitimate market or laundering of antiquities within a market country before a final sale.
“Looting” is here defined as a criminal action involving the illegal excavation of
archaeological sites. The result, looted antiquities, are defined as those taken illicitly from the
ground, or from their place as an integral part of, or attachment to, a temple or other ancient
structure. There is a conceptual consensus that the term “antique” excludes all material that is
less than one hundred years old (Mackenzie, 2005; Renfrew, 2000).
The trade in illicit antiquities has the greatest negative impact on archaeological sites,
which are plundered so that the looted items can end up, mostly, in museums and private
collections in rich countries. A primary impact of the demand for antiquities involves the
destruction of major sites, especially when the plunder activities are large scale, rough, and
devastating. Looting has a tremendous impact on ancient structures like temples or tombs, as
it prevents the expert hands of an archaeologist from obtaining the items properly. As such,
these structures are often reduced to ruins due to inexpert excavation systems. The need to
hide the evidence of the act of looting itself, also unintentionally contributes to damaging the
site (Brodie, 2002).
2

A second negative impact of looting is the destruction of archaeological context and
the loss of historical information. Precisely because antiquities are the form of learning from
ancient cultures long gone, the systematic study of context is, according to Renfrew (2000),
essential. Bauer (2008) defines context as the physical space in which an artifact is
discovered in relation to other artifacts and features in the earth. As such, when an
archaeologist excavates a site, he or she documents the contextual information of where the
object was found and in what position. Evidently, this systematic way of proceeding is not
undertaken by looters, but rather erased. The result is that looted antiquities do not shed any
light on our joint past: they may be aesthetically pleasing, but from an archaeological point of
view, they are meaningless (Brodie, Doole & Watson, 2000; Chippindale, Gill, Salter &
Hamilton, 2001; Gerstenblith, 2009, 2007; Renfrew, 2000).
A third negative consequence of looting is its direct impact on communities who
suffer looting. Not only does looting deplete these communities of their heritage, but it also
deprives them of an economic resource. A further indirect consequence is the corruption of
officials handling permits or in charge of checking exit points (Brodie, Doole & Watson,
2000).
In recent decades, technological advances, such as bulldozers, mechanical diggers,
dynamite, metal detectors, power saws and drills, among others, have enabled widespread
looting. This improved technology has opened up areas which were previously out of reach
for looters. The erosion of political barriers and cheaper traveling costs has also allowed for
an easy access to the sites. These factors, combined with collectors who regard
archaeological or ethnographical objects as works of art, investment assets, and/or
fashionable decorations, help perpetuate this situation (Brodie, 2002).
The literature on archaeological looting and the illicit trade in antiquities concludes
that the demand of rich countries is the catalyst of looting. Archaeologists believe that looted
3

objects obtain a patina of legitimacy and then become revered objects in museums or private
collections, even though they have been illicitly excavated. The transformation is possible
due to the fact that antiquities surface in the legal market even though a large percentage of
them appear with no provenance whatsoever. In other words, the piece does not carry any
information of where it was excavated, its circumstances, or who owned it privately before
the last acquisition (Brodie, 2006; Chippindale & Gill, 2000; Elia, 2009; Gerstenblith, 2007).
As Brodie and Tubb (2002) state, the majority of antiquities, which lack demonstrable
provenance, have been looted. On the other hand, dealers, auctioneers, collectors, and
museum officials dispute these charges arguing that provenance can be lost in many ways
other than looting, such as the passing of time, war, migration, indifference, or even chance
finds (Ede, 1995, 1998; Mackenzie, 2005). Archaeologists blame this situation on dealers and
final consumers. The former voluntarily neglect to investigate the legitimate provenance of a
piece, and the latter’s appetite for antiquities drives the market and fires the illicit trade.
Through their collections they knowingly or unknowingly fund and underwrite networks of
looters (Renfrew, 2000).
The trafficking of looted antiquities creates a so-called “grey market,” which
Mackenzie and Yates (2016) state that it is being caused by the mixed streams of supply of
antiquities, the changing status of objects as they pass through trafficking networks, and the
neutralization and greying of the moral psychological process of engagement by buyers of
looted antiquities. In other words, white, licit antiquities mix with black, illicit antiquities to
form a grey market, which flourishes because of the art market’s tolerance of opaque
business practices. This tendency is encouraged by the fact that both looted and legal
antiquities both meet the consumers’ need for them to look a certain way aesthetically when
presented in the market (Alderman, 2012; Brodie, 2012; Mackenzie, 2011a; Mackenzie &
Greene, 2009; Proulx, 2011a, 2011b; Visconti, 2015).
4

Source countries have their own problems when it comes to curbing looting and the
subsequent antiquities trafficking. Most of these countries are low-, or lower-middle-income
countries, which implies that even though looting is not an economically sustainable activity,
it persists because it provides an income not only to individuals but also to communities
(Politis, 2002). Further, the lack of economic resources also undermines the protection of
archaeological sites. Even though these countries have naturalized antiquities by passing laws
that make them property of the state, their law enforcement agencies systematically fail to
enforce these laws. For most states, safeguarding archaeological heritage is not a high
priority.

2. The problem of quantifying looting
Measuring the prevalence and incidence of particular crimes is always fraught with
difficulties, and archaeological looting and the trafficking of illicit antiquities is not an
exception. This form of illicit activity presents particular forms of measurement problems,
when compared to other forms of crime. Clandestine excavations, the smuggling, and the
private sale or the mix of the objects in the legitimate market are particularly significant
stumbling blocks (Balcells, 2016; Mackenzie, 2011a). At present, we do not have a
systematic approach to collecting criminal statistics that would allow an accurate analysis of
looting (Brodie, Doole & Watson, 2000; Calvani, 2009).
To begin with, the illicit trade in cultural material is obviously clandestine. It is, in
consequence, difficult to quantify the damage caused worldwide by illegal excavation, to
estimate the size of the illicit market, or to assign value or structure to it. Further, as Conklin
(1994) stated, looting involves two types of sites: on one hand, those that are well known to
archaeologists as they have been excavated beforehand, and on the other, sites that
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archaeologists have not yet discovered. In both instances, it is difficult to assess the extent of
damage caused by looters.
There are very few facts and figures, and discussions often rely on anecdote and
assertion. Arriving at reliable estimates is difficult given that conventional crime statistics
generally obscure this type of offense. Recording practices for crimes against antiquities
vary across jurisdictions, and often categorize these crimes thefts, thereby lumping them
together with other property violations (Brodie, Doole & Watson, 2000; Mackenzie, 2011a).
INTERPOL collects annual estimates which include thefts from archaeological sites. Yet
once again, these numbers remain doubtful, as these crimes remain undetected or unreported,
and these numbers are not publicly accessible; moreover, national statistics frequently
disregard the type of object stolen, and only half of the organization’s members respond to
the questionnaire (Passas & Proulx, 2011).
In 1990, the Museums Association estimated the profits of the illicit antiquities trade
at between $225 million and $3 billion per year. In 2000, the Organized Crime Group from
the Metropolitan Police, in the United Kingdom, and Interpol estimated the profits of the
illicit antiquities trade at between $300 million and $6 billion per year. And the European
Association of Archaeologists estimated the profits of the illicit antiquities trade at around
$4.5 billion per year (Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2000). However, the reliability of
these figures is uncertain, as private sources tend to estimate (Gill & Chippindale, 2002).
Private initiatives to estimate the extent of the phenomenon have been more
successful. Particular scholars and their studies have focused on assessing the extent of
looting in source countries through archaeological field surveys and photographic records,
giving us continuing evidence of this crime (Brodie, Doole & Renfrew, 2001; Coggins,
1969). For example, Chinese officials estimated that in one year (1989-1990) 40,000 tombs
had been emptied (Anderson, 2002; Murphy, 1995; Platthy, 1993). By 2003, it was estimated
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that an additional 220,000 tombs had been pillaged (Beech, 2003). Alva (2001) estimated a
similar amount in Peru. Another source has been case studies of specific types of objects,
which have suggested that high proportions of them have a doubtful origin.
A third and more recent attempt to assess the extent of looting uses

auction

catalogues and import and export records, an innovative method which increases the accuracy
of the results: (Mackenzie, 2011a). Proulx (2011b) surveyed 2,350 archaeologists and
concluded that 98% of the participants had suffered looting in some capacity where they were
working. 68% of the participants personally encountered evidence of looting, and 24%
witnessed looters working in their site. In short, as Bator (1982) stated, as long as there is a
market for this kind of object, a substantial amount of looting will persist, no matter what
policies are enacted.
In recent years, there has been an emergence of case studies which take account of
regional differences in order to paint a more detailed picture of elements such as routes taken,
criminals involved, and how their perpetrated crimes have evolved. A qualitative approach is
needed to understand the dynamics of particular instances of cultural heritage crime in
diverse geographical areas. The researcher must understand the processes by which events
and actions take place, developing contextual understanding, facilitating interactivity between
researcher and participants, adopting an interpretative status, and maintaining design
flexibility.
Two examples of such regionally focused qualitative research in the field of cultural
heritage crime are Huffer and Chappell’s (2014) fieldwork to evaluate the illicit traffic of
antiquities in Vietnam and Davis and Mackenzie and Davis’ (2014) fieldwork to assess
temple looting in Cambodia. The former involved unstructured interviews and short formal
questionnaires among a pool of both Western and Vietnamese archaeologists, museologists,
and government officials in Hanoi. One advantage of this research is that it triangulates data
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sources, or, in other words, it uses several methods to measure the same phenomenon. In this
particular case, the researchers not only used qualitative work but also quantitative, through
the collection of surveys in order to figure out the spatial distribution of dealers, the endmarket collectors or the prices’ variations, among other issues (Huffer and Chappell, 2014).
Davis and Mackenzie and Davis’ (2014) fieldwork used as data interviews ranging from short
conversations to oral history discussions in order to assess the looting inflicted by the Khmer
Rouge in the period ranging from 1970 to 1998. These interviews all took place in temples
in Cambodia. During a second phase of research, the authors conducted interviews in
Bangkok with looters, traffickers, and dealers in order to track trafficking networks (Davis &
Mackenzie, 2014; Mackenzie & Davis, 2014).
Recently, scholars have been supporting programs intended to research and map
unknown archaeological sites through the use of technology, such as satellites and computer
analysis of aerial images. For example, one piece of research used Google Earth imagery to
investigate site looting in Jordan; the authors concluded that Google Earth is a tool well
suited to the task (Contreras & Brodie, 2010a, 2010b; Kennedy & Bewley, 2009; Parcak,
2009).
In conclusion, data about archaeological looting reveal that the illicit trade in
antiquities is highly lucrative. This is due, in part, to the fact that cultural heritage is a nonrenewable resource, as the object keeps circulating openly in the art market for many years
while generating money in transaction after transaction. Although this trade is lucrative for
many, the community where the artifact was found is hurt, as looting severely undermines the
community’s economic base, not to mention that purchasing these pieces is not a
humanitarian act (Brodie, Doole & Watson, 2000).

3. The problem of archaeological looting in Italy
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The present research project focuses specifically on the Italian case concerning the looting of
antiquities, as it is one of the most paradigmatic cases of source countries in the field of
looted antiquities. Italy, a vast open-air museum and traditionally one of the most prolific
countries for the art market, is, logically, exposed to several forms of attacks towards its
cultural heritage. The typology of crimes is vast: commissioned thefts, fakes and forgeries,
vandalism, or money laundering through the purchase of art, among others.
Looting mostly affects Italy’s ancient heritage, the history of so many stable or
nomadic tribes and civilizations. Because the traffic of looted antiquities relies on a country’s
richness in its cultural heritage, not all source countries are classified by the World Health
Organization as low- or lower-middle-income. As Lazrus (2002) stated, Italy is a G7 country,
and as a consequence, has a decent standard of living (see also Borodkin, 1995). As a
consequence of Italian archaeological heritage being one of the richest in the world,
clandestine excavations have been one of the greatest crime-related problems that afflict Italy
(Nistri, 2008).
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FIGURE 2. An illegal excavation perpetrated by tombaroli at the
necropolis of Cerveteri.
Source: the author (2017)
Illicit excavations were initially deemed a small part of the more dangerous
phenomenon of illicit trafficking of antiquities. The phenomenon has increased since the
1970s, alarming not only archaeologists, who are unable to control the situation, but also the
institutions in charge of safeguarding Italy’s cultural heritage.
The circuit of clandestine looting is complex and varies according to the geographical
area affected. Tomb raiding is most intense in several of the well-known Greek and Etruscan
provinces, such as, Sicily, Puglia, Sardinia, Etruria, Lazio, Basilicata and Campania. These
regions abound in necropolises, like the one of Cerveteri, in the province of Lazio, near
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Rome. The rich heritage of the old Caere, underneath Cerveteri, makes this archaeological
site a preferred place for tombaroli. Important tomb raiders have worked here for centuries,
and, of course, have earned the attention of Italian officials from both the Police and the
Ministry of Culture. Archaeological sites like Cerveteri are being destroyed at an alarming
rate (Silver, 2009).
Given the vast proportion of cultural heritage in Italy, the specific harm of illicit
archaeological diggings comes from the tomb raiders’ hastiness in retrieving the artifacts
from the tombs and their complete disregard for preserving the archaeological context and the
tomb and the goods within (Iannizzotto, 2006). As grave robbers’ excavations are conducted
in a hasty manner that neglects scientific methods, they are particularly destructive. As tomb
raiders only prioritize the market value of the piece, they inevitably destroy the morphology
of the site and make it difficult for scholars to interpret. The items found and removed
without scientific criterion lose all the information that is derived primarily from the original
context.
In some instances, the illegal excavation becomes particularly devastating. This
occurs, for instance, when, instead of using their traditional techniques, such as the pin, spade
and pickaxe, tombaroli use bulldozers or chainsaws to pull out the frescoes (Comando
Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale, 2008). Over the past century, tombaroli have
destroyed all archaeological evidence of the Etruscan history (Silver, 2009). A relatively
recent trend is to deliberately break the findings into pieces and release them onto the market
in a controlled manner over time to increase sale value (Isman, 2009a).

4. An evolution of the tombarolo through the centuries
It has been stated that there is no criminological literature on the figure of the tombarolo. The
only accounts available in the existing literature come from the field of archaeology,
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journalistic accounts, official reports from Italian authorities, and a few autobiographies.
Together, they form a fragmented picture of this phenomenon, filled with contradictions.
However, by synthesizing the existing literature into a historiographical account, particular
historical stages regarding the evolution of tombaroli can be found. Tracing the evolution of
this collective sheds light on their contemporary activities.

4.1. Tombaroli in ancient times
There are accounts of the illicit activities of tombaroli since the Roman Empire, as Roman
law already condemned this activity. The earliest traces of legislation against tombaroli,
according to Hamblin (1970), are the laws passed in the times of Vespasian in the first
century AD and Constantine in the fourth century AD. The term tombaroli was not yet
created and looters were called “seekers” instead. These seekers turned their attention to the
same objects that entice most of today’s tombaroli: Etruscan tombs. In fact, a study of
seekers does not reveal many differences involving motives and goals between historical
seekers and today’s Italian looters. In both cases, their primary concern was to obtain gold
and other valuable pieces that were put in the more important tombs as a token of the nobility
of the deceased.
Tagliaferri and Rupi Paci (1992) claim that in the zone of Vulci, one can trace the
illicit diggings of Etruscan tombs to the second and first centuries BC. The authors even think
that the Etruscans may themselves have raided the tombs of their predecessors. There is,
however, no record of Romans raiding tombs dated beyond the 7th century, and it must be
mentioned that Romans did not raid all the available tombs for one reason: they did not have
the necessary means to find them. As such, Romans went straight to the visible tombs, the
ones which, most of the time, had a visible marker.

12

According to Tagliaferri and Rupi Paci (1992), only these markers warned Roman
looters that the tomb beneath was important, and therefore, worth raiding. In order to do so,
seekers started digging, and once they reached the entrance of the tomb, they created a tiny
hole no bigger than 40 cm in diameter and used children to get inside, who only had the task
of taking the valuables, including gold, silver, and bronze. Curiously, the valuable ceramics
or frescoes that nowadays constitute the core of the findings of tombaroli were discarded:
usually, Romans tended to smash them against a corner of the tomb. Then, the grave was
earthed again with the marker buried inside. In fact, Tagliaferri (1992) himself, as a noted
tombarolo, has found many tombs that Romans had pillaged centuries before him. So, as the
tomb raider indicates , it is possible that a tomb robbed by his gang had been entered three
times over the centuries. However, an unopened tomb can be easily spotted when, logically,
all objects are intact.
For centuries, farmers and shepherds would use both the tombs and Etruscan caves as
shelters for themselves and their flocks or as deposits for harvests. Also floods, long before
modern agricultural vehicles existed, had washed tombs away, leveling the lands and
bringing out a lot of waste ceramic. As most field workers were indifferent about these
fragments , urns and Etruscan vases were used as containers or troughs. But centuries later,
everything would change.

4.2. Tombaroli in modern times
The next testimonies of tomb raiding, in the nineteenth century, did not come from tombaroli
themselves but from travelers such as William Hamilton and George Dennis. This century
marked the renaissance of archaeological looting, a phenomenon that continues today. These
gentlemen visited the states that today make up unified Italy as important stops in the grand
tours, or travels, that the nobility engaged in to educate themselves in the art and history of
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continental Europe. Hamilton and Dennis gave first person accounts of the activities of the
tombaroli (Dennis, 1848; Mead, 2007).
The first to be interested in Etruscan tombs beyond tomb robbers and farmers were, in
modern times, scholars and antiquarians who began these activities for fun and love of the
ancients, which led them to collect everything they could find. Things changed, however, in
the early decades of the nineteenth century, when a real “grave fever” exploded in all its
virulence. This was not very contagious, however, if judged by the historical facts. Those to
be “infected” were almost exclusively rich aristocrats and large landowners, who essentially
devoted themselves to excavations precisely because they were the ones who could afford to
do so; the ones who sought to become more cultured; and also, because as landowners, they
owned the estates which were beginning to become the important necropolises of today.
Nobles and aristocrats were not always erudite intellectuals, and yet they planned,
organized and managed the predation of the archaeological riches of Italy. For nearly a
century, they had the dubious right of exclusive excavation. The name of the most famous
and documented landowner might sound familiar to the reader: Lucien Bonaparte, who
eventually would be nicknamed “the Prince of grave robbers.” Lucien Bonaparte was the
brother of emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, a man with a strong personality and a man of his
time, the Enlightenment, as he was a politician, a minister, an ambassador, a writer, a poet, an
archaeologist, and a lawyer.
Banned to Italy after quarrels with his brother due to a marriage, Lucien Bonaparte
became, according to George Dennis’ (1848) Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria, a tomb raider
in: the spring of 1828, when the vault of a tomb near the castle of Vulci collapsed under the
weight of an ox, revealing the presence of a few ceramic fragments. Dennis (1848)
documents how Bonaparte, in a few weeks, systematically sifted an area of about two
hectares bringing to light more than two thousand artifacts.
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Possibly (the sources are scarce) Bonaparte should be credited with the dubious merit
of having sensed the cultural value and, above all, the economic potential of the still
developing market in antiquities. Naturally, many of these artifacts ended up abroad, but this
was not yet illegal. Bonaparte immediately showed a passion for painted vases. In fact,
Dennis (1848) recalls Bonaparte ordering the superintendent who had assumed the direction
of the excavations to recover even the smallest fragment. The recovered fragments were then
cleverly recomposed and, if possible, integrated. The vessels so reconstituted then ended up
on the market, especially in European cities where these items were highly valued.
This practice undoubtedly had a positive impact. It contributed to the restoration and
preservation of a large amount of high-quality parts that would otherwise have been lost.
Further, Bonaparte favored the training of a new class of craftsmen and pottery restorers, the
same class that would later produce numerous fakes and imitations. However, Bonaparte was
not driven by an interest in archaeological preservation. He decreed the destruction of crude
pottery to raise prices by reducing the supply of antiquities.
Vulci, being one of the less sacked necropolises in ancient times, became a very
important site to Bonaparte, until his death in 1840. His work on Vulci was deemed a
success, given that he discovered important burial grounds such as the ones known as the
Cuccumella and Cuccumelletta. However, Bonaparte missed the discovery of what is thought
to be one of the most famous sites of all Etruria, the tomb François, discovered in 1857 on the
property of the Torlonia family by the French archaeologist Alexandre François. Bonaparte
has been labeled by history as a predator of graves, though other dealers and collectors follow
his example today. Bonaparte’s love for antiquities was genuine, and not surprisingly, he
was the greatest collector of his time. Inadvertently, Bonaparte would be a key player that
would boost this (yet to be) illicit trade into modern times, as will be seen.
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After Bonaparte’s death, the excavations were

continued by none other than

Bonaparte’s widow, Alexandrina de Bleschamps, who witnesses such as Dennis (1848)
describe ruling the sites with military precision with the goal of obtaining maximum profits
from archaeological findings. When Dennis visited Vulci in 1842, Bonaparte had been dead
for a couple of years, but the industry of the excavations was in its full swing, under the
guidance of de Bleschamps.
Dennis witnessed Bonaparte’s expeditious and brutal methods: a team of diggers
working under the supervision of a thug armed with a rifle, ready to shoot in the unlikely
event that some pieces were stolen. The tomb was opened and quickly scoured. Each
painting fragment was collected and stored carefully in a basket, and the remaining pottery
was systematically destroyed , after which the tomb was closed again and buried, and the
workers passed to the next. An enlightened Dennis, struck by so much brutal insensitivity
towards such ancient historical and artistic pieces, asked one of the directors of the work if he
could have one of those valueless jars as a token. His request was denied, as de Bleschamps
ordered that none of the findings were to be given to anyone, but especially jewels, which she
loved to wear at formal dinners.
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FIGURE 3. Discarded piece of pottery by tombaroli at the necropolis of Cerveteri.
Source: the author (2017)
Dennis also visited the castle of Musignano, home of the princess, where her son
welcomed him (according to the traveler, he was also apparently involved in the family
business), and where the assembly line of the industry of the excavations had its end. The
house and garden were invaded by a large number of exhibits in bulk. Dennis could see the
number of vessels ready to be exported and a restorer at work in the delicate task of
reassembling the fragments. Similar scenes can be seen today in warehouses in the free ports
of Switzerland, where dealers take advantage of the established tax system to store and sell
their pieces. According to Dennis (1848), the excavations were carried out during breaks in
the agricultural work.
Until today there has been no way to determine the number of raided tombs, which
some estimates situate in the thousands. Most of the pieces found at Vulci that can be seen in
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archaeological museums around the world were improperly excavated in the late seventeenth
century and then passed on to other family members as heirlooms. This particular
phenomenon would continue in the nineteenth century. As Rupi Paci (1992) states, every
historical epoch has their tomb raiders. Before the Italian unification that began in 1815 and
finished in 1871, the phenomenon kept happening. Although land ownership was altered after
Italy’s unification, this change did not affect the activity of tombaroli at all.

4.3. Tombaroli during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
An important turning point during the twentieth century was Mussolini’s 1939 law that made
every archaeological find the property of the Italian state. The dictator realized the problem
of looting, even though it furnished both international institutions and private collections
(Iannizzotto, 2006). After that moment, looting tombs implied stealing property that belonged
to the Italian state. In the period after World War II (1945-1970), local farmers cultivating the
fields, known as agricoltori del posto, mostly looted tombs as a way of gaining a modest
income to supplement their poor lifestyle, taking the occasional findings and hiding them
while waiting for prospective buyers (Silver, 2009). Also, during quiet periods, the farmers
prospected the terrain for likely places in which to dig (Hamblin, 1970).
However, over the decades that led to the 1970s, the activities of tombaroli gradually
intensified. This period from approximately 1970 to 2005 is known as the grand
archaeological raid, or grande razzia. From that particular time frame onwards, illicit
excavations became a real industry. This was the most damaging period, as tombaroli became
full-time looters and professionals (Graeppler & Mazzei, 1996). Within the supply side,
tombaroli were the first step in a long chain that involved middlemen, seasoned professionals
in the rules of the black market, and, as such, the reference for sale and export abroad.
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Middlemen know the rules of the market, and as such they are able to guess the most
favorable economic moments before entering the pieces into commercialization.
The next stage concerned the marketing of the piece, a sale organized through local
representatives, who collected the product until the traffickers took it abroad. In Italy not all
the smugglers have access to the international market. In fact, only a few are able to enter this
third stage of activity, as it requires access to financial resources and international contacts.
The last part of the supply chain involved art dealers, individual collectors, and experts in
foreign markets who are usually the receivers of stolen property (Nistri, 2011). Pastore
(2001) added the involuntary and inadvertent aid of archaeologists: archaeologists may assist
this trade by offering their expertise to art traders and private collectors, which increases the
market value of these items. Archaeologists may also acquire ancient works of art on behalf
of a museum or university collections without asking for their documents of origin, and they
may also create a pedigree for objects of unknown provenance, enabling these piece to
acquire a new and legitimate status.
Finally, the looted antiquities would pass from the hands of tombaroli to those of
fences and traffickers, the two groups which represented the highest segment of this illicit
industry. According to the Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale (2008), these
subjects are particularly well-educated and well-placed in both the national and international
art market. They have contacts with similar criminal figures abroad, an operational network
in strategic cities and nations for the art market, with branches also in other continents. After
creating false certifications of legitimacy, these intermediaries used to sell the stolen goods,
following the trends and preferences of the art market and adapting to its demands.
Isman (2009a) has pointed to several factors that led to the steep rise of the tombaroli
during the third phase. These include the weakness of the laws (for example, slow judicial
processes, difficulty noticing the notitia criminis, difficulty proving the crime, or low
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sanctions, among others) that make it unlikely that a tombarolo will be sentenced to prison,
the weakness of the public protection of cultural heritage in Italy, budgetary issues, and the
difficulty of controlling the territory by the Italian police forces. Regarding this last point,
Silver (2009) states how “It was no wonder that the Italian police didn’t have the time or
resources to crack down on every tomb raider or smuggler” (p. 103). The majority of
archaeological objects on the market come from areas where professional illicit excavators
have been proven to operate (Isman, 2009a).
Watson and Todeschini (2007), in their investigations, noted that some tombaroli
received regular salaries rather than being paid only for their discoveries. Pastore (2001)
states how

Illicit excavations… have now increased to such levels as to become a major problem,
not only for archaeology but also for those institutions responsible for its safeguard.
In fact, during the last few years, looting… has grown to such an extent that
archaeologists are not able to control the situation (p. 155).

Another radical change from the previous phase involved the use of more aggressive,
mechanical instruments, such as probes, canisters, hoes, electric saws, and spades (Pastore,
2001). Tombaroli, according to Nistri (2011), work in groups and use heavy machinery. They
set up local collection centers that are controlled by one or more individuals, who in turn
report to a local collector.
What happened to tombaroli after the great raid? Who are the tombaroli that have
been interviewed in this research project? The great raid is over but the phenomenon, albeit
mutated, still persists. Nowadays, most of the looters work in groups by themselves, without
being part of a larger trafficking spectrum, and the looter-client relationship is more hidden
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(and thus safer), now that the major players have been identified and the demand has been
severely targeted. The transactions are local, from Italian looters to Italian clients. Clients are
less important than the big museums and international collectors of the past, but they still
make the action of looters possible, which means more sites keep being damaged (Isman,
2009a).
Tombaroli still heavily loot certain geographical areas of Italy, but without doubt, the
conditions that enabled the great raid have ended. While there still likely remain a large
amount of unexcavated archaeological items, there is no longer space for complex chains of
subjects with specialized roles from supply to demand (De Rita, 2009). Yet who knows
whether there will be another great raid in the future?

5. The difficulties of curbing looting in Italy
In Italy there are five police forces: Polizia di Stato, Arma dei Carabinieri, Guardia di
Finanza, Polizia Penitenziaria and Corpo Forestale dello Stato, even though the last two only
operate in the field of corrections and forests, respectively. The Minister of the Interior
coordinates all of them (Polizia di Stato, 2013). The two forces that are mostly involved in
preventing and detecting archaeological looting are the Carabinieri and the Financial Police
(Guardia di Finanza), as both law enforcement agencies have special divisions devoted to
safeguarding cultural heritage (Iannizzotto, 2000, 2006; Rush and Benedettini Millington,
2015).
The general rule is that archaeological research is reserved only for the Ministry of
Culture, which can choose to make a concession on sites to third parties. Random discoveries
must be communicated to the Ministry in no less than twenty-four hours, and the finder
retains a portion that can reach half of the value of the discovery. When it comes to
exportations of archaeological items, once again, the State needs to give permission. The rest
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of cases are all under the domain of criminal law, with the exception, due to the application
of the principle of retroactivity, of findings before 1902.
In accordance with Italian criminal law, anybody who takes possession of any
archaeological material in a clandestine excavation site can be charged with the relevant
crime, and therefore be punished according to the regulation on the protection of cultural
artifacts according to Art. 176 of Decree No. 42/2004. Purchasers of these items can be
charged with the reception of stolen goods (Art. 648 of the Italian Penal Code) or the
acquisition of objects of uncertain provenance (Art. 712 of the Italian Penal Code).
However, Iannizzotto (2006), Isman (2009a) and Pastore (2001) point out that weak
legislation has perpetuated this activity. Specifically, Isman (2009a) refers to several factors
contributing to the survival of this form of crime. To begin with, the punishment is too light
compared to other forms of trafficking prohibited by the Italian criminal code. The author
here refers to the so-called pene editali, or low punishments, as the new legislation does not
consider aggravating circumstances. Also, the entire judicial process is so slow that
sometimes prescription becomes an advantage for the accused. The difficulty of determining
the notitia criminis (when and where the crime happened), and, therefore of linking the crime
to an accused, makes proving the crime practically impossible.
Prosecutors in this field like Paolo Giorgio Ferri (2014) claim that the law often
complicates their task. For decades courts were not prepared to deal with archaeological
looting, due to its specificity and exceptionality, but criminals rapidly adapt to this form of
crime. The lack of communication between all the actors within the Italian criminal justice
system makes their task more difficult. As a result, tombaroli rarely end up in prison.
Iannizzotto (2000; 2006) has studied the application of the famous law Bottai of 1939 (law
number 1089/1939) and determined that in its 65 years of history only 5,000 sentences have
addressed the topic.
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Despite their efforts, law enforcement agencies will always have limited control over
Italy’s rural areas, according to Isman (2009a). Nistri, interviewed by Isman (2009a), states
how even though police efforts have increased, they still faced key limitations. Police
normally perform controls periodically, using helicopters, cars, horses, and walking.
According to the Carabinieri, officials frequently patrol the tombaroli’s favorite spots, but
patrolling entire fields all the time is virtually impossible. As Nistri claims, tombaroli are at
home in the fields.
A final factor stated by Isman (2009a) is the weakness of the Italian state to protect
the country’s cultural heritage. To begin with, just as the police have been unable to protect
archaeological sites in a country like Italy, so has the Ministry of Culture. Isman claims that
because Italian museums were mostly closed to the public, safeguarding Italy’s cultural
heritage was a low priority for the public..
These factors impact on the tutelage of cultural heritage, as citizens believe that the
job of safeguarding archaeological areas belongs merely to the relevant institutions, a belief
that generates a culture of impunity according to Iannizzotto (2006). The same author links
the lack of interest of public opinion in the poor legislative techniques provided to curb this
phenomenon.
In conclusion, archaeological looting is a serious problem for Italy. As Isman (2009a)
puts it, it is a red thread that ties together all the characters in play. These objects are
excavated by non-professional hands from tombaroli, to middlemen, to the big traffickers
who are distributed over different geographical areas; and then onto famous international art
dealers, until they reach the museums and private collections. This trade has obviously
contributed to the boom of the art market in the last thirty years. Italy, unwillingly, has
contributed to this phenomenon with incredible archaeological pieces that by law belong to
the Italian state and to the Italian people, as they make up its cultural heritage.
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6. The prevalence of looting in Italy
The illicit excavation of Italian archaeological sites is an offense that is difficult to quantify,
as law enforcement cannot know exactly what and how many works are looted annually. The
Italian criminal justice system has a rough idea of the numerous recoveries that are carried
out by

the police, but these discoveries represent only the tip of the iceberg. The

phenomenon is far reaching, given that many looted artifacts have been commissioned or
acquired both on Italian soil and in foreign countries by wealthy collectors, auction houses,
and museums that are particularly receptive to Italian goods of dubious origin.
As early as 1962 a survey of a single Etruscan cemetery showed that 400 out of 550
tombs had been looted since the end of World War II (Lerici, 1962). Between 1970 and 1996
the Italian police recovered more than 300,000 antiquities from clandestine excavations.
These, however, are thought to be only a portion of the total (Isman, 2009a). This author
estimates that 80% of all Roman and Etruscan pieces have a clandestine provenance, and that
in the last forty years, 800,000 items have been found. The fact that clandestine excavations
of sites is not a crime which is easily quantified, as it is impossible to pinpoint the exact
number or relics or the procedure employed to remove them is the cause of unreliable data.
However, a general idea of the estimates can be reached through the official statistics
recorded by the Carabinieri and other Italian law enforcement agencies. According to all of
them, official data reports a gradual decrease in the number of clandestine excavations that
have been discovered. The numbers have dwindled from a peak of more than one thousand
per year during the 1970s and 1980s, to 103 in 2008 (Nistri, 2011). Isman (2009a) thought
that the level of tomb raiding in the necropolis of Cerveteri diminished in 2007 from eighteen
tombs per night to one; today, far from being an international trade, tombaroli only devote
themselves to local clients.
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According to official statistics, the trend of illicit diggings has been diminishing for
the last ten years, from 216 cases detected in 2006 to 58 in 2016 (as seen in the figure below),
with occasional increases (Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). The 2008 report highlights a particularly major reduction in
illicit diggings, a drop to 161 cases, or -76%; yet it also shows a slight but significant increase
of counter activity in terms of both persons pursued before judicial authorities and of the
variety of typologies of the crimes prosecuted (Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio
Culturale, 2008; Manacorda, 2011).
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FIGURE 4. Illegal excavations detected in Italy from 2006 to 2016.
Source: the author, after Carabinieri (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017)
However, there has been no single analysis of the motives for the decline in tomb
raiding from 2006 to the present, beyond the report on criminal activity in 2011 by the
Carabinieri (2012), which claims as a cause of the descent their new operational deployments
in archaeological zones in half-year periods of controlling and monitoring with the aid of
several public institutions.
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There are several problems with this explanation of the decline. First, it has been
stated how the extent of this illicit activity is difficult to measure. Second, the tombaroli still
have the advantage of knowing the terrain well. Third, all agents engaged in stopping these
crimes acknowledge there are archaeological zones still to be discovered. Finally,
prosecutions are scarce and sentences are even scarcer. As such, extensively investigated
tombaroli still keep operating. In sum, decline is real, but there are serious problems
remaining despite the decline.
The most looted areas lie in Sicily and the region of Campania. There is a trend
tending to privilege a national market for the looted antiquities; the illicit export of these
items is reserved for only the most valuable goods. The most trafficked archaeological goods
are sculptures, architectonic elements, and frescoes. In an interview with Isman (2009),
Maurizio Fiorilli, a state attorney, states that 80% of Etruscan and Roman items in the market
have been looted.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that scholars outside the criminal justice system have
produced unofficial data concerning looted antiquities in Italy. Elia (2001), referring to
Apulian red-figured vases, stated how it is clear that several thousands, even tens of
thousands, of ancient tombs have been plundered to obtain the more than 13,600 vases that
exist throughout the world and were recovered in a non-archaeological manner. David Gill
and Christopher Chippindale (1993) wrote an article in the American Journal of Archaeology
reporting on some classical collections and exhibitions and their catalogues. Investigating
three auction houses’ seasons both in New York and London (December 1994, May 1997,
and July 1997), they tried to assess the proportion of antiquities being sold without a declared
history recording where and when they were excavated and who the archaeologist was. The
percentage of illicitly excavated antiquities ranges from 98 percent to 73 percent, depending
on the researched period. They also examined five well-known collections and attempted to
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trace every one of the 569 objects; they found that only 101 of them (18 percent) had a
history.
Likewise, Lobay (2009), in a study devoted to assess archaeological looting in the
center of Italy and the illicit export of these items to the United States, also used the
catalogues of auction houses as data sources. The study investigated, on one hand, the area
involving the provinces of Emilia Romagna, Le Marche, Lazio, Toscana, and Umbria; and on
the other hand, the activity of auction houses in two timeframes: 1997 to 2000 and 2001 to
2005. These years were selected so as to empirically value the implementation of the bilateral
agreement between Italy and the United States that limits the importation of particular
cultural heritage goods to America. Departing from the hypotheses that, first, the treaty
should reduce the dimensions of the market in illicit antiquities through a demand for greater
information on the provenance of the piece, and second, an increase in the price of the items
due to a limited availability of antiquities, the analysis of data concluded that the former
hypothesis was accurate while the latter was not. Other researchers such as Beltrametti
(2013), however, concluded that bilateral agreements achieved only some small results
regarding the reduction of illicit exports of looted antiquities.

7. Purpose and plan of the dissertation
As seen in the previous sections, tomb raiding and the subsequent traffic of illicitly obtained
antiquities is a real problem, with an alarming (albeit difficult to assess) prevalence. Existing
research indicates the grave problem of mass destruction of archaeological sites in Italy by
groups of tombaroli or looters of archaeological heritage. Beyond this destruction of
archaeological sites, tombaroli also destroy archaeological scientific evidence (by removing
it from the context where the item was found), information about provenance (the collecting
history of the item), and contribute to a grey market in the illicit trafficking of these pieces.
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The overall purpose of this dissertation is to understand contemporary Italian tomb
raiding from a criminological perspective. This dissertation is both descriptive and
exploratory as it investigates a subject that has been addressed mostly by archaeologists but
has received no attention whatsoever by criminologists (it is therefore important to uncover
this potentially important crime).
A qualitative angle and multi-data gathering techniques suit these two purposes
(Kraska & Neumann, 2008). These exploratory and descriptive strategies are also justified
not only for obtaining an assessment of the problem of archaeological looting in Italy (thus
contributing to an existing body of literature on the topic) but also to allow further
criminological research of the problem through the formulation of more precise questions
that future studies can answer.
This chapter introduced the context, the problem that will be investigated, and the
purpose of research. Chapter two provides a systematic, topic-specific literature review on
the figure of the tombarolo, through the systematic identification, location, and analysis of
multiple materials, including books, book chapters, articles, reviews, monographs,
dissertations, research reports, and media from several countries and in several languages, in
order to provide a clear and balanced picture of studied concepts, theories, and data, with the
purpose of representing the sum of current knowledge on the subject. Chapter two also
provides the theoretical framework used in this research project.
Chapter three presents the methods employed in this dissertation. As such, both the
general and specific research questions, and the design and the collection of data will be
explained. More precisely, the chapter will describe the rationale for the research approach,
the research sample and the population from which it was drawn, the type of information
needed in order to answer the research questions, the design of the study and the methods
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used to gather data, ethical considerations, issues of trustworthiness, and limitations of the
study and the attempts to address those.
Chapters four and five deal with the analysis of data and the reporting of findings on
both research questions from the interview transcripts, documentary sources and derived
qualitative comments, and field notes observations. Each chapter will synthesize all data
sources and insights, turning them into an interpretation that is both holistic and integrated
through the summation of all collected data in a dependable and accurate manner. These two
chapters also deconstruct and interpret the findings, again, on both research questions,
digging into the results in order to develop some understanding of them, examining deeper
meanings and providing interpretative insights into the findings, and integrating them with
the literature, research, and practice. Chapter six ends this project by drawing conclusions
and presents actionable policy recommendations.

8. Conclusions
The case of Giacomo Medici and the organogram drawn by Pasquale Camera shown at the
beginning of the chapter served to illustrate the severity and the magnitude of the problem of
archaeological looting in Italy during the great raid, the moment when tombaroli worked
alongside dealers and traffickers to supply pieces worldwide to important, wealthy clients.
Many years have passed since the Medici affaire, and the case is still deemed a milestone in
the field, precisely because it illustrates so well several problems, including why
archaeological knowledge is important, how looters prey on archaeological items, the
problem of assessing the prevalence and incidence of looting, and how this particular crime
affects Italy’s cultural heritage.
The chapter also has explained how despite the end of the great raid, tombaroli keep
looting archaeological sites. More importantly, it has introduced the main figure that will be
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researched, the tombaroli, which despite being dealt with in detail by other disciplines and
the press, have not been empirically studied by criminologists. This chapter has also
introduced the purpose and plan of the present dissertation. As this chapter has introduced the
problem of archaeological looting in Italy, it is time to turn the attention towards what the
literature states about the perpetrators of this crime: the tombaroli.
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CHAPTER 2
I SEGRETI DI UN TOMBAROLO:2
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON TOMBAROLI AND
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE DISSERTATION

If we [archaeologists] do not protest when popular articles are written, illustrating someone
wrapped in gold finds or suggesting where to go on a treasure hunt, then we silently condone
these portrayals of our activities.
(Lazrus, 1995)

Even though nowadays there is a small repertoire of books and articles written by
criminologists in the field of art/cultural property crime, empirical research still needs to be
done across many parameters to document the magnitude, nature and impact of this form of
crime. If chapter one introduced the reader to the broad topic of contemporary Italian tomb
raiding, the purpose of the present chapter is to systematically review the available literature
on tombaroli with the intention of assessing the extent to which existing research clarifies the
criminal phenomenon of tombaroli; of identifying gaps and inconsistencies in the literature;
and in the end, of describing directions for future research within this doctoral dissertation. In
sync with the scope of the dissertation, the present systematic literature review refers solely
to the Italian problem of archaeological looting, narrowing its focus on the figure of
tombaroli.

2

The secrets of a tomb raider.
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1. Methods concerning the compilation of articles
A systematic review of literature on Italian looters has never been conducted beforehand, and
thus this is the first of its kind. Objective, unbiased, and explicit inclusion and exclusion
criteria for the acceptance of studies were established a priori. This step was intended not
only to reduce the risk of bias but also to allow rapid reassessment should the rationale for
exclusion of one or more studies be called into question. They also serve to ensure the quality
and similarity of included studies and define the boundaries of the review (Crowther et al.,
2010). Inclusion and exclusion criteria were based on common items such as the research
topic, but also the definition of terms, participants, and time frame. As such, studies that met
the inclusion criteria and missed the exclusion criteria were included.
In selecting which academic articles needed to be included in the present systematic
literature review, the pieces had to meet the following criteria, which were applied to all
titles, abstracts, and full manuscripts:

•

Studies dealing with the topic of archaeological looting in Italy or studies dealing
with looting on a global scale where Italy and tombaroli were used as an example.
The justification of the present inclusive item is the fact that much of the literature
based on looting of archaeological sites uses many examples of different
geographical areas worldwide, although between them, these cases cannot be
extrapolated. Therefore, the literature has centered on Italy and Italian looters;

•

Studies dealing with the topic of tombaroli to a large degree. Many articles only
use tombaroli sporadically and do not bring any new information on their
activities. Therefore,

articles that only mentioned tombaroli were discarded.

Included articles had either to deal with the topic of tombaroli extensively and/or
to describe their activities;
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•

Published or unpublished books, book chapters, journal articles, doctoral
dissertations and master theses, government reports, and conference presentations
that have been written in English, Italian, French, and Spanish. The justification
for this inclusion criterion is the fact that due to the scarcity of existing literature,
a wide net was cast to include serious articles in order to maximize and enrich the
image of what has been written about tombaroli. Pieces of news that dealt with the
topic but just brought a one-time and brief description of the case, editorials, front
matters, opinions, book reviews, fictional accounts in novels, or blog posts,
among others, were excluded for their lack of empirical value. A final motive for
post facto exclusion were the few instances where either the book could not be
found (the only instance being Carlo Lerici’s [1962] Italia Sepolta, one of the first
studies done on the level of destruction in Italian archaeological sites carried out
in the early sixties of last century, yet unavailable at the moment of conducting the
systematic literature review) or it was written in a language that complicated the
assessment of both the sensitivity and specificity of the item (such as books that
were written in German, which due to the lack of electronic support, the
translation process could have been very complicated).

It is worth mentioning the usage of biographies of tombaroli, as a source. These are important
sources provided one purges the justificatory and self-aggrandizing rhetoric or takes it into
account and accepts it within the frame of reliability.
A systematic literature search was then performed to identify published and
unpublished studies that have dealt with the topic of archaeological looting in Italy conducted
by tombaroli. A careful planning of search terms helped locate as many potential relevant
articles to be included: the most important search terms included were tombarolo and
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tombaroli. Synonyms such as tomb raiding, tomb raider, looter, verbal forms such as looted,
raided, a narrow term such as Italy and Italian, and toponyms (Sicily, Sicilian, Puglia,
Apulian, among others) produced in all instances similar, if not the same, results, due to the
lack of available literature. Also, wildcard symbols were used to stand-in for one character,
which varied depending on the database. A strength of this literature review is that it has been
conducted in several languages, mostly English and Italian, but also French and Spanish.
The search was conducted in multiple electronic bibliographic databases, clustered
around transversal topics that could be relevant to the issue of tomb raiding in Italy. An
exhaustive search included topics such as criminology and criminal justice (ProQuest
Criminal Justice Database), political and social sciences (JSTOR, Scopus, Web of Science,
ProQuest Political Science Database), law (JSTOR, Academic, HeinOnline), psychology
(ProQuest Psychology Database) and human sciences with special reference to the arts and
archaeology (JSTOR, ProQuest Periodicals Index Online). It must be noted that some of the
electronic databases were transversal and covered a variety of fields, such as JSTOR or
ProQuest Periodicals Index Online. The only database that was entirely excluded due to
results was LexisNexis. Even though LexisNexis also has law articles, in the present case
searches only produced pieces of news as results, which is an exclusion criterion.
The searches covered titles, abstracts and the full text of the articles. The following
table shows the number of records identified through searches in the identification phase,
where no quality check was performed at this stage. The resulting number of documents
includes repetitions of the articles between search engines.
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TABLE 1 Number of results per electronic database
Range of years covered by search: 1966-2015

Database

Number of resulting documents

Web of Science

4

Scopus

6

JSTOR

23

HeinOnline

55

ProQuest Criminal Justice Database

1

ProQuest Psychology Database

1

ProQuest Political Science Database

4

ProQuest Periodical Index Online

12

Total number of resulting documents

107

SOURCE: the author.

Finally, other methods related to the location of published work included reading the
reference section of works suitable for inclusion and also consulting privately owned works,
in order to locate both content related to tombaroli and references. This manual search
produced twenty-two works.
In order to avoid publication bias, defined as the tendency for the availability of
published research to depend on the results (Begg, 1994; Cooper, 2003; Rosenthal, 1979;
Vevea & Woods, 2005), which poses an important threat to both the validity and the
conclusions of the systematic literature review, the search also included unpublished work.
The literature about methods has sometimes deemed unpublished research as works of lesser
quality. However, it is now an accepted practice in rigorous systematic literature reviews to
include both published and unpublished works (Cooper, 2003; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
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With the goal of finding unpublished work, first, two researchers doing work on the
issue of tombaroli (one of them a sociologist and archaeologist and the other an
archaeologist) were contacted in order to locate their own work or forthcoming publications.
There were no new results. The researchers could not point to relevant pieces that were not
already included in the systematic literature review. Another method referred to locating
“grey literature” (that is, literature produced in electronic or print format not controlled by
commercial publishers, such as doctoral dissertations, working papers, conference
proceedings, among others) was using databases such as WorldCat or Google Scholar, using
the same search criteria as when searching for published works. The first produced fortyeight results, while the second was discarded due to the large amount (five hundred and sixty)
of either repetitive entries or articles that did not meet the inclusion criteria.
At this point, it must be mentioned that in the balance between sensitivity, defined as
finding as many articles as possible that may be relevant, and specificity, defined as making
sure those articles are relevant, search terms erred on the side of sensitivity. After all the
possible eligible items were located, a record keeping system was created. In order to do so,
records of the results obtained were made by printing and filing them, where the excluded
studies at the screening and eligibility stage and their reasons were marked.
Once the screening of articles was performed, the remaining studies were sifted in
order to assess potentially eligible articles and extract relevant information to be included in
the systematic literature review. The focus, at this point, moved from sensitivity to
specificity. At this stage, instead of reading the title and the abstract of the work in question,
full-text versions of potentially eligible articles were read to assess their suitability. As in the
screening part of this process, the same recording system was maintained. When a work was
identified for inclusion, relevant information was extracted and recorded in an Excel
spreadsheet.
36

There were some studies that were labeled as “near misses,” also known as
“borderline cases” (Trickley et al., 2012). These studies can be defined as those which can
almost equally be argued for inclusion or exclusion, and therefore require more of a
subjective judgment call. In this specific research, three articles were deemed near misses:
“Tales of a tombarolo” by Giovanni Lattanzi, published in Archaeology, in 1998; “My life as
a tombarolo” by Cristina Ruiz, published in the Art Newspaper in 2000; and “Head found on
Fifth Avenue: Investigators finally think they know who’s been taking the ancient treasures
of Sicily” by Alexander Stille, published in The New Yorker in 1999.
These articles were deemed so because although the three were published in
magazines, they bring a lot of insight into the topic of tombaroli, because they solely focus
on them or because they manage to interview them. The studies, in the end, were included.
This action is justified as these works had an illustrative value, demonstrated also when
several authors have quoted them in academic articles listed in the database.
In conclusion, after progressing through the identification, both through the
mentioned databases and the records identified through other sources; the removal of
duplicates; and the screening in the eligibility phase, a total of forty-six articles were selected
for inclusion into the database that makes up this systematic literature review. Annex A
depicts graphically the process described in the present section.

2. Results of the systematic literature review about tombaroli
The following is a description of the forty-six relevant studies analyzed for the purpose of
this project, based on criteria such as topic of the study, year of publication, language,
country of origin of the article, type of study, field and purpose of research. The goal is to
begin identifying gaps based on these shared characteristics.
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The first result is that, out of the forty-six articles included, only sixteen
predominantly focus on the figure of the tombarolo. The remaining articles research looting
in Italy and only tangentially deal with tombaroli. Chronologically speaking, the interest in
tombaroli began in the 1980s after some well-known looters began publishing books about
their lives. It is in this period that we can see a trend of other articles being published by
academics trying to assess this phenomenon. During the eighties studies on tombaroli took
off. In the previous two decades (the 1960s and 70s) there was some mention of tombaroli in
the literature, but their presence was still marginal. There were only four works, and none of
them centered on the tombarolo.
In the present century we can observe this line of research picking up speed, as thirtyone works have been written after 2000. This increase was partially influenced by the
importance the media gave to what they labeled “art crimes.” This created a synergy between
studies on the topic and the presentation of the problem of archaeological looting and helped
bring the activities of tombaroli to a larger audience. Regarding language, the results indicate
that most of the literature is in English (thirty-three works), followed by Italian (thirteen).
Regarding the country of origin of the article, Italy (with eighteen works) and the United
States (with nineteen works) are the top two countries of production of literature on the topic.
Other countries where the literature on tombaroli has found a niche are the United Kingdom
(with five works) and countries within the European sphere such as Belgium, Hungary,
Spain, and Canada (all of them with only one published piece).
Regarding the type of articles included in the literature review, most of the forty-six
pieces take the form of a book (eighteen) or a journal article (sixteen). After these two
categories, book chapters, conference presentations, and journalistic articles are the most
common formats reporting on the tombaroli, followed by reports, dissertations, and
encyclopedia entries (one each). These formats cover a variety of fields that have dealt with
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the topic of Italian tomb raiders, but most come either from fields such as law (fifteen
articles) or archaeology (nine). Other fields that have explained this phenomenon are
anthropology (with two studies), criminology (three studies), sociology (two studies), and
cultural heritage studies (one article).
Archaeology has been worried about the destructive phenomenon of looting and has
studied it since Coggins published one of the first pieces in the field in 1969, Illicit traffic of
Pre-Columbian antiquities, deemed a milestone in research about the illegal trade in cultural
heritage. Consequently, the field of art law has been blooming since seminal pieces such as
Bator’s The International Trade in Art, published in 1981. However, within criminology,
John Conklin’s (1995) is a broad study dealing with all sorts of cultural heritage crime
manifestations, whose sources are all journalistic, and Giovanni Pastore’s (2001, 2011)
articles on archaeological looting in Italy draws on the author’s expertise as a colonel inside
the Carabinieri. Accordingly, these two works have been included in the “Criminology”
category as a proxy.
Most of the studies included are descriptive in nature (thirty-nine of them), as they
paint a picture of the situation of archaeological looting in Italy and/or tombaroli. More
methodologically complex research includes either exploratory research (whose primary
purpose is to examine the phenomenon of looting in order to develop new ideas or move
towards more refined research questions; five studies in total) or explanatory research (whose
primary purpose is to explain why events occur and to build, elaborate, or test theory; two
studies in total). Therefore, it is important to notice the preeminence of the description of the
phenomenon. As stated, few of the studies analyzed included hypotheses or complex methods
beyond the simple statement and discussion of facts regarding tombaroli.
Exploratory studies include Migliore’s (1991) article, dealing with treasure hunting in
Sicily, which concludes that audience views determine whether this activity is categorized as
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“deviant.” The article of Thoren van Velzen (1996) evokes the image of tombaroli and how
they present themselves, interpreting them in relation to responses from other members of the
Tuscan population. The last two exploratory articles are by Fiona Rose-Greenland (2014a;
2014b); in both, the author investigates tombaroli from a sociological perspective, labeling
them as a social construct, and concluding that tomb raiders are embedded in a system of
shared cultural meaning and feeling. Explanatory studies include Peter Campbell’s (2013)
article, where the author used a wide range of source material to chart interactions from
source to market using an approach based on criminal networks, and Ippolito (2014), who
examined the application of a human-agent based network to the Medici case, testing whether
the dealer’s hierarchical pyramidal structure is accurate.
After both an in-depth read of the forty-six articles and cross tabulating some of the
characteristics mentioned above in the formal description of the articles, some important
topics emerged and some research gaps could be identified at first glance. The fact that some
of the topics deal with and subsequently analyze the figure of the tombarolo, is more
prevalent in particular topics. The first five topics (activities, motivations, justifications,
trafficking, and relationship with organized crime) make the tombaroli in most instances the
focus of their scope, whereas topics identified as “Prevention of looting,” “Archaeological
issues,” and “Legal issues” only deal indirectly with tombaroli. In other words, the central
scope of these articles was not looters per se but other issues derived from the situations they
create. Therefore, even though all of the forty-six articles were treated equally when
performing the analysis, emphasis was placed on the first group of articles, which are more
relevant to the present research project.
After the analysis and the identification of topics, the identification of gaps also
started emerging. In fact, cross-tabulating different descriptive elements of the articles (year,
goals of research, used methods, among others) allowed for the gaps and inconsistencies to
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clearly appear. Overall, there is a total lack of a criminological analysis. There is also an
excess of description over more in-depth, analytical research stances. The articles perpetuate
information coming from outdated sources and exploit sensationalistic and/or romanticized
elements related to the lives of tombaroli. They further tend to lack research related to the
supply side of the illicit antiquities trafficking spectrum, opposed to an excess of research on
the demand side; and finally, the literature reveals a lack of communication between
disciplines. These gaps will be discussed later in the chapter.
However, these flaws affect three particular topics that will be mentioned next: the
relationship between traditional Italian organized crime and the tombaroli, how tombaroli
organize themselves, and how tombaroli learn to loot. The topics have been presented in this
specific order so a logical continuity between them can be perceived.

2.1. Organized crime and tombaroli
Only a few articles suggest that traditional Italian organized crime has a vested interest in the
traffic of illicitly obtained antiquities in Italy (nine); many more articles neither deny nor
allege any involvement between tombaroli and Italian organized crime (thirty-seven). The
majority of the articles that do mention the involvement of organized crime target the south;
most of them refer to links with the Sicilian Cosa Nostra.
These articles vary from alleging a clear involvement with the Italian mafia by, for
instance, mentioning their presence when the tomb raiders are working, to indicating only
partial cooperation, such as sharing the profits of trafficked archaeological goods, as stated by
Thoden van Velzen (1991). Hamblin, an American journalist visiting Italy, gave an example
of this clear involvement of the Italian mafia in the activities of tombaroli in 1970. The
author, in her book on archaeological looting, talked about Sicilian organized criminals
involved in tomb raiding:
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From time to time the Mafia, that infamous Sicilian organization whose influence
reaches even to certain underworld activities in the United States, has taken over the
Selinunte dig as its own private domain. Mafiosi… did the diggings themselves, says
a Sicilian, and since they controlled everything, including the police, they were able
to dig even in the daytime. It was very funny, really. The men would be digging, and
the head Mafioso was a sort of superintendent, watching them from a window,
sometimes with field glasses (p. 87).

Similar accounts involving mafia-type organizations in the south are those of
Alexander Stille (1998) or Giovanni Lattanzi (1999), who claimed that tombaroli could work
during the day because they had the protection of organized crime; Hamblin (1970) also
claimed they could work undisturbed. Other details of Stille’s (1999) account complement
those of Hamblin’s (1970):

Cammaratta’s role in the world of antiquities was so flamboyant and so widely known
that the police in Catania wondered how it had escaped the notice of local
authorities…. As the looting investigation proceeds, there are signs that the local
underworld may be trying to intimidate the authorities (pp. 66-67).

In the north of Italy there is also an incipient activity. Northern tombaroli such as
Luigi Perticarari (1986) denied the existence of an onorata organizzazione in the north of
Italy, where he operated; yet he could not deny the involvement of organized crime in the
south. In the same sense, tombarolo Antonio Induno, in an interview with Ruiz (2000),
revealed that “…we are not like the Mafia; there is no violence but there is a code of
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honour… it is a matter of loyalty. If I get messed around, then I’ll make an anonymous call to
the Carabinieri” (p. 4). Perticarari (1986), however, added that he had knowledge that in the
region of Campania one had to pay an organized crime boss in order to be able to dig.
There are differences in opinions between people who work inside the criminal justice
system and those who do not, yet differences of opinions sometimes appear even inside
allegedly like-minded groups such as law enforcement agents, judges, or prosecutors. Melillo
(2008), Deputy National Antimafia Prosecutor, argues that all of the traditional Italian
criminal organizations have a vested interest in the illegal use of the archaeological sites
located in the territories that they control and states that there is a relationship with Italian
mafia-type organizations, mostly in the controlling of zones, facilitating related services, and
laundering of the profits from other criminal activities via the underground trade of works of
art and archaeological relics.
Iannizzotto (2006) takes a similar point of view in his work, by highlighting the
undervalued and little known phenomenon of the vested interest of organized crime in
cultural heritage. According to the author, all well-known Italian organized crime groups (he
specifically refers to Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, and Sacra Corona Unita) have long
participated in the illicit trafficking of works of art, as it requires a particularly complex
structure. Pastore (2001), also a police officer within the Carabinieri as Iannizzotto, refers to
the existence of criminal organizations and gangs which study and survey archaeological
sites.
Nistri (2008), on the other hand, refers to networks whose task is to handle the
numerous changes that take place from the time of the theft to the time the objects reach the
final users. Nistri (2008), thus, is the only dissenting voice, when stating that
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We should underline, at least as regards our own experience, that no proof has ever
been found of an involvement of mafia-type organizations in the direct and continuing
organization of the activities related to the traffic of cultural artifacts, despite the fact
that investigations have often demonstrated a link between mafia organizations and
the specific criminal sector regarding both the monitoring of the territory and the
selection of objectives (pp. 97-98).

Luigi Lombardo, an Italian examining magistrate, however, confirms a clear
involvement of Mafia-type organizations in the operations of tomb raiders, as confirmed by a
case that occurred in 1996 where tombaroli were arrested alongside other Mafiosi (Stille,
1999):

Far more serious charges against Vincenzo Cammarata, however, arose out of a
smuggling-conspiracy investigation that began in 1996, when police in Caltanissetta,
the province adjoining Enna, arrested some suspected Mafia figures. Several of them
turned out to be tombaroli, and they agreed to become state’s witnesses…. (p. 66)

Several research gaps affect this specific topic. The most important one is probably
the mounting contradictions surrounding a possible involvement of tombaroli with organized
crime. Only nine articles out of forty-six reviewed mentioned some kind of involvement
between organized crime and tombaroli; therefore, not many of them have observed this
supposed relationship. As a result, it leaves us unable to determine whether the hypothesis of
the involvement of organized crime as a supplier of illicit antiquities is true or false. While
some components of the Italian criminal justice system talk about “archeomafia,” others deny
their involvement. And the fact that the literature uses terms like “gangs” and “squadrons”
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interchangeably adds a further level of confusion to the issue in question. These
contradictions in the literature do little to shed light on the research questions that guide this
research project.
The lack of agreement regarding the relationship between tombaroli and organized
crime is also perceptible in the broader debate about organized crime permeating the illicit
antiquities trade. The question of what the level of involvement of organized crime in the
illicit antiquities trade is has been marred by the paucity of comprehensive and reliable
information on this sort of crimes (Proulx, 2010). However, the main problem has been the
definition of organized crime (Alder & Polk, 2002, 2005; Chappell & Polk, 2011; Mackenzie,
2005, 2008, 2011b; Proulx, 2010; Tijhuis, 2006). Scholarly literature mostly states that the
involvement of organized crime is not the prevalent dimension of this particular phenomenon
(see, for example, Alderman, 2012; Chappell, 2011; Dietzler, 2013; Mackenzie, 2011c;
Tijhuis, 2006; or Visconti, 2015).
This is not a debate that is only being discussed in academic circles, but also in
government agencies, non-profits, and advocacy groups. Historically speaking, some scholars
have criticized quick assumptions stating that organized crime has permeated the art market
at least since the 1960s (Chappell & Polk, 2011). Ferri (2014) refers to how during the 1960s
there was a shift in the trafficking of cultural property from single offenders towards
organized crime groups; the internationalization of markets and the liberalization of the trade
helped boost this particular change. However, most of the accounts that have claimed some
kind of involvement have rarely been substantiated, leading to some voices within the
literature to claim that this relationship between organized crime and the art market is, to say
the least, spurious.
More specifically, there are important conceptual inconsistencies to be found in the
literature. Some refer to organized crime broadly; others use the term “networks”; and still
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others attribute the phenomenon to Cosa Nostra in Sicily. Beyond the important gap of
inconsistencies surrounding this issue, it must be mentioned that cross tabulations permitted
detecting other important issues. One of them was the lack of criminological analysis of the
involvement of organized crime in the activities of tombaroli (the nine articles come from
disciplines as varied as archaeology and law, but there are also journalistic accounts and one
autobiography of a tombarolo).
All of the claims made in these articles are descriptive in nature, which by itself might
not be a problem, were it not that some of these claims date back to the 1970s, and that none
of the articles presents a methods section detailing how the information was acquired and
results were produced. The most recent account, from archaeology, dates back to 2012.
Finally, some of the accounts are highly sensationalistic (see, for example, Hamblin’s
quotation), a factor that needs to be taken fully into consideration. After all, out of the nine
mentions, four of them come from outside academia, and no information about the employed
content is made available.

2.2. Organization of groups of tombaroli
The structure of groups of tombaroli, which has an impact on both the conceptualization of
what constitutes organized crime and how tombaroli learn as a group, is a topic rarely
addressed in the reviewed articles. In twenty-one out of the forty-six articles there was some
reference regarding how tombaroli organize. The descriptions, however, are highly simple.
What can certainly be assessed is that, beyond some cases where it is stated that the tomb
raider works alone, we find that literature depicts tomb raiding as a group activity. Out of the
forty-six studies reviewed, only twenty articles refer to some kind of organization, while
twenty-six omit this information. Again, like the involvement of organized crime with
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tombaroli, the responses are varied and encompass a wide range of possible organizational
outcomes.
Some tombaroli work by themselves. Curiously, the only two instances in the
analyzed studies that address tombaroli working alone also cover the fact that they work with
others as well. For example, one of these two instances is the account by Perticarari (1986),
who states that,

Sometimes I go digging all by myself, yet with a team it is easier, as I only probe the
soil (I can get to probe more than two-hundred times a night all by myself), whereas
the others have to watch, dig and do all the heavy work… Nowadays, I often go all
alone. It is a thing that nobody dares to do, as it is very dangerous. You need to do it
all by yourself: probe the terrain, dig, and watch. Often the time to go comes and you
have not even finished; you must leave and hide all the findings and hide the tomb. It
is very exhausting (p. 35, 38).

As can be seen, illicit diggings are excruciating for just one tombarolo to perform.
Thus, it is normal that most of the instances refer to a group activity, in very diverse forms;
some refer to groups but do not refer to how many tombaroli integrate those groups. The
literature also talks about groups formed by three to ten men, although some authors such as
Stille (1999) talk about fifty. In his Sicilian account, he states how Silvio Raffiotta, a
prosecutor in Enna, uncovered a network of more than fifty tombaroli operating throughout
southern Italy, which could indicate looting on an industrial scale. However, Stille’s (1999)
account is clearly an outlier. Perticarari’s description is more typical of the descriptions of
tombaroli groups in the studied literature.
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Other examples are the reports issued by Pastore (2001), who refers to gangs which
study and survey archaeological sites, which was confirmed by a later report by Carabinieri
(2008). Journalists like Watson and Todeschini (2006) refer to Armando Cenere, a wellknown tombarolo, when they describe teams of at least six members. Eight members,
between diggers and helpers, integrated the team of another tombarolo, Giuseppe Montrasto
(Silver, 2009). Even archaeologists report that in the zone of Puglia, tombaroli operate in
well organized bands (Graeppler & Mazzei, 1996). It must be noted how a wide variety of
terms are used to describe these groups, including “organized and fairly large enterprise,”
“well-organized and specialized bands,” “illicit network,” “large gangs,” “tomb-robbing
circles,” or “crews.” Watson and Todeschini (2006) summarize the police’s understanding of
the tombaroli organizational structure as follows:

Long experience had taught the investigators what to look out for. At the lowest level,
the tombaroli, or tomb robbers, are invariably laborers or farm workers, who don’t
make many calls. Above them come those the tombaroli call the capo zona, the head
of the region. The tombaroli normally sell their finds to the capo zona, frequently a
man with a white-collar job, meaning he has some sort of education and whose
telephone records as often as not show that he regularly makes calls abroad (p. 6).

Maybe the best insight into the domestic and international organization of tombaroli
came from the so-called Medici conspiracy. Italian investigators located a handwritten note
and an accompanying diagram listing by name the persons involved in this trade leading from
the tombaroli to the middle men and art dealers, and ultimately to the museums and
collectors in the United States and Europe. The following fragment describes the part of the
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Medici diagram that shows the relationship between tombaroli and the capo zona, in the
words of Peter Watson and Cecilia Todeschini (2006):

Below these were still more names, written in smaller letters. Below Becchina was
Elia Borowsky, an M. Bruno of Lugano, Cerveteri and Torino, though with other
words in brackets (“north Italy, Roma, Lazio, Campania, Puglia, Sardinia, Sicily”) –
indicating his areas of competence. Below him was Dino Brunetti of Cerveteri,
followed by Franco Luzzi of Ladispoli, a small town on the coast, just north of Rome,
and below him the words “Tombaroli di…” and then a list of places including
Grossetto, Montalto di Castro, Orvieto, Cerveteri, Casal di Principe and Marcenise.
Also under Becchina was “Raffaelle Monticelli (Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia),” and under
him Aldo Bellezza (“Foggia,” and elsewhere). Under Medici, dotted lines linked him
to “Alessandro Anedda (Roma)” and Franco Luzzi (again), of Ladispoli, with a solid
arrow linking him to “Elio-stab. of Santa Marinella” (“stab.” is short for stabilimento,
meaning “factory”), “Benedetto d’Aniello, of Naples,” and “Pierluigi Manetti, of
Rome” (p. 17).

Once again important problems can be found, some of them replicating the previously
encountered topic that examined the relationship between organized crime and tombaroli.
Out of the forty articles analyzing structural issues, three use a criminological angle.
However, this statement must be treated with caution. Both of Pastore’s pieces have been
labeled criminological as a proxy, as the author is a retired police officer; Conklin’s article is
both dated and uses as data points pieces of news. Therefore, this is yet another topic that
once again lacks proper criminological analysis. Also, the descriptive nature of most of the
accounts does not provide further theoretical analysis. This is particularly important in a field
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where the usage of terms such as “gang” or “network” can imply radically different realities.
In this sense, we can find a similar confusion as to the one seen with organized crime.
Structure is one of the elements mentioned by most of the disciplines, although eight
of the twenty articles are non-academic sources, such as news articles or biographies of a
tombarolo. In these cases, one has to be aware of the source and the validity and reliability of
the contents. More importantly, once again none of the articles present a methods section on
how information was acquired and results were produced. Also, most articles do not possess
a methods section. However, it can be estimated that the findings regarding the group nature
of the tombaroli’s work are conclusive. As such, the hypothesis that looting is a group
activity is correct, at least based on the present evidence. What is less conclusive is the extent
of the participants in the groups. It would seem that groups vary heavily, although there may
be an unknown variable (geographical zone, for example) that produces this and is not
assessed in the pieces reviewed.

2.3. Learning processes of tombaroli
This systematic review of the literature also reveals limited knowledge about the learning
processes of tombaroli, which is central to this study. Similarly to the previous two issues
discussed, there is no article that refers specifically to the learning processes of tombaroli,
which implies that only some articles indirectly address the topic of how tombaroli learn to
perform their criminal actions. More precisely, only ten of them give the reader some insight
into this question. A specific search was conducted to see whether the articles mention
organizational learning or competitive adaptation; such an understudied topic has not been
analyzed from these theoretical lenses. As will be seen, the learning processes vary from selflearning to family transmission of the knowledge of how to loot, as di Grazia summarizes
(1970).
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Some studies point out self-learning processes and continuous learning and practice to
hone techniques. Luigi Perticarari (1986) explains how he learnt everything by himself,
observing:

The first time I went probing, I went to Monterozzi, where the necropolis lies. I heard
that with the probe you could find things, but nothing more. I did not know the
technique. It was a disaster. I have learnt all by myself, stealing a word I heard here
and there. And probing. And just like this, I came to know so many things. Someone
will think it is impossible, but my experiences took me to find amazing discoveries. In
the beginning, I only found opened tombs. Out of these I learnt the pathway to the
entrance, the stairs, the front, the directions of them all. In sum, where the tomb was
located. Therefore, it was not wasted time. Even the looted tombs gave me new
information (p. 18).

On the other hand, the studied literature seems to point to some personal transmission,
such as from father to son, or older tombaroli teaching newer generations. An example of the
former is given by Greenland (2014b):

From Michele, a “former child tombarolo” who participated in unauthorized
excavation with his father for more than a decade, I learned that unauthorized dig
teams feature specialists who perform differentiated tasks in the course of the dig. In
Michele’s experience, the strongest men handled the spillone, Michele’s father tossed
down a rope, and the young Michele shimmied down the shaft. If the men agreed, on
the basis of Michele’s report, that the tomb was worth digging out, the work

51

proceeded rapidly (to evade detection by police authorities) but also systematically (p.
214).

Marín-Aguilera (2012) gives an example of the latter when stating that “the oldest tombaroli
teach new generations where, when and how to excavate following a real paudeutic model,
based on fidelity and passion for the Etruscan past” (p. 573).
The content of what is being learnt is both, in the words of Thoden van Velzen
(1991), “…experience and specialized knowledge to locate tombs” (p. 38). She adds, “Such
knowledge is often passed on within a family. In one town the chief tomb robber has been a
member of the same family for three generations in row. The rest of the community is
perfectly aware” (p. 38). Some articles talk about learning skills such as exploring the
territory, locating the entrance of the tomb, or opening them, although the process of learning
these actions is not explained.
An example of this experience-based knowledge could be Perticarari’s abovementioned trial-and-error learning process with the probe in order to locate tombs. However,
tombaroli also acquire techniques from archaeology. For example, Ruiz (2000) states how
Antonio Induno, a tombarolo who learnt the trade from his father and also from working for
years as a henchman for another looter, takes a scientific, archaeological approach when
opening a tomb:

“It makes no sense to come in from the top [of the tomb],” he says. “It is faster, but
you break too many objects and what you break, you cannot sell. If you know how to
break in properly, you can get a lot of stuff out of a tomb. I have years of experience;
I know how to handle the works, how to retrieve them without damage” … According
to Mr. Induno, on average, a virgin tomb will yield some 30-40 vases as well as an
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assortment of other artifacts … Breaking into a tomb usually takes two nights. On the
first, enough earth is cleared away to allow ventilation of the interior chamber. The
tomb is left for 24 hours so that the burial goods inside, which may have lain buried
for as long as 2,600 years, can oxidize and harden. “When I first started out in this
business, many of the objects I handled crumbled to pieces. They were too fragile.
Now, I have a more scientific approach,” says Mr. Induno (pp. 2-3).

This is not an isolated case in the literature: some other tombaroli claim to be
passionate about archaeology. In an interview by Lattanzi (1998) of a tombarolo, he claims “I
have never studied it [archaeology], not even in elementary school. When I was young, only
the rich went to school, and I was poor. Over the years I have fallen in love with archaeology
and have read many books” (p. 49).
It is important to remember, with respect to research gaps, that there is no article that
refers specifically to the learning processes of tombaroli, which implies that only some
articles indirectly address the topic of how tombaroli learn to perform their criminal actions.
The most important concern here is that only four articles are academic, opposed to six nonacademic pieces, with the corresponding problem this poses for their validity and reliability,
already discussed in this analysis. The only exploratory article of the ten has no methods
section beyond the author stating that the “… analysis draws on ethnographic data and textual
analysis of newspaper articles concerning tombaroli” (p. 570).

3. Analysis of the extant literature about tombaroli
The results of this systematic literature review have shown relevant research gaps and
inconsistencies. Highlighting these problems is essential, especially in a small field where
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there is a lack of a considerable body of literature when compared to other criminological
phenomena, where produced research is more abundant.
The first research gap to be highlighted is the lack of criminological research. It is
true that Italy, as an important source country for antiquities, has had in-depth scholarly
attention on looting, alongside other countries. However, even though it is true that tomb
raiding in Italy has been studied, there are few accounts that use a criminological perspective.
This problem has therefore been completely understudied from this particular point of view.
Proulx (2011a) confirms the trend toward non-criminological oriented literature in the
field of illicit antiquities trafficking by stating that despite the importance of researching the
criminal dynamics of this type of market, there is still little criminological research. There are
not many criminological studies focusing on archaeological looting. In other words, all
criminological research conducted until now focuses on the consumer’s end of this form of
trafficking. Therefore, it is evident that the literature fails to move beyond descriptive studies
about the supply side of the problem, how antiquities are illicitly removed from
archaeological sites by tomb raiders, and towards the production of empirical knowledge.
This gap is due to the fact that there is only a handful of criminology scholars for whom the
trade in illicit antiquities is a central interest. The topic of illicit traffic in antiquities is also
well removed from the traditional core of interests within criminology.
Two more gaps are related to the fact that most of the literature surrounding the figure
of the tombarolo is mostly descriptive and, in some instances, seriously outdated. These
articles can help us have a view of the phenomenon but there is a need for understanding why
certain things happen, beyond a mere description. Otherwise, a saturation of information on
this issue can be noticed, mostly because recent descriptions of this phenomenon do not differ
from older ones. As a result, unless new information appears that drastically changes the
picture, it is safe to assume that no significant changes have happened since older accounts of
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tombaroli were produced in the 1960s. Therefore, research has to balance this descriptive
emphasis with more exploratory and explanatory pieces. Various theoretical frameworks
drawn from different disciplines need to be applied to explain the “whys” and leave behind
the “whens,” “whos,” and “hows.” An emphasis must also be put on promoting research
based on evaluation, as none of the reviewed articles empirically analyzed policies and their
effectiveness.
One of the most important problems lies in the fact that no methodology is provided
about how the information was obtained or, more importantly, about threats to its validity,
reliability, or generalizability. A reader cannot guess where information comes from,
replicate the information, or assess its quality. These problems affect the consistency of the
information, which per se is already very contradictory. In this review, where most of the
empirical articles are descriptive in nature, many do not refer to criteria such as study design,
selection of participants, methods of data collection, or methods of analysis, thus making the
assessment of this extremely difficult.
As a result, some of the articles that have taken news as data points might have used
some of the non-academic sources that tend to sensationalize, romanticize, or aggrandize the
exploits of tombaroli: For example, pieces of news such as Caccuri’s (2012), entitled Cosa
cerca quest’uomo? (What is this man looking for?), published in Vanity Fair Italy, provides a
romanticized account of tomb raiding, denounced by some public officials and private
citizens in Italy as an apology for looting. This action might unknowingly produce a snowball
effect where particular descriptions might end up being replicated in other articles and
accepted as a truth, perpetuating ideas that reader might find attractive but are far removed
from reality.
Another flaw is that research has mainly focused on describing the final receivers of
the illicitly obtained antiquities, and described how museums, dealers, and collectors
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perpetuate this form of crime. However, in order to be able to assess the phenomenon of
looting properly, it is important to know the role of the tombaroli as the starting point of the
illicit antiquities trade. Literature that focuses on this transnational phenomenon has mainly
focused on the demand side of this spectrum. As has been seen, there is no more than
tangential information on the role of the tombaroli in this chain, beyond understanding that
they are the ones finding the goods.
This pattern is repeated in other crimes, such as drug trafficking, where supplying
drugs is labeled as “upper-level drug trafficking,” which would include, according to
Natarajan (2011) the production; manufacturing and processing; shipment points, and
satisfying the demand countries via smuggling of the drugs. According to Desroches (2007),
there are several reasons for this lack of research: the highly covert and elusive nature of
upper-level drug trafficking, the relatively small number of dealers at this level, the different
geographical levels and transnational variations in drug dealing, and the permanently
changing nature of drug markets. As a result, there are fewer than a dozen relevant studies
worldwide that deal with upper-level drug distribution. These include research conducted in
the U.S. (Adler, 1985; Hafley & Tewksbury, 1995; Natarajan & Belanger, 1998; Reuter &
Haaga, 1989), Britain (Dorn, Lutz, & White, 1998; Dorn, Murji, & South, 1992; Pearson &
Hobbs, 2001), the Netherlands (van Duyne, 1996; Zaitch, 2002a, 2002b), and Canada
(Desroches, 2005).
Equally, we do not have criminological research on tombaroli. The reasons mentioned
by Desroches (2007) could be applied in this instance to antiquities trafficking; yet, in this
particular instance, the scenario is darker, as there is not a single piece of research within the
discipline of criminology based upon this phenomenon. In this sense, tombaroli, as any other
manifestation of art criminals, are still waiting for a serious criminological analysis in
academia. Finally, these studies come from a variety of disciplines, which use different
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methodologies. The problem for researchers interested in researching tombaroli is to build
bridges and dialogue between the different disciplines involved. After reviewing the literature
it can be seen how every discipline has moved in a different direction without harmonizing
the results across the other disciplines.
After having assessed the gaps in the analyzed literature, this research project is
essential because it is expected to provide a criminological perspective on the phenomenon of
looting of archaeological heritage in Italy. This dissertation aims to shed light on two obscure
areas: first, the level of involvement and interest of organized crime in this form of criminal
activity and traffic; second, the gap in information regarding how tombaroli gain their
knowledge.
Regarding the first obscure area, this research project will present the different
perspectives on the categorization of this particular form of criminal activity as organized
crime. In that sense, this dissertation will delineate the different ways of categorizing
tombaroli, either as a phenomenon within organized crime or as just an independent criminal
group activity, and propose alternatives within the existing literature related to this topic.
Naturally, this has an important impact on the tailoring of policies at both the national and
international level.
The dissertation will also discuss how the organizational methods of the tombaroli
impact their learning techniques. An in-depth description of the structure of the tombaroli,
one that goes beyond merely categorizing it as a “group activity,” can help develop policies
to limit their activity. Similarly, lawmakers have tailored policies targeting other forms of
crime (such as terrorists or drug traffickers) after the criminal population’s particular form of
organization.
Above all, having identified important gaps in the literature about tombaroli, this
dissertation seeks to ameliorate them. Beyond the use of an analytical criminological angle,
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which expects to bring results that go further than a simple description of the current
situation, the research project has a solid methodological foundation. Data collection, mostly
based on interviews, is recent. Because the focus of this research project is the figure of the
tombarolo (looters themselves have been interviewed), the criminological analysis provides
insight into the supply side of the spectrum. Finally, it will try to assess in the upcoming
chapters whether the collected information confirms or refutes the information highlighted in
the present systematic literature review.

4. Theoretical framework and conceptual approach of the research project
The review and critique of the literature about tombaroli has contributed to developing a
conceptual framework for the design and conduct of this dissertation. The conceptual focus
developed for this research project shapes the research process, inform the methodological
design, and influences the selection of data collection instruments. The conceptual framework
also becomes the repository of the collected data, providing the basis for and informing the
various iterations of the coding scheme. As such, this framework provides an organizing
structure both for reporting this study’s findings and for the analysis, interpretation, and
synthesis of these findings.

4.1. Organized crime vs. crime that is organized
Defining organized crime is somewhat challenging given that it is a multi-angled and multifaceted criminal phenomenon. This is an important problem at three different levels. At the
legislative level, there is no consensus on what constitutes organized crime. As a result,
definitions in various legal bodies differ considerably. Because law defines what constitutes a
crime, the definitions in legal bodies must differentiate distinct behaviors and label them
illicit. At the policy level, the problem of the inability of defining organized crime impacts
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the allocation of resources, both in terms of finances and personnel. As such, both the
perception of the public and of public officials will have an impact on resource allocation.
Finally, at a research level, the scholars investigating this particular criminal phenomenon try
to understand and explain it, with the further goal of possibly informing policy makers
(Finckenauer, 2005).
Clear evidence pointing towards this problem is the more than two hundred scholarly
and institutional definitions worldwide (Arsovska, 2014). In fact, Beare (2003) once
ironically stated that there is a whole industry devoted to defining organized crime. Most of
the time, note some researchers, we should be talking of descriptions rather than definitions
of organized crime, as they do not delineate the boundaries of the phenomenon defined, thus
only describing it (see Reuter, 1994; or Van Duyne, 2003). Therefore, no general definition
has emerged (Abadinsky, 2010) even though Albanese (2011) talks about an emerging
consensus. This consensus, however, given the above, must be disregarded.
After all, talking about organized crime involves referring to a multilayered social
phenomenon, constructed in several ways and influenced by different factors. Von Lampe
(2016) notes that even scholarly definitions of organized crime are either shaped by
individual, political, and/or practical agendas and preferences. This trend is boosted by the
fact that there is not one preeminent conception of organized crime that rules out external
influences. Nor, on the other hand, is there a level of certainty on what the notion of
organized crime is. At most, some of the definitions derive from particular empirical
observations, thus having methodological problems of generalizability, or on a general
agreement among observers.
Cressey (1969), considered as one of the “fathers” of the discipline, defined the
concept of organized crime as a crime committed by someone who, in an established division
of labor, occupies a position in order to commit crimes. He added that in this division of labor
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there had to be a position for a person responsible for corrupting, a corrupter, and an enforcer.
From this point of view, a plethora of definitions have emerged within the criminological
community. Smith (1975) defined organized crime from an illicit enterprise point of view by
applying organizational theory to this field. His economic approach put more weight on the
criminal enterprises than on the individuals committing the crimes, thus undermining
previous approaches with particular ethnical assumptions, specifically both the ethnic aspect
inherent in the concept up to that date and subcultural dynamics (Finckenauer, 2005; Paoli,
2008). As such, it is historically relevant to recall the “alien conspiracy theory,” which,
according to Smith (1974), referred to “… an alien, organized, conspiratorial force that, with
evil intent and conspiratorial method, had forced its way on an innocent public” (p. 85).
It is also interesting to note the triple taxonomy of notions regarding the nature of
organized crime that von Lampe (2016) proposes, distinguishing between descriptions based
on activity, structure, and governance of organized crime. This taxonomy is useful to classify
different definitions of organized crime, as these are centered mainly on one of the elements
that form the division. In other words, some definitions center on organized crime being a
specific type of criminal activity, whether due to the activity itself or the people involved in
the task. These activities need to be organized precisely because of their level of complexity
(see, for example, Porteus, 1998). Other definitions revolve around the element of
organization, thus highlighting the above-mentioned trait that organized crime involves a
plurality of individuals (see, for example, the definition issued by the FBI (2016), which
defines organized crime as “any group having some manner of a formalized structure and
whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities”). Finally, a third
cluster of definitions revolves around the concentration of illegitimate power, either by
creating an underworld government or infiltrating legitimate governmental institutions (see,
for example, Block, 1983).
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The challenges of defining organized crime are also evident in two of the primary
international definitional frameworks. The first is the United Nations Convention on
Transnational Organized Crime, signed on December 2000, whose article 2 defines organized
crime as “… a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses
established pursuant to this Convention, in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial
or other material benefit.”
Arriving at a consensual definition proved to be, once again, quite a challenge. This
Convention has been criticized for overlooking the arguments of a sector of scholars who
claim that organized crime is local, not transnational; excluding, in its definition, elements
deemed a cornerstone in organized crime, such as violence, or corruption; and positing a
threshold of three members that must form the group (Arsovska, 2014; de la Corte Ibáñez &
Giménez-Salinas Framis, 2010). In sum, it is deemed that the definition that the United
Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime provides is too broad and merely
focused on the lowest common denominator (Finckenauer, 2005).
A year later, in 2001, the European Commission and EUROPOL, alongside the
Council of Europe, operationalized the United Nations’ definition in order to ensure a more
coherent response from the different European police forces and identify more easily this
criminal phenomenon. Instead of a definition, these organisms proposed a list of factors that
appear frequently in the best-known criminal organizations. Therefore, according to this list,
an association of criminals only can be identified as a criminal organization when there is
enough information to certify that all the mandatory criteria are fulfilled and at least two of
the optional ones.
The mandatory criteria consist of the collaboration between more than two people;
extending over a prolonged or indefinite period; the suspicion of committing serious criminal
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offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty; and a
central goal of profit and/or power. The optional criteria consist of a specialized division of
labor; exercising measures of discipline and control; employing violence or other means of
intimidation; employing commercial, business-like structures; participation in money
laundering processes; operations across borders; and exerting influence over legitimate social
institutions. The fact that this list of items articulates a broad and flexible definition, when
compared with other legal texts, is a clear advantage. However, the EU definition has been
deemed vague, and of course the minimum number of participants has been, once again,
questioned (Arsovska, 2014; de la Corte Ibáñez & Giménez-Salinas Framis, 2010).
Finckenauer (2005) raises another interesting topic that enriches the discussion,
namely the difference between organized crime and crime that is organized. The scholar
marks the difference between extremely complex and highly organized crimes and what he
labels “true organized crime,” or crimes committed by criminal organizations, and thinks that
the lack of distinction between these two separate scenarios is dangerous. The author states
that organized crime cannot be defined by its activities, but rather on the level of organization
associated with the commission of the criminal activity. Earlier typologies of organized crime
(Beare, 1996; Best & Luckenbill, 1981; Cressey, 1972; Hagan, 1983; Maltz, 1994a, 1994b)
have focused mainly on both organizational criteria, structure, the division of labor, and the
relationship organized crime groups have with society. As a result, many of the obtained
typologies ended up being outdated as they only could reflect mafia groups in the United
States during the 1960s and 1970s, where pyramidal structures, a clear division of labor, and
corruption were common (Paoli, 2002). However, the pitfall in that argumentation is that
many crimes that are complex may require a network of individuals who work in concert for
mutual benefit, but that does not necessarily imply they are part of an organized crime group.
Such networks are often small, informal, and short-lived.
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Criminal organizations, on the other hand, will have continuity both over time and
over crimes; thus for criminal networks to be labeled a criminal organization, they must, first,
organize themselves to meet the criteria described below (Finckenauer, 2005). First, they
must possess criminal sophistication, which relates to the degree to which criminals plan their
offenses. As such, their skill and knowledge levels are also indicative of the degree of
sophistication in their abilities. Second, they must possess a structure or divide labor within
the organization or group. Highly structured groups will be hierarchical and have defined
roles for members where a boss doles out tasks to lower echelons. Third, the members must
self-identify as such. Bonding is a major part of this characteristic, which is visible through
specific uniform clothing, tattoos, or initiation rituals. Finally, the organization must rely on
authority of reputation. In other words, the organization must coerce people either through
direct or implied threats that relate to the group’s sense of authority and reputation. Beare and
Martens (1998) raised the same issue by highlighting the element of bad reputation as a
catalyst to groups of offenders that allows them to access a criminal market.
In order to highlight the difference between organized criminals and criminals who
are organized, Finckenauer (2005) highlights specific cases such as an American insurance
fraud ring (Healy, 2003), Chinese human smuggling (Chin, 2003), drug trafficking (Eck &
Gersh, 2000; Natarajan & Belanger, 2008), and international trafficking of stolen vehicles
(Clarke & Brown, 2003). Finckenauer (2005) highlights cases where opportunities led to the
creation of an entity in order to exploit a particular criminal opportunity or an illicit trade
needing an organized participation and execution, committed by many small groups who
might even be employed in legitimate businesses. Research has found only a minority of
organized crime groups using hierarchal structures, which are typically found in Italy and the
United States. Many other groups are less structured and resemble more of a criminal
network, particularly as it relates to transit crime such as drug trafficking, human smuggling,
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and the like (Kleemans, 2007). That said, Finckenauer’s (2005) criteria allows for a range of
organizational structures to be included.
The present dissertation uses both Finckenauer’s (2005) and Natarajan and Belanger’s
(1998) frameworks in order to determine if archaeological looting is fueled by organized
crime or if it is merely a crime that requires some level of organization. Supply of
archaeological material by looters will be examined using Finckenauer’s (2005) definition of
organized crime groups (by using the criteria of criminal sophistication, structure, selfidentification, and authority of reputation) and using Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998)
framework specifically for structural organization.

4.2. Organizational learning and competitive adaptation
As with organized crime, it is complicated to find a definition of organizational learning,
given that there is a lack of agreement among scholars. However, Kenney’s (2006; 2007)
definition is not only valid, but also concise. According to the author, organizational learning
refers to the learning process of organizations understood as a group and how they modify
their established practices based on the acquired experience and knowledge.
It is generally agreed that the starting point of research on organizational learning is
Herbert Simon’s (1997) work Administrative Behavior, published in 1945. In this work,
Simon argues that organizations adjust their responses according to external stimuli and
experiences. Once Simon’s work was accepted, a new line of research formed, and
organizational learning was applied to fields as diverse as communications systems, policy
making processes, or enterprises, among others (Deutsch, 1996; Jarvis, 1976; Kenney, 2007;
Lowenthal, 1972).
The first step is to be able to define what an organization is. According to Scott
(1998), organizations are collections of participants that, through behaviors that have been
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previously patterned, coordinate how they operate. Porter, Lawler and Hackman (1975)
stated that an organization must possess five traits: it is formed by individuals or groups of
individuals; these individuals are associated together in order to reach certain goals; these
individuals perform different tasks among themselves; these individuals act in a coordinated
and rule-bound fashion; and these individuals act with a certain temporal continuity.
Learning is one of several actions an organization can fulfill. Organizations learn
when participants receive, interpret, and apply information gathered through organizational
routines (such as rules, practices, and procedures transforming individual action into
collective behavior) (Argyris, 1993; Argyris & Schön, 1996; Simon, 1996). Organizations
need to learn, as they need to face challenges, solve problems, and complete tasks. The
organization, however, does not learn per se, but its components do. Learning becomes
organizational when information and experiences of an organization is codified and stored in
artifacts.
According to the literature, organizational learning can be broken down into the
following three phases: acquiring, interpreting, and acting on information and experience
(Daft & Weick, 1984; Garvin, 2000). The acquisition of information includes know-how,
techniques, or practices, among others, helping organizations achieve their goals, through
trial and error and search practices (Argyris & Schön, 1996). In the second part of the
learning process, the interpretation of information, participants within the organization share
perceptions and build understanding, which facilitates making sense of relevant events for the
organization. Therefore, analogical reasoning allows participants within an organization to
link present and past experiences and help the organization learn (Weick, 1995).
Finally, the last phase involves acting on the acquired information, that is, applying
information to collective behavior through routines. Routines will outlast participants, as the
best practices will be kept within the organization, even after the people who implemented
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them leave the organization. When participants alter routines as a result of acquired and
interpreted new information, it is a sign that the organization keeps learning (Zeng, 1999).
According to Kenney (2007), learning cannot become organizational until knowledge
is embedded in routines and stored in artifacts. However, organizations differ with respect to
the degree to which they make both their rules and artifacts available, and as informal and
formal routines embody knowledge and experience, they allow participants to learn from
organizational history even when they have not experienced that history themselves. In sum,
companies discover information and then participants share and apply it through both formal
and informal routines. These phases can occur simultaneously and connect each other
through feedback that enables particular behaviors and interpretations to survive while others
perish because of their lack of usefulness.
The process of sharing, recording, and interpreting information is done through both
formal and informal organizational memories. The former include communicational elements
such as databases, correspondence, and files and manuals, among others. The latter include
conversations, stories, and myths about the organization. Also, the degree of availability of
these systems will make them more or less used (Argyris & Schön, 1996; Levitt & March,
1988). The knowledge being transmitted to the people who make up the organization can be
categorized as either metis (experimental or intuitive knowledge) or techné (abstract technical
knowledge).
As techné is taught through formal instruction and codified in knowledge-based
artifacts, metis is learnt through the practice of the activity itself and everyday interaction
with other participants, resisting this codification. Metis, in this sense, is learned by doing and
engaging in the activity per se. Metis includes several skills depending on the task learnt
which people share by communicative interaction between older and newer participants, who
gather together in communities of practice (Detienne & Vernant, 1978; Kenney, 2007;
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Niccolini, Gherardi & Yanow, 2003; Scott, 1998). This information changes over time, thus
modifying, either explicitly or implicitly, routines that already existed but needed
improvement (Cook & Yanow, 1993; Weick, 1995).
Until now, organizational learning has been explained with a theoretical patina that
assumes that organizations learn in perfect conditions. However, the truth is that
organizations learn under unavoidable, human-based complicated conditions, instead of
under a perfect vacuum that isolates them from the real world. These conditions might
include, among others, bounded rationality, incomplete or imperfect information, inferences
or learning disabilities (March, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c; Simon, 1997). Other factors that affect
the process of organizational learning, either by facilitating or complicating it, are the size of
the organization and the levels of management as set by a particular number of hierarchies
present in the organization. These two particular factors, thus, will have an impact on
acquiring, interpreting, and acting on the information.
The organizations studied by a variety of disciplines have been legal. Why not,
however, apply this theoretical framework either to the misdeeds of legal organizations or to
criminal ones, as Williams (2001) argues? When organizational learning and competitive
adaptation was applied to criminal organizations, researchers tried to analyze not only how
criminal groups learn but also how they resist law enforcement by altering their criminal
activities in response to new experiences; how they store this information and experiences;
and how they select the most optimal routines to produce the desired results. In sum,
organized criminals learn, and they build new skills and practices with the goal of avoiding
law enforcement detection.
Kenney (2007) provides examples in his research, applying these two concepts to
drug trafficking and terrorism. For example, in drug trafficking, metis is essential, as the trade
requires one to adapt to changing circumstances. Drug traffickers’ smuggling operations
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require traits such as craftiness, intuition, deceit, and foresight in many activities, such as the
processing, shipping, bribing, or delivering of the drugs, for example. Indeed, drug traffickers
learn by doing and observing more experienced colleagues, talking with them, and then
performing the tasks on their own. In that sense, drug traffickers learn mostly by metis
(performing their tasks) rather than by techné (book learning). Of course, this does not mean
that techné does not play a role in drug trafficking, as some organizations might codify metis
into manuals in order to teach the new recruits. In sum, both metis and techné are important,
given that many skills required might not be easily acquired via abstraction (Kenney, 2007).
As criminal organizations deal with the disruption of their activities by police forces,
they engage in competitive adaptation (Kenney,2007) or, in other words, they learn by
interacting, gathering, and analyzing information in order to change practices while trying to
outsmart police and other opponents in a dynamic interaction. This process also works a
sensu contrario, given that law enforcement also learns from the illicit activities of criminal
organizations. This interaction is central to competitive adaptation. In terms of biology, some
scholars see this relationship as a symbiotic one, as both sides depend on each other.
Organized criminal groups

benefit from the demand created for illicit goods by state

prohibitions; they also benefit when a successful police operation dismantles their
competition. Terrorist organizations justify their actions by symbolically targeting policies
enacted by other states in their countries. Yet at the same time, law enforcement agencies
fighting these criminal phenomena need these criminal organizations in order to keep
existing, solidify their identities and funding, or put their means to a very specific end
(Andreas, 2000; Kenney, 2007).
Even though it is a relatively new theoretical angle there is a growing body of
literature regarding the relationships of transnational criminal networks and the learning
techniques of, mostly, drug traffickers and terrorists. See Jackson et al (2005), Hamm (2005),
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Forest, 2006, Nesser, 2008, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008, Stenerson, 2008, Morselli,
Petit and Giguère (2007a; 2007b). In the cultural heritage crime field, Campbell (2013) has
applied criminal network analysis to chart interactions from source to market in the illicit
antiquities trade. This particular framework works well in order to address the gap in the
literature related to the learning techniques of tombaroli, as looters fit well within the
different traits that operationalize the definition of organizations used in the theoretical
framework of this research project. According to Scott (1998), organizations are collections
of participants that, through behaviors that have been previously patterned, coordinate how
they operate.
Porter, Lawler, and Hackman’s (1975) definition stated an organization must have the
following traits: it is formed by individuals or groups of individuals; these individuals are
associated with each other in order to reach certain goals; these individuals perform different
tasks; these individuals act in coordination and according to a set of rules; and these
individuals act with a certain temporal continuity. Once one accepts that tombaroli can be
labeled an organization, one can see how they learn as a collective. In fact, it is essential to
understand first how looters are organized, in order to assess how tombaroli learn and to
analyze how looters acquire and analyze knowledge and experience and adapt their
organizations and operations in response to feedback.

5. Conclusions
In the first chapter the problem of archaeological looting was introduced both on a global and
an Italian level and connected indirectly to the perpetrators, the tombaroli. The present
chapter, by contrast, has dealt directly and exclusively with the tombaroli and their presence
in the literature. The previous chapter hinted at the scarcity of how literature on Italian
looters. The deliberate systematic literature review in this chapter has shown and reviewed
69

the very limited research dealing with the tombaroli and at the same time has identified
numerous gaps in this literature.
More precisely, this chapter’s results indicate that there is a lack of knowledge in
three areas: the linkage of looters to traditional organized crime, their organization, and their
learning processes. It has revealed that there is an excess of descriptive research and a lack of
exploratory and explanatory research. Thanks to the existing descriptive research the field has
progressed since the interest arose in the early 1960s towards knowing more of the illicit
excavators known as tombaroli and their activities. However, there is a serious lack of
innovative research, mostly from a criminological standpoint. As such, it is expected that this
research project will provide a deeper understanding of the three core issues raised in this
chapter by asking and answering pertinent research questions that will be introduced in the
next chapter, which is devoted to the methods used in the present research project.
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CHAPTER 3
L’ESPERIENZA NON BASTA:3
METHODS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

It is easy to like the man we shall call Antonio Induno. He is a softly spoken man in his midforties who smiles often. His manner is friendly and direct and he speaks candidly and
enthusiastically about his work. Mr. Induno is a tomb-robber.
(Ruiz, 2000)

Michael Kenney, in his book From Pablo to Osama (2007) describes his research as
paleontology because, as the author states, the secretive nature of criminal and extremist
networks complicated his efforts to acquire and analyze valid and reliable data. Indeed, this is
the case for this research project. Like narcos and terrorists, tombaroli themselves are not
easily accessible, and interviews with law enforcement experts merely produce documents
whose primary function is gathering intelligence. The adaptation of data to social sciences is
not always possible or easy, as each side asks different kinds of questions, or uses different
meanings for the same terms. These factors complicate the efforts of any researcher to obtain
and analyze information that is both valid and reliable.
As chapter two demonstrated, there is also a shortage of analysis in the study of
Italian looters. Consequently, there is a shortage of empirical studies that have a valid
methodology section telling a wider audience how the used information was acquired and
how the examined researchers obtained particular results. This chapter illustrates these
important points.

3

Experience is not enough.
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1. Research questions employed in this research project
This research project tries to answer two general research questions which are broken down
into several sub-questions, which in turn stem from the gaps revealed in the systematic
literature review regarding both the relationship of tombaroli with organized crime and the
learning processes of tombaroli. The first general research question asks: what is the nature
of the relationship between tombaroli and organized crime? Out of this general research
question emerge three sub-questions. The first one specifically refers to the nature of the
relationship between tombaroli and traditional Italian organized crime groups such as Cosa
Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, Sacra Corona Unita, or the Camorra, among others. This question is
important, as it was seen in chapter two how there is a significant lack of agreement
regarding the relationship between tombaroli and traditional Italian organized crime.
A second sub-question asks what traits tombaroli share with organized crime. It is
important to know whether tomb raiders in and of themselves have traits that could define
them as organized criminals or whether they are just criminals that require an organization in
order to commit their crimes. Finally, the last research sub-question addresses the following:
what forms of organizational structure do tombaroli adopt? This is an important element that
will end the inquiry on organized crime by trying to assess in which forms tombaroli
organize to conduct their tasks.
The second general research question asks: how do tombaroli learn and adapt during
their careers? Broadly, this question’s aim is to analyze how tombaroli learn both technical
and intuitive knowledge in order to become tomb raiders during their criminal careers, and
how they adapt and learn again in a hostile environment where disruptive police operations or
the competition with other factions is normal due to the illicit nature of their activity. Out of
this broad research question arise four specific sub-questions, which are required to answer it
fully.
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The first sub-question bridges the first research question on organized crime with the
second one, on learning. This sub-question asks how tombaroli organize themselves, yet this
time it tries to answer organizational issues from a descriptive angle, taking into account
elements such as the undertaking of group vs. individual activities, the planning of their
criminal activities, recruitment tasks, internal hierarchy, and the following of orders.
The second sub-question is how tombaroli learn their tasks. This is, eminently, the
most introductory part to this general research question, as it introduces and links
organizational learning within the reality of tomb raiding. Also, the question analyzes
whether the way tombaroli organize might impact on learning and adapting. The third and
fourth sub-questions complement each other. The third sub-question asks how tombaroli
adapt their activities in response to new knowledge and/or experience and how often this
happens.
The fourth sub-question asks what parts of these adaptations are due to perceived or
actual threats from law enforcement agents or competing groups of looters. The importance
of these questions lies in gathering data referring to elements of adaptability, understood as
learning anew through adapting old routines into new ones.

2. Research design
Researching secretive criminal activities such as tomb raiding is filled with challenges. To
begin with, one must take into account the geographical location of this criminal activity,
which occurs in the vast fields of Italy as concealed as possible. One must also take into
account the further fact that, unlike other criminals, tombaroli are difficult to encounter
because they are rarely sentenced to prison.
As such, members of this illicit enterprise are not easily accessible, and criminologists
have not yet achieved direct access to tombaroli, forcing them to rely on other participants
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within the illicit antiquities trade like archaeologists (Proulx, 2010) or dealers (Mackenzie,
2005). The information produced by Carabinieri or the Guardia di Finanza in Italy is ample,
yet their goal is not to generate information for criminologists or other social scientists. This
is a problem that is not only encountered in this particular research, but one that has plagued
criminological research (Abadinsky, 1983; Cressey, 1967; Kenney, 2007).
Having witnessed the inherent difficulties to this research project, quantitative
methods may not be able to draw on the data necessary to address the proposed research
purposes. Generally, quantitative methods provide a general picture of associations,
relationships, and trends, with an emphasis on processes experienced by people, their
responses, the contexts where they interact, and their thoughts and behaviors governing their
responses (Creswell, 2013). Therefore, the fundamental assumptions and key features that
distinguish what it means to proceed from a qualitative stance fit well with this study.
These features refer to understanding the processes by which events and actions take
place, developing contextual understanding, facilitating interactivity between researcher and
participants, adopting an interpretative status, and maintaining design flexibility. There are
many reasons for the use of qualitative research techniques in the present study: the need to
study such a particular and hidden population like Italian tomb raiders, the desire to generate
richly detailed data, and the need for a deep understanding of this particular issue. This
research study is not an experimental effort but rather an interpretative one. Through all the
qualitative methods used, researchers strive to reveal meanings, through scientific inference,
by basing their interpretations on the observable data collected (in that sense, see Geertz,
1973).
More specifically, the study is most suited for a case study design, defined by Cressey
(2013) as a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary
bounded system over time, through detailed and in-depth data collection involving multiple
74

sources of information, resulting in a case description and case themes (see, among others,
Berg, 2004; Merriam, 1998; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2001). As
Merriam (1998) indicated, a qualitative case study fits well for understanding and interpreting
the looting of archaeological heritage perpetrated by tombaroli in Italy, as she states that,

A case study design is employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation
and meaning for those involved. The interest is in process rather than outcomes, in
context rather than a specific variable, in discovery rather than confirmation. Insights
gleaned from case study can directly influence policy, practice and future research (p.
19).

As such, the present research fits well with Merriam’s criteria as it sought to better
understand the phenomenon of Italian tomb raiding by trying to study the relationship
between traditional Italian organized crime and archaeological looting and how looters learn
and adapt to external factors during their careers. Case study research began by identifying
the specific case of tomb raiders, bounded by place, in different geographical areas of Italy
where tombaroli are active and by time, ranging from the last decades of last century to
current times. The cases are instrumental, as the intent is to understand the problem of
archaeological looting in Italy through them (Cressey, 2013; Stake, 1995). In order to achieve
an in-depth understanding of the case, many forms of qualitative data were collected,
including interviews, observations, documents, and audiovisual material.

3. Research sample
Qualitative sampling differs from quantitative sampling, as the former does not involve
drawing representative samples from a huge number of cases. As Flick (1998) states on
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qualitative research, “…it is their relevance to the research topic rather than their
representativeness which determines the way in which the people to be studied are selected”
(p. 41). This statement takes more relevance, once again, with the study of hidden
populations and especially with organized criminals. Several criminologists have targeted a
particular offender population, like Rawlinson (2008) with Russian criminals, Troshinky and
Blank (2008) with human traffickers, or Johansen (2008) with the illicit alcohol market in
Norway.
This qualitative research project is based on a sample selected through a combination
of purposive and snowball sampling procedure. Previous researchers within the field of
organized crime have used purposive sampling, which involves, according to Von Lampe
(2008), accessing specific participants identified beforehand as important for their research.
In this fashion, Junninen (2008) studied Finnish organized criminals, who purposively were
active during the 1990s in that country, with the goal to collect individual depictions of the
everyday life of professional criminals; in order to achieve this, the author established a list
of items that the sample had to fulfill. Arsovska (2008) also used this type of sampling
technique when researching Albanian criminals, by selecting a sample of participants
according to their expertise on the subject.
The interview sample consisted of police officers, prosecutors, archaeologists,
ministry officials, journalists, writers, criminologists, and tomb raiders. As mentioned, there
has been an effort to include in the sample representatives all groups who have a daily
experience with the phenomenon of tombaroli. Had the sample consisted of only one group,
the research project might have been seen either as unbalanced or even apologetic. As such,
the sample can be seen as a multiple data set including the views of all major groups affected
by looting, while at the same time retaining its focus on the activities of tombaroli.
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These sometimes conflicting accounts of particular issues between groups help to
provide a check on the overall veracity of data by the inclusion of different perspectives on
the research questions and enabling the comparability of data. A first stage of interviews
involved purposive sampling involving Italian police officers, prosecutors, archaeologists and
journalists. The subjects were selected based on their substantial expertise on the topic. After
an extensive systematic literature review including newspapers, academic articles, and
attendance of conferences in the field, a list was compiled of the names of active and retired
tombaroli, police officers, archaeologists, and journalists who had a prolonged contact with
the studied phenomenon.
A second stage of interviews involved snowball sampling (also known as network or
chain sampling: see Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2001) was used to locate tombaroli.
Many studies researching hidden, criminal populations use snowball sampling in order to
access their samples. Of the abovementioned studies in this section, most of them relied on
this technique. Examples of these research studies are Zhang and Chin’s (2002) study of
Chinese human smuggling organizations, Ruggiero and Khan’s (2006) study of drug supply
Asian networks in the United Kingdom, Siegel’s (2008) study of Russian Mafiosi, and
Antonopoulos’ (2008) study of retired cigarette smugglers. Subjects within the legal sphere
or from the community who had contacts with tomb raiders were seen as “seeds,” or those
who start the chain of referrals. Some of the contacted subjects indicated how they could
introduce the researcher both to well-known and more reserved tomb raiders. Annex B
summarizes the respondents’ data.
The inclusive criteria for all participants in all phases of this study was to be Italian
citizens aged eighteen or over and have knowledge of the phenomenon of archaeological
looting for at least two years both in the legal or illegal sphere, which is a delimiting time
frame that aimed to ensure a proper level of experience of the subject. Archaeologists and
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journalists with knowledge on the topic were exempted from the requirement of being an
Italian citizen. In these cases, however, it was required that they had spent at least two years
in Italy and had direct contact with the topic studied.
An important question to address is whether the sample is representative. Initially
fifty-one subjects were targeted as key informants and all were contacted with the intention
of creating a final sample frame of important members within the field of Italian
archaeological looting. These key informants were sought due to their substantial knowledge
of looting occurring in Italy, mostly based on their own professional experience. Only
twenty-four responded positively to the request for an interview. The rest declined due to
reasons as varied as health issues, conflicting schedules, not wanting to discuss criminal
activities, or simply not being interested, including those who never responded.
The most important interviews were with five former tombaroli, although two out of
these five were retired. These tombaroli were contacted either because they were famous
(they appeared frequently in the media, or have written books, for example) or because police
officers offered to introduce them; these tombaroli had functioned as police snitches (in
Italian, antenne). The sample, in consequence, is clearly biased, as qualitative samples tend to
be, in favor of those who responded positively to be interviewed. The contact with the fiftyone targets was done via phone call using Skype and when no phone number was available,
respondents were contacted via their emails. In these instances, a personalized letter was
emailed to the target, with a follow-up email sent if no reply was received within fifteen days.
A few of them never responded and were dropped from the sample.

4. Data collection
The central method to data collection was the qualitative interview. A total of 24 interviews
were conducted in Rome, Montalto di Castro, La Giustiniana, Montefiascone, Cerveteri and
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Naples, between December 2016 and July 2017. These data, as stated, consist of core of
interviews with a sample of key respondents in relation to the research questions that guide
this dissertation.
Most of the interviews involved interviewer and interviewee only, yet three
interviews were conducted with two, three and four interviewees simultaneously. The
interviews ranged in length between one and two hours, but most of the interviews were
approximately two hours long. The interviews took place in the privacy of the subjects’
homes, offices, a car, and discreet zones in bars. All of them were conducted using Italian as
the spoken language. Most of the interviews were recorded, after having read along with the
interviewee the informed consent and having answered doubts they might have regarding
their rights. However, some of the interviewees did not consent to being recorded, and then
their responses were written down as the interview proceeded. One of the interviewees could
not fit into his schedule the possibility of a meeting and responded via email.
The interviews were transcribed verbatim in Italian. Quotations from this in this
research project have been translated into English with no correction of grammar, to avoid
inadvertently altering the meaning. Insertions of fragments not coming from the interviewees
have been bracketed in regular type in order to differentiate them from their words, which
appear in italics. These are intended to clarify the interviewee’s statements or protect an
identity. Ellipses have been used to indicate an omission from the interviewee’s transcript, in
cases where, for example, non-essential phrases or sentences have been purposely left out in
order to present the data in a concise fashion.
The interviews were semi-structured, proceeding on the basis of the schedule of
questions listed in the questionnaires (see annex C and D for complete versions of the
questionnaires), though they occasionally departed from this schedule to explore areas that
the respondents saw as important or to pursue lines of inquiry that seemed pertinent but were
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unanticipated. Also, this format allowed keeping the interviewees on themes relevant to both
researched topics while allowing them, at the same time, to talk about their own experiences.
It was feared that an entirely unguided interview would have produced irrelevant data, while
a highly structured questionnaire would not have allowed space for the inclusion of topics
that the interviewees saw as relevant but might not have been considered when drafting the
questions.
In order to answer the general research question on organized crime and its subquestions, the respondents were asked about the involvement of large Italian criminal
organizations and also smaller organizations, and their possible involvement with Italian
looters. These criminal organizations have been culled from the most recent reports of
international police forces such as EUROPOL or INTERPOL. To answer whether tombaroli
shared traits with organized criminals, the chosen definitional list of factors used was the one
issued by the European Commission/EUROPOL/Council of Europe. As such, the same
criteria were used to answer this specific research question. Another list of items used in
order to enhance the European Commission/EUROPOL/Council of Europe list of factors is
Finckenauer’s (2005) criteria in order to assess whether a specific criminal group was either
an organized criminal group or whether they merely performed criminal activities that needed
to be organized.
These items include criminal sophistication and self-identification as attributes not
covered by the European Commission/EUROPOL/Council of Europe list, and structure, and
authority of reputation as items already covered by the previous checklist, yet used again.
Finally, in order to address the organization of tomb raiders, organizational structure as
theorized by Curtis (1995) and used in previous research such as Natarajan and Belanger
(1998) was used as a theoretical framework, albeit adapted to the case in hand.
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The organizational structure classification used covers the following four categories:
freelancers (or individuals who are described as such when there is no formal hierarchy or
division of labor) whose transactions occur without expectations for future transactions;
family businesses, where criminal activity may operate as a family operation and where a
division of labor may exist, but is not formally defined or structured; communal businesses,
where the division of labor is not formally defined, but rather flexible, mostly involving a
small group of people involved in the activity with a clearly identified boss; and corporations,
where the division of labor is clearly defined and corresponds to a defined formal structure
with a large number of individuals involved in the activities. To assess organizational and
structural elements of tombaroli, questions were asked on how looters organize themselves,
changes within the organizational structure, and levels of hierarchy.
In order to answer the general research question about organizational learning and
adaptation, questions were asked about how tombaroli learn to perform their tasks through
the classification of the learning of these tasks either in metis, understood as experimental or
intuitive knowledge or in techné, understood as abstract technical knowledge. The items used
to answer this specific research question also included information on apprenticeships; the
gathering, recording and storing of information; often and by whom the information is drawn.
Regarding competitive adaptation, the questionnaire uses two items: the adjustment of
behaviors in response either to past experiences or new information and whether there is a
learning process from past mistakes or just a simple reaction to these.
So far, this present section has described the main data-gathering technique employed
in this research project: the interview. It is also worth mentioning the usage of
autobiographies of tombaroli as data points. Biographies have long been used in criminology,
even though this discipline that remains skeptical as to the value of the information the
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individual has to offer. However, since the appearance of the Chicago School, the
biographical account has been an accepted data source.
Even though autobiographies are not deemed mainstream data points, and thus long
neglected, many advocate their resurrection as a tool for research development, recognizing
their methodological and theoretical advances (Goodey, 2000). The same can be said of
tombaroli’s biographies, which, once the justificatory and self-aggrandizing rhetoric is
purged, become important sources in a field where accessing this very hidden population is
time consuming. Other forms of documents used were official records and news stories
mostly, that subjects recommended and were consequently checked.

FIGURE 5. Since the 1980s, famous tombaroli have written their autobiographies.
This body of literature has been growing since then.
Source: the author (2017)
With these documents, qualitative document analysis was performed to integrate their
information as an additional source to the data provided by the interviewees. By analyzing
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their meaning, an attempt has been made to make theoretical sense of the autobiographies,
official documents, and some relevant pieces of news. As with other qualitative data treated
in this research project, the aim was to be systematic and analytic, but not so rigid as to be
unable to fit this information into the codes created after reading the transcripts.
Fieldwork included two trips to the Necropolis of Cerveteri, a heavily looted
archaeological side, with the intention to see first-hand the phenomenon from the participants
on both the legal side and illegal side. As such, one of the interviewed tombaroli suggested
that he should ask an old looter to guide him around an area filled with previously looted and
emptied tombs. Out of an entire morning visiting the area, information was compiled in the
form of memos, pictures, and video recordings. The old tombarolo was not interviewed with
the questionnaire, as his understanding of the questions was severely impaired due to age and
education.
The second trip to Cerveteri was scheduled with an interviewed archaeologist from
the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, in charge of international seizures of trafficked Italian
cultural heritage. That trip took an entire weekend and the opportunity to interview four
archaeologists and one tombarolo arose. Once again, the field trip allowed for the collection
of memos, pictures, and video recordings of a legal archaeological excavation and, most
importantly, the rapport between archaeologists and looters. A final method employed was
textual legal analysis, in order to document and critique the relevant laws, with the inclusion
of commentaries made both at the time of drafting those laws and thereafter, from a criminal
policy standpoint.

5. Data analysis
The transcription of the interviews produced a considerable amount of pages filled with data.
After transcribing the interviews, the challenge then became to make sense of the data,
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reduce the volume of information, identify significant patterns and construct a framework.
Because qualitative research seeks to develop an understanding of a particular phenomenon
from the perspective of those involved in it, according to Maxwell (2013), a content analysis
of the data obtained in the interviews and several other supports was conducted. This method
of analysis is appropriate for analyzing different forms of communication (Ellis, Hartley &
Walsh, 2010; Kraska & Lawrence Neuman, 2008; Lichtman, 2014; Spencer et al, 2014;
Withrow, 2014). Within the case study approach, it was decided to opt for an embedded
analysis, described as an analysis of specific aspects of the case (Yin, 2009).
The content analysis was focused mostly on the interviews, which are the main data
source of the dissertation. The goal was to identify themes emerging from both general and
sub-questions. As the transcriptions were in Italian, the responses were read in order to
discover emerging patterns and themes through an interpretative lens that fits with an
exploratory research project like the present one.
Broadly, data were coded, analyzed, and organized first by research question and then
by categories and subcategories. More specifically, in the open coding stage of the analysis,
the codes developed over time as they began to be filled by the data. If codes started too
broad, eventually they became narrower. More often, what was coded in early interviews was
then shown through links with texts in later interviews to be a specific part of a larger area of
interest. As a result, the process of open coding proceeded not only as an exercise of tagging
data, but also as a conscious, intellectual task of producing themes. Initially created tags were
themselves organized, enabling fully saturated and all-inclusive codes to emerge.
Analytic categories are directly aligned with each of the project’s research questions.
In fact, these same analytic categories were used to code the data and will be used to present
the findings. In the analysis, connecting patterns were primarily sought within the analytic
categories, as well as the connections or themes that emerged among various categories. As a
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secondary level of analysis, the relevant theory and produced research were tied in, as these
themes are compared and contrasted to issues raised by the literature.
The analysis followed the open, axial, and selective coding stages (Creswell, 2013;
Kraska & Neuman, 2008). In the open coding phase, data were organized under twenty-two
codes. In the axial coding phase, these twenty-two codes were filed under five category
headings, which seemed to best represent the common themes shared by groups of coded
data. In the selective coding phase, the relationship with the axial codes was examined, so the
connections between codes could be explained.
Instrumentally speaking, alphanumeric codes were assigned and identified in a colorcoded chart sheet that guided the created data matrix in three spreadsheets: one for the
matrix, one for the codebook, and a final one for frequencies. Transcribed and coded
quotations that were deemed important and relevant were cut and pasted into the data matrix.
The goal was to articulate a number of themes that were linked together, either similarly or
divergently, in a way that they could collectively analyze archaeological looting perpetrated
by tombaroli in Italy nowadays and answer the research questions.
In order to achieve this goal, a three-layered process was followed: a first layer
involved the examination and comparison of threads and patterns within categories; a second
layer involved the same work but this time across categories; finally, a third layer placed the
information gathered with respect to prior research, thus comparing and contrasting issues
raised in the previous chapter about the literature. All three layers were iteratively taken into
account simultaneously while conducting the data analysis. The obtained results not only
informed a presentation and a discussion of them, but also revealed directions for broader
implications of research. As a result, both conclusions but also practical and research-based
recommendations could be formulated.
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Qualitative analysis allowed for the respondent’s answers to tell a story regarding
Italian archaeological looting, thus creating meaning for the responses of the interviewees
and allowing an interpretative reading of the data. Once keywords, phrases, and themes were
identified, findings were produced that allowed research questions to be answered. The focus
on these key issues allows one to understand the complexity of the phenomenon but not to
generalize about it. By the way of thick description (Denzin, 2001), a broad range of
experiences were documented, thereby providing an opportunity for the reader to better
understand the reality of archaeological looting in Italy. The emphasis throughout the
following two chapters is to let participants speak for themselves. Illustrative quotations
taken from interview transcripts attempt to portray multiple participant perspectives and
capture some of the richness and complexity of the subject matter. Where appropriate, critical
incident data are woven in with interview data to augment and solidify the discussion.

6. Ethical considerations
At the same time that the proposal of this dissertation was defended, Institutional Review
Board (IRB) clearance was obtained (project number 601567-1). The IRB at John Jay
College of Criminal Justice deemed the study’s risk level as “More than Minimal Risk.”
Specifically, the IRB’s one main concern was that this type of sampling may expose the
tombaroli to breach of confidentiality by referring to other participants. In order to avoid this
risk, looters were not asked to refer to other looters, and the five of them were interviewed in
different geographical locations. For those participants within the legal sphere, there was no
further risk to their reputation or safety, as they were interviewed mostly in their workplaces
regarding their knowledge about looting and their line of work fighting against it. There were
no personal risks involved.
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The IRB approval process also involved a close examination of both the consent
protocol and the questionnaire. Specifically, some of the questions were modified after
notification to IRB and the subsequent approval, and the Informed Consent Document (ICD)
was revised to simplify language to the 6th grade level and reduce jargon. Once the IRB at
John Jay College of Criminal Justice set the parameters for the interviews, these guidelines
informed the events.
It was anticipated that no physical or psychological discomfort tarnished this research
project by either affecting the research participants or the researcher. However, this research
project employed various safeguards to protect both the participants and their rights. Given
that the licit research subjects were police officers, archaeologists, officials from the Ministry
of Culture, prosecutors, judges, and journalists and that the illicit research subjects were
tombaroli, there was no intention of using deception or covert observation, which pose
serious ethical threats to research. Also, there was no group that belonged to any special
population, given that tomb raiding is an activity that does not involve prison terms.
Therefore, the research project eliminated both the risk of coercion and the creation of new
inequalities.
Interviewees were offered, at the moment of explaining the informed consent, both
confidentiality and, above all, anonymity. Some of the interviewees took it while others had
no problem with their names being attached to a forthcoming presentation of the data or
publication of this project. However, it was decided to mitigate risks concerning the privacy
of the respondents by adhering to a strict process of protecting their identity through the
usage of pseudonyms. None of the interviewees requested to see and approve their transcript
before it entered the dissertation.
Observing illegal behavior was not central to this particular research project, but as
the study revolved around tomb raiding in Italy, it involved direct discussion of it. In order to
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improve the chance of tombaroli participating in the present research project, the aim of the
discussion was directed towards the key topics presented in this research project. Possible
incriminating information appearing in the data was acknowledged and discussed with the
participants.
Informed consent is not only a fundamental principle of ethical research but also a
priority throughout the study. In that sense, informed consent became pivotal in avoiding
risks regarding the disclosure of incriminating information. After discussing the overall
design of the interviews with each participant, informed consent was requested verbally. The
option of requesting consent verbally was based, in this research project, upon the fact that
many participants might find it risky to review and sign forms. Likewise, Troshinky and
Blank’s (2008) research on sex traffickers used this form of consent. Since the name and the
signature of the participants are the only elements that link them to the research project, the
signed consent would be the only means allowing for the identification of the respondent's
responses, and also for the risk of breach of confidentiality. Also, as the research topic is
sensitive, waiving the signature of the subjects reduced possible harm.
No comments were repeated outside of the interview setting, and no statements were
ever directly linked to the names of the respondents. Their concerns were addressed as
frequently as participants asked them, and they knew they could discontinue their
participation in this study at any time. When interviewees allowed themselves to be recorded,
these files were destroyed once transcribed. Information was recorded in files protected by
encryption and password generating software, stored on a non-networked and passwordprotected hard drive, and a matrix of passwords was stored under lock and key in a hard file
in a safe. In sum, the participants’ rights and interests had priority whenever choices arose
regarding both the reporting and dissemination of the data related to their privacy and the risk
of breach of confidentiality. The main aim throughout the study was to maintain
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confidentiality and to protect the subjects, not only in this research project but also in every
publication thereof, even though sometimes this is not entirely under the control of the
principal researcher.

7. Issues of data trustworthiness and derived limitations
During the entire period of the data collection process, the nature of the researcher’s
relationship with the participants was of interviewer (whose professional background was
always disclosed to all participants) and interviewee. As months passed and interviews were
conducted, the researcher’s role evolved from a position of outsider. The interviewees saw
the researcher as a curious scholar from Spain (the trait of being a foreigner has to be
emphasized, when reactivity is concerned) interested in the topic of archaeological looting,
generously devoting him some of their time and seemingly pleased to have a receptive mind
to whom they could present their task and impressions. As an example, interviewees often
commented that they found it amusing that a Spanish criminologist wanted to know about
Italian archaeological looting, a topic they also felt had not deserved enough attention even in
their own country by their own criminology scholars. Interviews were conducted in fluent
Italian, which was seen as an asset. Questionnaires were translated with the help of an Italian
philologist, in order to refine the pitch and delivery with the goal of clarifying meaning and
avoiding possible misunderstandings while interviewing expert respondents.
As interviews progressed, a bank of information from previous interviews was
amassed that was used in establishing a different rapport from previous encounters. Up to that
moment, the establishment of rapport was aided by sharing race, class and, in most instances,
educational level. In most instances, gender was also shared, as few female subjects were
interviewed, and none of them, tombaroli. Two of them were archaeologists; and finally, an
expert who wrote about tombaroli. It was an aim of this research project to have a diverse
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sample, both regarding age and gender; however, it must be noted that regarding tombaroli,
there is only one account in the existing literature about the involvement of women in this
kind of illicit activity (Perticarari & Giuntani, 1986).
With the passing of time, the researcher’s role evolved towards, becoming an insider
in the field. For example, both tombaroli and other interviewees made some confidences at
particular moments; put a lot of effort in the snowball process; or allowed questions about
them which otherwise would have been deemed impertinent. Specifically with tombaroli,
after gaining their trust through previous meetings before the interviews took place, they
ended up speaking freely about their illegal activities to what they thought was a sympathetic
listener.
The nationality of the researcher was the most significant impediment, concerning
rapport, with one particular group: law enforcement officials. Specifically, it created a
difficulty about the potentially sensitive information that they could provide during
interviews, especially if they were members of the highest ranks within the force. Also,
tombaroli, who live in rural areas, posed a cultural challenge, due to being an outsider to a
rural community in another country. As such, gaining trust and rapport was anticipated as a
difficulty, given that some qualitative literature in the field has already stressed this particular
issue (Migliore, 1991). As rapport was of paramount importance, the norm was to always
interview tombaroli on a second (or third or so forth) occasion.
All of the key informants understood the purpose of this research project: a doctoral
dissertation on tombaroli with the sole goal of research. It cannot be ruled out that subjects
from the sample lied or that their memories were flawed or biased. Concerning law
enforcement officials, one of their biased effects could have been to exaggerate the
magnitude of the problem. In any case, it cannot be asserted that these biases have been fully
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eliminated from the analysis. A further degree of triangulation has been built into the study in
order to attempt to diminish the possible impact of these biases.
A multi-data approach typical of case studies was chosen, which gave further
confidence in the validity of the collected data. Steps were taken to ensure the maximum
strength of the validity of the obtained data: to begin with, law enforcement officials were not
only high-ranking officials with a bureaucratically inclined mind but also low-ranking
officers who have roamed the Italian fields trying to dismantle illicit diggings. Interview data
were situated in a study of the existing literature on the issue of looting in Italy, which gives
the raw data context; however, data that interviewees gave was validated through other
external sources. In order to obtain stronger data reliability, information was crosschecked,
confirming that the original informant was not the source of the corroborated information. If
assertions could not be verified they were not included in the stage of data analysis. Efforts
were made to locate evidence that built a code or a theme from different sources. This
evidence was then used to triangulate information in order to provide validity in the findings.
The second technique used to strengthen validity was the use of rich data by the
compilation of transcripts from the interviews and memos. Participants’ reactions and the
changes throughout the research processes were documented before the actual analysis of the
data. Rich data has an impact on reliability, as procedures have been documented in order to
demonstrate how coding schemes and themes have been used consistently. In order to do so,
research journals and memos provided an audit trail on how the information was collected
and analyzed, chronicling the evolution of the research project and documenting every
rationale for possible choices made during the process. In sum, triangulation of data sources
and data collection methods tried to yield a fuller and richer picture of the phenomenon of
tombaroli from a criminological point of view, while counterbalancing flaws inherent to the
usage of a single method.
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Regarding content, as other studies that inquired about the level of permeation of
organized crime in the looting of antiquities have acknowledged as a limitation,
archaeologists might not know what organized crime is or what forms organized crime adopt
in a specific geographical area; or they might even have culturally biased images of what
constitutes organized crime (Bowman, 2008; Proulx, 2011a, 2011b). The same can be said of
the archaeologists and experts consulted in this dissertation; the degree of knowledge about
organized crime varied from respondent to respondent. And once again it is worth
mentioning that, regarding tombaroli, there is always the possibility that they are not telling
the truth about such a thorny issue for them.

8. Conclusions
This chapter has provided the reader with a detailed description of the dissertation’s research
methods. Qualitative case study methodology was used to study the problem and
phenomenon of contemporary Italian tomb raiding. Data collection was made through
interviews mostly, where the participant sample was made up of 24 purposely selected
individuals, who through snowball sampling, permitted the interviewing of five tombaroli.
Other forms of qualitative data were observations, documents, and audiovisual material.
The resulting data were reviewed against the literature about this phenomenon as well
as emergent themes that appeared in the analysis phase. An analysis enabled key themes from
the findings to be identified. Through a comparison with the literature, interpretations, and
conclusions were drawn, and recommendations were offered. Finally, trustworthiness issues
were accounted for and mitigated through several techniques. Now that the explanation of
this research project’s methodology is complete, it is time to assess the first of the two issues
that motivates this dissertation: what is the nature of the relationship between tombaroli and
organized crime?
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CHAPTER 4
UMBERTO, IL MARCHIGIANO, L’ORFEO, FARGETTA… E TUTTI GLI ALTRI:4
TOMBAROLI AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
WITH ORGANIZED CRIME

“It would seem that he had connections with people from the south.”
“Are they getting interested in art now?” Brunetti asked.
“Yes, it seems drugs and prostitutes aren’t enough anymore.”
(Leon, 1996)

Writers and journalists alike are passionate about cultural heritage crime. Unfortunately, they
often draw hasty conclusions about the subject to attract readers. For example, on the 12th of
January 2015, Ferrante, Teodonio and Viettone (2015), journalists in one of the biggest news
outlets of Italy, La Repubblica, published a story named I tesori dell’arte nelle mani della
mafia (The treasures of art in the hands of the Mafia). With this running headline, it looks
like the press has solved a mystery that scholars keep debating: traditional Italian organized
crime has both a solid link and an interest in archaeological heritage.
In the article, some well-known Italian crime bosses’ names are mingled with those
already famous antique dealers that have been the main protagonists of previous years’ court
cases. Already in the first paragraph, the journalists link mafia bosses Matteo Messina
Denaro and Giuseppe Fontana to dealer Gianfranco Becchina. Furthermore, a cartoon tries to
illustrate this relation depicting an attendee of an exhibition who is carefully observing a
modern painting, labeled Collezione Totò Riina, referring to the infamous and very violent
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Umberto, the guy from Le Marche, Orfeo, Fargetta... and all the others.
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boss of bosses in the Italian mafia, as if the paintings in the exhibit have been lent by the
mobster to the museum.
This case is an example of the passion used when reporting about cultural heritage
crime and organized crime; this passion, however, does not translate into scientific
knowledge. The article is a missed opportunity to enlighten readers. It refers to both art and
archaeology (thus mixing two different cultural heritage crime forms: art theft and
archaeological looting); it does not mention tombaroli as the source of the trafficked material;
and it uses examples that are a decade old, such as, the then fourteen-year-old case against
Gianfranco Becchina.
Is it true that the Italian mafia is interested in archaeological goods? Is the notion of
archaeomafia a myth or a reality? In order to answer this question, this chapter integrates
both relevant findings from research conducted in Italy and the existing literature. This
chapter argues that this belief is inaccurate. This chapter allows the reader to explore the
relationship of tombaroli and organized crime by taking them on a journey that not only
traverses Italian archaeological necropolises nearby tiny towns but also other important
places such as the headquarters of the art squad of the Italian police and the vaults of the
Italian ministry of culture. Finally, appendix B provides the reader with a detailed list of all
those who have participated in the present research project and who appear in this chapter.

1. Tombaroli and the relationship with traditional Italian organized crime
Chapter two proved that most of the forty-six articles did not see any kind of relationship
between organized crime and tombaroli. Only a few articles considered traditional Italian
organized crime to have an investment in the traffic of illicitly obtained antiquities in Italy,
and a majority of them neither denied nor supported any involvement of tombaroli in Italian
organized crime. It is precisely this conundrum within literature that generates so many
94

questions surrounding the relationship between traditional Italian organized crime and
tombaroli. Based on the available data, what can be said about this contested relationship
between tombaroli and traditional Italian organized crime? Three important results
concerning this relationship are described in the following sections. Before presenting these
results it must be remembered that the Italian criminal organizations presented in this section
have been culled from the most recent reports of international police forces such as
EUROPOL or INTERPOL; thus the groups covered include minor ones as well as the most
important ones.

1.1. Italian organized crime is not specialized in cultural heritage
The first important finding is the lack of interest of organized crime in archaeology when
compared to the attention organized criminals have paid to other manifestations of cultural
heritage such as paintings or sculptures, to name a few. Existing literature and the majority of
expert respondents (strongly) disagreed regarding a possible relationship between tombaroli
and organized crime. Less than half of the respondents (strongly) agreed with this possible
relationship, yet the literature did not back their opinions.
Many interviewed experts thought that even in archaeological areas that exist in
provinces where important organized crime groups are rampant, there is little evidence that
these groups are trafficking with archaeological items. This lack of interest is mostly based
on the fact that organized criminals are more prone to steal art than loot archaeological items,
as it is easier to take well-known, valuable pieces instead of learn to find unknown pieces
buried in unearthed tombs.
Italian traditional organized crime does steal works of art. Tristano is a professor at
the University of Naples who was interviewed on-line, who claimed that
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Cases are too numerous to name them all. Examining magistrate Diana De Martino in
the 2012 National Anti-Mafia Directorate affirmed: “The involvement of characters
belonging to mafia crime in theft and possession of some of the most important works
stolen from the state's patrimony is documented in investigative and procedural
acquisitions.” Artworks have been discovered and confiscated at the homes’ of bosses
such as Beniamino Zappia, Gioacchino Campolo, boss Michele Zagaria and others
(Tristano, e-mail communication, May 19, 2017).

Both extant literature and Tristano highlighted important cases of Italian cultural
heritage stolen by organized crime, even though in most instances data come from journalists
who only describe the incidents. The first case involved the theft of a masterpiece by
Caravaggio, stolen on October 16, 1969, from the altar of the chapel of San Lorenzo in the
Sicilian capital, Palermo. A former Mafioso-turned-informant claimed in 1996 that he had
stolen the work on the orders of boss Gaetano Badalamenti. Others say an amateur lifted it
and peddled it to the Mafia. Theories have circulated that rats and pigs ruined it while it was
stored at a farm; while others thought it could even be hidden in another country (Scarlini,
2012).
The second case involved a car bomb on May 27, 1993, which exploded in a street
behind the Uffizi Gallery, killing six people, wounding twenty-six others, and destroying or
damaging dozens of works in the gallery's priceless art collection. Three works (one by the
17th-century Dutch painter van Honthorst and two by the Italian Manfredi were destroyed)
and thirty others, including The Death of Adonis, by del Piombo, were badly damaged. Italian
authorities, after investigating the attack, ascribed the explosion to the Mafia (Iannizzotto,
2006).
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A third case of organized crime preying on other forms of cultural heritage occurred
in Caserta, a province near Naples. Carlo, an archaeologist who works for the Ministry of
Culture, explained that Caserta is well known for being an important stronghold of Camorra,
one of the Italian organized crime groups. Someone within the group was interested in
stealing artistic structures from buildings to embellish their houses. Carlo participated in the
police operation that ended seizing stolen marble staircases and other artistic elements such
as columns, friezes, or even stone slabs, among others, looted from the famous Borbonic
palace of Carditello in Regi Lagni (Erbani, 2011). However, while these cases have been
documented and attributed to organized crime, they obviously do not fit within the scope of
this dissertation, as they do not involved looted antiquities. What these cases illustrate is the
fact that organized criminals are better suited to steal, bomb, or plunder rather than excavate
and loot in search of archaeological goods.
Interviewed experts noted that economic reasons explain why traditional Italian
organized crime groups do not engage in the looting of tombs. Organized crime groups who
are used to amassing large profits trafficking other illegal commodities cannot expect to
achieve the same profits with archaeological items. After all, other commodities can be
produced or obtained en masse while archaeological items can be hard to find, are nonrenewable, and are not valuable enough to justify this permanent involvement of organized
crime.
One of the oldest tombaroli, Alfredo, who has been excavating for many decades,
talked about his gains during his active years. Alfredo used to be an important looter until he
decided to quit after being caught for the second time. Now he works as a repairman and a
supervisor near Lake Bolsena, in the north of Italy, in the province of Viterbo, where the
interview was conducted. As stated by the former looter,
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In an area like Bisenzio, where we dug, most of the objects we found in the tombs
could be, the objects that were inside could be around two million lire a day, do you
understand? They carried an average of two million lire a day ($1227). As we were
four in the group, it was just about 500,000 lire ($307). So, as you can see, it's not that
there were huge profits, do you understand? That's why you cannot talk about
organized crime. Organized crime won’t get dirt on their hands for 500,000 lire, do
you understand? (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017).

Despite the media’s sensationalistic portrayals of mafia connections to the tombaroli, this
statement by an actual tombaroli perfectly explains organized crime’s lack of interest in
archaeological looting.
This lack of interest in archaeological items has created organized crime’s lack of
specialization in this sort of trafficking. Furthermore, it is even rare to find this sort of
trafficking combined with other smuggled goods. As stated, for these organized criminals to
have access to archaeological items buried in tombs, they would either need the collaboration
of tombaroli, or learn to do that task themselves. Data collected in this study did not find any
solid evidence for either of these scenarios.
Extant literature highlights the lack of evidence supporting organized crime groups’
specialization in antiquities along other illegal goods such as drugs. For example, the possible
connection between the illicit traffic in antiquities and the illicit trafficking of narcotics (to
use drugs as an example) is, in the words of Yates (2014), often discussed but poorly
understood. As the author claims, many of the primary centers of narcotics cultivation also
experience looting of archaeological sites, while at the same time many of the countries
where there is a demand for narcotics are also consumers of illicit antiquities. Yet Yates
(2014) conducted ethnographic research in Guatemala focusing on the nexus between drugs
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and illicit antiquities, and makes discoveries similar to what has been uncovered in the
present research project; the archaeologist found that “…most likely the actual cartels are not
actively or specifically engaging in the looting of Maya sites or the trafficking of Maya
antiquities… The evidence for a direct connection simply is not there, at least not yet” (p.
34).
As briefly stated, the same could be applied to the Italian case. Expert respondents
claimed that the connection between drugs or other trafficked goods and trafficking of
antiquities does not occur in Italy as in other countries in the world. Back in Rome,
prosecutor Bartolo, who specialized in prosecuting criminal cases involving important
archaeological pieces trafficked outside Italy, labeled the relationship between organized
crime and tombaroli as very diluted and further argued that this form of criminality cannot be
compared to other criminal organizations that operate worldwide or even to established
criminal organizations operating in Italy. In any case, the expert stated that the problem with
tombaroli is completely different from manifestations observed in Colombia or in Peru,
where trafficking of antiquities is strongly linked to drug trafficking; in Italy, these ties do not
exist (Interview, Olgiata, 2017). In sum, Italian expert respondents conclude that they have
not witnessed any possible specialization of organized crime regarding archaeological
looting.

1.2. Italian organized crime controls the terrain where tombaroli might excavate in the
south of the country but not in the north
Expert respondents in the north, where there has always been a prevalent activity of
tombaroli because of the high concentration of Etruscan necropolises, highlight the fact that
there is no presence in the north of criminal organizations or the infiltration of organized
crime groups from the south. According to these experts, in the north the involvement in
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looting is done occasionally at a small-scale and at a local level, as always happens in towns,
nearby the necropolises where the pieces might be found. Their points of view agree with
existing literature defining looting as the task of small town inhabitants who occasionally loot
(Carabinieri, 2008; Isman, 2009a; Pastore, 2001; Pastore, 2011; Watson & Todeschini, 2006).
In fact, Maffio and Riccardo, police officers working at the archaeological section of
the art squad of Carabinieri, denied that the situation in the south is out of control and in the
hands of organized crime. By contrast, some documentary accounts, such as Hamblin (1970)
or Stille (1999), depict entire teams of tombaroli working under the rule of a local Mafioso.
However, these sources are outdated and do not seem to represent the reality of looting in the
South nowadays (thus having the effect of perpetuating the myth of mafia involvement), as
police officers stated. According to these expert respondents forces, tombaroli in the south
are the same as tombaroli in the north.
As such, the involvement of organized crime in archaeological zones in the south is
still unverified. A retired Vice-Commandant of the Carabinieri’s art squad, Enrico, who
during his years in the force commanded many art police divisions, stated that organized
crime groups in the south have been found with looted archaeological items, yet these are
anecdotal accounts involving individuals, not entire organizations. In his opinion, these
criminal organizations do not have a specialized investment in looted antiquities (Interview,
Rome, 2016).
These claims are consistent both with the literature on archaeological looting that
claims that looting is a local, small business both in the north and in the south of Italy
(Carabinieri, 2008; Isman, 2009a; Pastore, 2001, 2011; Watson & Todeschini, 2006) and also
on the dynamics and criminal mobility of organizations across Italy. The south, called by
Italians il mezzogiorno, is the zone where Italian organized crime has historically thrived.
Through an excess of clientelism, patronage, vast construction projects, among other
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elements, organized crime expanded from its original cities and towns to other spots that
were free of it (Stille, 1993). But expert respondents claim that there are no organized crime
groups moving to the north to control the flow of looted antiquities, as they would to control
other financial or real estate assets (Di Nicola & Savona, 1998).
Another retired interviewee, the tombarolo Gennaro, referred to the only known case
of involvement of an organized crime group in the north. Gennaro, who raided tombs for
decades, witnessed the great raid of Italian archaeological heritage, and sold looted items to
all the important dealers of the time, claimed that he heard from a trustworthy source (the
respondent did not want to provide information about the source) in his town that if they
found a valuable item, tombaroli had to give it to Cosa Nostra. Likewise, buyers had to
acquire the goods through this criminal organization. Worried, he finished stating that this
was not a good scenario because he thought that tombaroli in the town are not prepared to
face a structure such as Cosa Nostra (Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017). The story has not
been corroborated by other sources and is thus labeled as anecdotal.
The only differentiating factor in the looting of archaeological heritage between the
Italian north and south refers to the control of the territory by certain organized groups.
Maffio, one of the two Carabinieri interviewed in Rome, stated how

In the south of Italy, criminal organizations hold a lot of power in the land they
control. Evidently, that land might be filled with archaeological riches, thus making
the task of looters difficult, who need to confront these criminal organizations and pay
fees. That is not the case of the north, where tombaroli are free to excavate where
they please as there is no possession of lands by organized crime in the northern
provinces (Interview, Rome, 2017).
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Giuseppe, an investigative journalist, also shares this point of view. When
interviewed in Rome, he stated that in southern areas heavily controlled by traditional
organized crime groups such a Puglia, Calabria, or Sicily the control of the territory exercised
by these groups is higher than that exercised by law enforcement. For example, the control of
the territory in Calabria, Puglia, or Sicily by organized crime does not allow Sicilian
tombaroli to excavate without the permission of whoever governs that area (Interview, Rome,
2016).
Therefore, several expert respondents thought that no one in the south can excavate
without their permission. Another important investigative journalist, Linda, stated that if
looters are not approved to dig there by ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra, or the Sacra Corona
Unita, they cannot dig (Interview, Rome, 2017). This statement coincides with what Luigi
Perticarari, the famous tombarolo, stated in his autobiography. He had knowledge that in the
region of Campania one had to pay an organized crime boss in order to be able to dig
(Perticarari & Giuntani, 1986).
Andrea, archeologist, and Luca, expert, both working at the Italian Ministry of
Culture stated how they had never found evidence of organized crime controlling territory in
the north. However, they think that wherever there is a criminal organization controlling the
land, it follows that there is at least a control of the archaeological looting that happens in the
area perpetrated by its members (Interview, Rome, 2017).
In sum, many expert respondents claimed not to have witnessed the involvement of
organized crime in archaeological looting in the south. They also claimed that there is no
influence of criminal groups of the south involved in the looting of northern archeological
sites. However, they thought it was plausible that tombaroli might have to pay to excavate
territory that was controlled by organized criminals.

102

1.3. Anecdotal participation of traditional Italian organized crime groups in
archaeological looting
So far the conclusion is that evidence does not point towards an involvement of traditional
organized crime in archaeological looting. However, if one accepts the assumption that there
might be some tenuous involvement of organized crime groups with archaeological looting,
then the next step would be to ask respondents which group(s) might participate in the
trafficking of illicitly obtained antiquities in Italy.
According to Finckenauer (2005), “Mafia is a social construct. It is an idea. It is a
cultural artifact. As such, it extends beyond the people, the places, and the activities that
comprise it” (p. 73). This idea, this cultural artifact, however, can be translated into reality
and labeled by law enforcement as a serious threat (see, for example, EUROPOL, 2013). The
four Italian Mafia-type organizations are the Sicilian Mafia, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, the
Neapolitan Camorra, and the Apulian Sacra Corona Unita, among others in the region
(Abadinsky, 2010; Antimafia, 2016; EUROPOL, 2013; Santino, 2003).
According to EUROPOL’s (2013) analysis of these four groups, Cosa Nostra, is the
oldest and most widespread group of the Sicilian mafia. Some younger groups include the socalled Stidda and important clans not affiliated with Cosa Nostra such as the Cursottis and the
Laudanis, which, unlike Cosa Nostra, are not centralized, and manage their activities, mostly
violent heists, individually. Cosa Nostra mostly deals with several criminal operations with a
particular increase in cocaine trafficking and the subsequent money laundering, while
cooperating with other criminal organizations worldwide. In comparison to the Neapolitan
Camorra, they tend to keep a low profile, whereas Camorra bosses tend to sport a flashy
lifestyle. Another difference is that Camorra is a horizontal cluster of clans and families,
fighting against each other. Their principal criminal activities include drug trafficking,
cigarette smuggling, illicit waste dumping or the production of counterfeit currency.
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‘Ndrangheta has become one of the richest and most powerful criminal organizations
in the world because of their good relationships with producers of cocaine. This organization
has a dominant position not only in the European drug market but has also infiltrated legal
markets such as transport, real estate, and construction, through corruption, while attempting
to expand worldwide through migrant communities from Calabria. The organization is
constituted through units named ‘ndrine with a hierarchical structure. Finally, in Apulia law
enforcement has traced the activities of several groups such as Sacra Corona Unita, Società
Foggiana, the Camorra Barese or the Gargano’s mafia. These groups all started with petty
criminal activities and moved to more ambitious activities such as drugs, weapons, or human
trafficking (EUROPOL, 2013). In sum, as Santino (2003) states, “There is not a monarchy…
in the organized crime world, but there are many republics that variously interact and are
protagonists of the international division of criminal labor” (p. 83).
The respondents in this study were asked to elaborate on the traditional Italian
organized criminal groups that could be involved in archaeological looting. The respondents
could choose between the groups identified in the previous paragraphs (Cosa Nostra,
Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, Sacra Corona Unita) and an open option that would include smaller,
lesser-known groups such as Stidda or minor clans. Because of the possibility that all of these
groups could be involved in antiquities looting, the respondents could name them all or, at
least, several of them if they so wished. Figure 6 charts their responses.
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FIGURE 6: Responses of participants about which criminal groups tombaroli might
cooperate with (N = 24).
Source: the author
The majority of the respondents thought that there was no involvement of specific
Italian organized crime groups with archaeological looting. This response establishes a
logical continuity with the previous sections, which reported the lack of evidence supporting
the relationship between traditional Italian organized crime groups and tombaroli, based on
the lack of interest of organized crime towards the trafficking of archaeological material, the
lack of the specialization in this type of traffic, and the absence of a stable trend of cases
instead of sporadic incidents.
Out of the available existing groups, most of the expert respondents referred to Cosa
Nostra in Sicily. However, their responses were all geared towards the control of the territory
that Cosa Nostra’s Mafiosi exert over tombaroli. For example, Roberto, a criminology
professor at University of Rome-III, highlighted that although he has not been able to
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substantiate a contact point between tombaroli and organized crime, mafiosi in Sicily control
the territory. Moreover, Roberto focused on the fact that looting of archaeological items it is
not a criminal business that involves mafia-type organized crime, but it is a business that
emerges in a sector already heavily controlled by mafia-type organized crime (Interview,
Rome, 2017).
A parallel example would be the crime labeled as “ortomafia.” Organized crime is
involved with agricultural products grown in regions controlled by Cosa Nostra, such as
mozzarella or olive oil (Lavorgna & Sergi, 2014). Similarly, Agrigento, a province on the
island of Sicily, is both a territory that is controlled by the Cosa Nostra and a zone rich in
archaeological heritage. Like these other cases organized crime profits from the benefits
derived from controlling areas rich with tombs, but it does not necessarily control the tomb
raiding trade.
Beyond this control, however, there is little evidence of the Cosa Nostra’s
involvement in the trafficking of antiquities. Interviews, literature, and other sources
repeatedly refer to two important cases regarding the possible participation of Cosa Nostra in
archaeological looting. One was the case of the well-known mafia boss Matteo Messina
Denaro, who ordered the theft of the Satiro Danzante (The Dancing Satyr), a bronze statue
attributed to Praxiteles, the great Greek sculptor of the 4th century BCE.
Although the full details are still unclear, the mafia boss seems to have wanted to steal
the statue in order to sell it to a foreign art collector (although others claim he wanted the
statue himself); in doing so, he proclaimed his power in the area of Mazara del Vallo over
boss Natale Bonafede. Still, this instance is not representative of the interest of organized
crime in archaeological looting as the statue was found in the sea, and not by tombaroli.
However, Matteo’s father was Francesco Messina Denaro, a mafia boss who began his
criminal career as a tombaroli in Sicily, exploiting the archaeological site of Selinunte during
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the years of greatest activity of looters (Isman, 2009b). Francesco Messina Denaro was
probably the tombarolo that Hamblin (1970) mentioned in her account of archaeological
looting in Sicily, as recounted in chapter two of this dissertation.
The other case refers to the brother of the famous convicted art dealer Giacomo
Medici, Roberto. In September 1973 he and a friend, Ferdinando Mateucci, drove towards the
south. After two days, Roberto Medici’s car was found completely burned in the town of San
Cesareo, in the province of Lecce, in Puglia. Roberto Medici and Ferdinando Mateucci were
never found. Giacomo Medici testified that his brother was sent to the south with a huge
amount of cash to buy art, yet he fell prey of the son of Don Mico Tripodo, a boss of the
Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta (Isman, 2009a). However, this case again fails to clearly link
organized crime with tombaroli.
In sum, both cases do not provide clear evidence of a relationship between organized
crime and archaeological trafficking. As Giuseppe, the investigative journalist, summarized
after commenting on these cases, there is no way of knowing more at the moment about this
involvement. Certainly, in some cases Mafiosi have been found with archaeological items.
However, it is also evident that the Mafioso certainly did not dig the tomb himself, because
he is not capable of doing so; if interested, he will need someone who does it for him. And
what they do is use tombaroli. As the expert stated, “… when you have a contiguity of
territory, business becomes communal, right? Inevitably” (Interview, Rome, 2016).
Camorra and Sacra Corona Unita have been the second most mentioned organized
crime groups after Cosa Nostra by expert respondents. Giorgio is a retired police officer from
the Italian finance police. He worked in the art squad and thought that Camorra, a group so
involved in the trafficking of drugs had to be also involved in antiquities. More precisely, he
stated that the Finance Police had encountered cases where both drugs and antiquities were
involved. According to him, “…there is a connection because there is always a chance of
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making money with archaeology” (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017). The respondent, however,
could not offer any information on these cases, and a search for other sources did not provide
any relevant results. Pieces of news only mentioned feeble links between Camorra and the
trafficking of antiquities. Although the criminal group’s name appeared in the headline, there
was no mention of it in the body of the piece (In Primapagina, n.d.).

FIGURE 7. A short piece of news linking looting of archaeological sites with Camorra in
the headline, yet the short body of the piece omits any linkage to this organized crime
group.
Source: In Primapagina, n.d.
Similarly, the respondents who mentioned the Sacra Corona Unita did not provide any
information about their involvement in the trafficking of antiquities. Equally, there is no
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presence of Sacra Corona Unita in the literature concerning Italian archaeological looting.
The presence of this group in the press related to trafficking of antiquities is feeble at best.
Finally, ‘Ndrangheta was the least mentioned group. These expert respondents
thought this criminal organization to be the least involved in the trade of illicit antiquities
when compared to the rest. Recently, Camorra has been alleged by ISIS to have received in
Italy trafficked looted archaeological items (de Conto, 2016; Quirico, 2016; Ruggiero, 2016).
However, Carlo, the archaeologist who became a guide in the second of the field trips and
who had collaborated in the case, stated that the press was exaggerating. True, looted
antiquities coming from Syria had been intercepted at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, in the
province of Calabria, and Camorra certainly might have helped this. But, he stated, “If the
boss of 'Ndrangheta put his hand in the container he would say, ‘But what is it? Stones?’ That
is, they are so ignorant… no, impossible” (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017). Finally, Tristano, the
archaeologist at the University in Naples, was the only one participant who mentioned minor
groups and family clans, but once again, these were cases that broadly involved cultural
heritage and not archaeological items (Tristano, e-mail communication, May 19, 2017).
To conclude, the relationship with traditional Italian criminal organizations seems
sporadic and anecdotal. Neither the responses of experts nor the consulted documentary
sources can determine a solid link of any given analyzed organization to the trafficking of
looted antiquities.

2. Tombaroli as organized crime
As there was no evidence of traditional Italian organized crime involved in the trafficking of
looted antiquities, the next step was to assess whether tombaroli could fit the description of
organized criminals. As stated in the previous chapter, the criteria employed to define
organized crime were taken from the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of
109

Europe. Precisely because of the heterogeneity of manifestations concerning organized crime,
these criteria, sponsored by important institutions, can serve as a checklist. The European
Commission/EUROPOL/Council of Europe’s definition is ample and flexible ; it allows for
the inclusion of a greater number of traits of organized crime than other definitions which are
too conventional and rigid. The following two sections chart their responses on both
mandatory and optional criteria.

2.1. Mandatory criteria
The mandatory criteria employed to define organized crime by the European Commission,
EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe are the collaboration between more than two people;
extending over a prolonged or indefinite period; the suspicion of committing serious criminal
offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty; and a
central goal of profit and or/power. All of them have to appear in any studied phenomenon
susceptible to be labeled as organized crime. Figure 8 charts the responses of the project’s
participants in relationship to the mentioned mandatory criteria.

110

Collabora Acting
Acts
tion
for a involving
among prolonge imprison
more
d/
ment for Central goal of
than two indefinite at least profit and/or
power
people period
4yrs

Does not know
None
Both
Power
Profit
Does not know
No
Yes
Does not know
No
Yes
Does not know
No
Yes

0
1
2
0
21
0
19
5
0
0
24
0
2
22
0

5

10

15

20

25

30

FIGURE 8: Opinion of respondents about the presence of the European
Commission/EUROPOL/Council of Europe’s mandatory traits in tombaroli (N = 24).
Source: the author
As shown in Figure 8, regarding the first of the mandatory criteria, the collaboration
between more than two people, almost all participants answered affirmatively. Confirming
what the systematic literature review highlighted regarding the group nature of looting, the
majority of expert respondents referred to compact groups that, on average, comprised
between two and five participants. This is not a fixed rule. For example, prosecutor Bartolo
once prosecuted a group of ten tombaroli (Interview, Olgiata, 2017), while active
archaeologists interviewed in the second of the field trips mostly reported witnessing small
groups of three individuals at most (Interviews, Cerveteri, 2017). These groups tend to use
the same participants over time, even though members are free to join, quit, or rejoin as they
please. Carlo, the archaeologist at the Ministry of Culture, stated that

111

He [referring to a well-known antiquities dealer] has worked not only for a long
period of time but also with the same team of people. If you were able to look at his
seized documents, the same names appear: tombaroli, restorers, people trafficking the
pieces out of Italy… they were always the same. It works better if the people are
always the same (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).

Interviewed tombaroli gave interesting insights about the composition of their teams.
They manifested that the limit of participants was mandated for economic (“…because
beyond five people there is no profit anymore”) and organizational reasons (“We are four or
five, but no more because later it becomes hardly manageable”) (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017;
Interview, La Giustiniana, 2017; Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017; Interview,
Montefiascone, 2017). Autobiographies of looters abound with examples concerning the
tasks performed by members. Broadly, one tombarolo performs the task of watching and
alerting the others of the presence of strangers or police patrols (named the Palo, the post);
others dig; and there is one who sorts the found material. Expert respondents and existing
literature coincide regarding these closed roles (Bordo, 1987; Perticarari; 1986; Tagliaferri &
Rupi Paci, 1992; among others).
A significant element raised by expert respondents is the fact that tombaroli use more
or less manpower in relation to the type of digging performed. That is, tombaroli organize the
group depending on the difficulty of the excavation ahead of them. For example, some
tombaroli like Pietro Casasanta (Isman, 2009a) devoted his looting to mostly Roman villas.
That implies that when he wanted to loot marble in ancient Roman villas, he needed the
person that knew how to use a bulldozer, and then somebody who could transport the marbles
(Isman, 2009a). Likewise, a tombarolo who specializes in tombs needs more manpower to
dig.
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A final factor concerning the need for working in groups was the dangers inherent to
the very act of digging. Tombaroli excavate without the precautions an archaeologist
employs. Unlike tombaroli, archaeologists pay special attention about where they place
themselves and their heavy equipment around the surrounding tombs to avoid collapses, as
the terrain is structurally weaker due to excavations. Angelo, a retired tombarolo, showed the
great height of some of the chambers of the tombs, thus highlighting the danger and damage
if the structure collapsed: working in groups tends to raise the probabilities of rescuing
another tombarolo if buried alive. Literature produced by tombaroli once again highlights
this necessity (Bordo, 1987; Perticarari; 1986; Tagliaferri & Rupi Paci, 1992).
As can be seen in figure 8 regarding the second of the criteria, all of the participants
agreed upon the fact that tombaroli act for a prolonged or indefinite period of time.
Tombaroli usually start at an early age (strength is required for such a physically demanding
task) and stop when they no longer have the strength to keep going (Bordo, 1987; Perticarari;
1986; Tagliaferri & Rupi Paci, 1992). For example, Gennaro, who was in his eighties was the
first of the two retired tombaroli interviewed for this dissertation; he stated how he began in
the 1950s and finished excavating with his team ten years ago (Interview, Montalto di Castro,
2017). The second, Alfredo, slightly younger (in his sixties), stated how he began when he
was fifteen and stopped when he was fifty-seven (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017). Both
their careers extended over five decades.
Acting for a prolonged or indefinite period of time is vital due to the need to know the
terrain where the illicit excavations will take place. As Giorgio, the retired police officer of
the financial police’s art squad stated, “They have to know the zones where they move well
… some of them are specialists and know the terrain and where to go to dig and find good
pieces perfectly well” (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017). Such prolonged periods of time also
allow tombaroli to amass a significant quantity of treasures, as information related to police
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seizures demonstrates (Carabinieri, 2008; Nistri, 2008; Rush & Benedetti Millington, 2015).
For example, Operation Andromeda found 337 archaeological finds from the areas of Lazio,
Puglia, Sardinia, and Magna Graecia, all repatriated from Geneva; Operation Iphigenia
recovered 23 funerary urns and 3000 archaeological items; Operation RoViNa recovered 520
archaeological objects (Povoledo, 2013; Rush & Benedetti Millington, 2015).
The majority of respondents disregarded the presence of the third criterion: the
commission of criminal acts involving punishment of prison for four years or more.
According to the cultural heritage and landscape law, passed in 2004, that punishes looting in
its article 175.a,

Anyone who performs archaeological research or, in general, works for the discovery
of things referred to in art. 10 [Article 10 defines in detail the concept of what a
cultural item is according to the law by listing them] without a concession, or does not
comply with the requirements of the administration will be punished with the arrest of
up to one year and a fine between € 310 and € 3,099 ($366 to $3655) (Carabinieri,
2008; Iannizzotto; 2006).

Other crimes related to archaeological looting are fencing (Art. 648 of the Italian Criminal
Code), for those who buy looted archaeological items; and associating with others in order to
engage in criminal activity, which can be found in article 416 of the Italian Criminal Code
(Carabinieri, 2008; Scotti 2002). Paradoxically, article 416 bis, also known as the RognoniLa Torre Act, introduced the crime of participation in organized criminal associations in law
no. 646 1982, and this is the article applied to members of Italian organized crime. (Turone,
2008; Vigna, 2006).
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The majority of expert respondents agreed that it is impossible for a if tombarolo who
is only charged with the crime of illicit digging to end up in prison because of the low
penalty attached to this crime. Therefore, it is extremely rare to see a tombarolo behind bars.
For example, tombaroli were asked whether they had been arrested and prosecuted, and what
their punishment was. Alfredo, the tombarolo turned supervisor, was sentenced to fifteen
months of jail for each of his two arrests, but both times his sentence was suspended
(Interview, Montefiascone, 2017). The second and third tombaroli who were interviewed,
Giovanni and Patrizio, are brothers who dig together; they were each sentenced to house
arrest for a duration of six months, but their sentences were also suspended (Interviews, La
Giustiniana, 2017). Gennaro, the oldest of all of the tombaroli, was fined, even though his
lawyer appealed and later won the case, so the conviction was overturned. As payment, his
defense attorney requested looted artifacts (Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017). The fifth
tombarolo, Alessio, has never been arrested for looting, but he had to demonstrate to police
that the goods seized at his house were crafted by him. In the end, he was not convicted
(Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).
All of the tombaroli stated that they do not know of any tombarolo serving time in
prison, and tombaroli do not seem to worry about serving time in prison. In fact,
paradoxically, as law enforcement becomes more aware of their activities, the law becomes
softer on them. Prosecutor Bartolo specifically complained that he cannot apply aggravating
circumstances to this crime with the latest criminal code reform (Interview, Olgiata, 2017).
The approval of the Cirielli law on December 5 2005, number 251, abolished some of the
aggravating circumstances that could be used previously (Isman, 2009).
The possibility of tombaroli ending up in prison exists. However, according to the
legislative framework, going to prison can only happen when a tombarolo becomes a
recidivist and has been arrested several times. As Carlo stated,
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They [tombaroli] do not even care about going to prison. After all, what happens?
They serve a year, tops. It is a holiday for them. They reorganize, they meet new
people, and when they leave, as long as they still have the money they made with
them, they are happy (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).

The last mandatory criterion refers to organized criminals acting towards a goal based
upon profit and/or power. The vast majority of respondents agreed that tombaroli are
motivated solely by economic profit. In fact, all of the tombaroli frankly admitted that they
do it for money However, as Alfredo, the looter, stated, as the days of the great raid are long
gone, looters will never become rich. As he put it,

No, no. No tombarolo works anymore as a full time looter, understand? It is all
people who have another job, and the profit obtained from looting tombs is used to
round off a salary, or a bad season in agriculture, understand? (Interview,
Montefiascone, 2017).

That is why, as was seen in the first mandatory criterion, concerning collaboration between
more than two people, it is normal that groups are not very big, so that looters can be
rewarded with bigger shares.
However, during the period of the great raid, some tombaroli made an impressive
amount of money compared to their daytime jobs in rural Italy. For example, Watson &
Todeschini (2007) analyzed the gains of tombarolo Giuseppe Evangelisti in different years
according to documentary evidence produced in his trial. In the year 1998, his lootings
earned him 81,750,000 lire ($68,000). 2000 was a better year for him, as he cashed 164
million lire ($135,000). As evidence covered several years, the expert witness, Maurizio
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Pellegrini, was able to calculate that in four years Evangelisti had made €185,000 ($215,768).
Also, during the period of the great raid, when looting was for some tombaroli a full-time
job, they used to receive regular salaries rather than being paid for their discoveries (Watson
& Todeschini, 2007; Isman, 2009a).
Tombaroli are suppliers and if they cannot find clients, they look for middlemen and
dealers to place their discoveries. Middlemen and dealers, however, only pay a small
percentage of the total value of the piece to those tombaroli. In those instances, out of the
total amount of money any given piece may produce, the big profit is not for the looter. For
example, according to the investigative journalist Linda, the dealer who sells the product to a
wealthy client is the one who profits the most (Interview, Rome, 2017).

2.2. Optional criteria
The optional criteria employed to define organized crime by the European Commission,
EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe are a specialized division of labor; exercising
measures of discipline and control; employing violence or other means of intimidation;
employing commercial, business-like structures; participation in money laundering processes;
operations across borders; and exerting influence over legitimate social institutions. The
following figure charts the responses of the project’s participants in relationship to these
optional criteria.
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FIGURE 9: Opinion of respondents about the presence of the European
Commission/EUROPOL/Council of Europe’s optional traits in tombaroli (N = 24).
Source: the author

Regarding the specialized division of labor, most of the respondents agreed that
members of the team have pre-established, well-defined roles. According to the responses of
the experts, the task of tombaroli can be divided into an operative part, related to the
excavation (this phase can be divided between people who look for areas where to excavate,
and the people who actually excavate), and a commercial part, related to selling the unearthed
items. In each phase, members have their own functions. For example, as prosecutor Bartolo
indicated, the brute will dig faster, the tech-savvy will use the metal detector, the person
experienced in archeology will value the piece accordingly, and so on (Interview, Olgiata,
2017). In fact, this division of labor can also be dictated by other factors such as age or
experience. Carlo, the archaeologist interviewed in the second field trip used the following
example:
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There was, I remember, the old tombarolo who is thought to be “the professor.” He is
the one that always considers himself more of a scholar, more learned than the others.
And of course there are the workers. Therefore you always find the workers and the
older one who decides where to go and excavate, and who has contacts with the
middlemen. It is not only a specialized division of labor, but it is obvious that there is
a small hierarchy in the team (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).

The next voluntary criterion refers to the use of measures of discipline and control.
The majority of respondents thought that there is no need for any kind of punishment if
orders are not followed, ascertaining that discipline and control between tombaroli was
anecdotal. Most of the expert respondents stated that in their respective careers they never
heard of measures of discipline or found any tombarolo who talked about this. The third
criterion deals with the usage of violence and/or means of intimidation. Once again most of
the expert respondents thought that tombaroli do not use violence or means of intimidation,
as the territory where to find tombs is so vast that there is no need to engage in violent tactics
of control. In fact, Andrea and Luca, the archaeologist and expert who have served as expert
witnesses in court, stated that they heard tombaroli threatening other looters, but they never
deemed the threats serious enough (Interview, Rome, 2017).
As with the last criterion, exceptions turn out to be quite illustrative of the instances
where violence or intimidation has been used. Extant literature points to mild instances of
violence between looters as several sources have documented how rivalry between looters
leads them to cheat one another. This then triggers acts of revenge (Thoden van der Velzen,
1996). For example, Silver (2009) explained how teams of looters not only need extra
protection against law enforcement, but also against rival gangs of looters. Ruiz (2000)
interviewed a tombarolo nicknamed Antonio, who revealed that
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… we are not like the Mafia; there is no violence but there is a code of honour… it is
a matter of loyalty. If I get messed around, then I’ll make an anonymous call to the
Carabinieri [as a way of denouncing the activities of unruly tombaroli] (p. 4).

Expert respondents and data obtained in field trips also proved the existence of cases
of violence or intimidation between tombaroli or between looters and others. Carla is a
topographic archaeologist at the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (the National Council of
Research) in Rome, the highest research center in the country, specializing in areas such as
biomedicine, physics, chemistry, engineering, and also cultural heritage. She is in charge of
documenting instances of archaeological destruction caused not only by tombaroli but also
by construction sites and other agents. Carla explained in the interview the frightening
moment when a looter threatened her with a pistol while asking for information about what
she was doing in the middle of the forest. The archaeologist was able to diffuse the situation,
but it clearly indicates that some tombaroli have the potential to become violent offenders
(Interview, Rome, 2017).
In the second of the field trips, Carlo, the archaeologist working at the Ministry of
Culture, explained how he was threatened and later slapped by a tombarolo as the looter
thought the archaeologist was interfering with his task. In fact, the archaeologist admitted that
some of them were not serious tombaroli but drunken teenagers or even drug users that
occasionally helped looters in order to procure money, thus highlighting the difference
between the old and new guard of tombaroli. In any case, this expert does not remember any
case that involved the death of looters, archaeologists, or law enforcement agents due to
violence or intimidation (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).
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There can be violence or intimidation between tombaroli. Expert respondents claimed
that among them there might be some fights but nothing serious. The brothers who excavate
together, Giovanni and Patrizio, explained how once their team had to fight with another
team of looters because they were making too much noise, thus putting all of them at risk of
being detected. Beyond this instance, they never had to fight other looters (Interview, La
Giustiniana, 2017). One of the Carabinieri interviewed, lieutenant Rodolfo, a member of the
art squad who took care of the force’s database of stolen items, narrated how a looter attacked
the very famous tombarolo, Pietro Casasanta, because of a broken deal (Interview, Rome,
2017). Another famous tombarolo, Luigi Perticarari, in the book he co-wrote with journalist
Anna Maria Giuntani (1986) explained that a member of his team denounced him because he
thought Perticarari was having an affair with his wife. As prosecutor Bartolo stated in his
interview, there are instances of small fights between tombaroli, and he has exploited the
losing team in his investigations (Interview, Olgiata, 2017).
The fourth of the voluntary criteria, the one related to the use of commercial
structures, elicited the most unified response. An overwhelming majority of respondents
agreed that tombaroli were able to create a simple commercial structure to sell their own
findings. This commercial structure can take two forms. The simplest one is selling the
material in what is labeled a “door-to-door” system. In this case, the tombarolo has
established his fame and has a pool of clients, who go to his house and buy what he finds.
This is the case of retired tombarolo Giuseppe Evangelisti, whose earnings were
discussed before; during the weekends, clients arrived to his house. These clients were upper
class urban bourgeoisie, professionals such as doctors, architects, and lawyers. Sellers and
buyers even became good friends, and word of mouth made the pool of clients grow larger.
Even important middlemen such as Giacomo Medici eventually ended up visiting him and
buying pieces, but Medici looked for more important pieces than Evangelisti could
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find(Isman, 2009a). Carlo, the archaeologist working for the Italian Ministry of Culture
commented that some tombaroli, feeling very secure, took their findings and sold them in
Rome to clients (Interview, Cerveteri, 2016). In both of these examples tombaroli had their
own clients and sold the goods themselves. On occasion these contacts can be exchanged
among looters.
The second, more complex option is the usage of a middleman. This scenario occurs
when looters do not have the resources to meet potential clients. Middlemen serve as a
connection between tombaroli; small antiquities dealers; the big players such as international
antique dealers, who often have stores in big art hubs such as Paris, London, New York,
Geneva, or Brussels; museums; and private collectors. In Italy, the three big middlemen have
been Giacomo Medici, Gianfranco Becchina, and Giulio Savoca (who died in 1998); all of
them were connected to tombaroli and all of them were investigated for their dubious role
behind their legitimate business façades. Medici and Becchina thrived during the period of
the great raid of Italian antiquities. Although they were competitors, they divided their
operation centers: Medici operated in northern Italy and Becchina in the south (Isman,
2009a).
The fifth criterion deals with the ability of tombaroli to launder their money. Again, a
majority of respondents thought that looters do not launder money. The most they can
launder is the provenance of the found item. That is, they can claim that the object they have
found has not been looted by inventing a string of previous acquisitions of the piece.
The closest a respondent came to providing an example of the involvement of
tombaroli with money laundering was the archaeologist Carlo’s statement that in the decades
of the sixties and seventies, land was so cheap that when looters sold pieces, they ended up
using the money to buy a plot on which to build their houses. As he said, “Decades ago,
terrains were cheap, so with the little money you made with two vases you bought the land,
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and off they went to abusively build. I remember people: one, after selling some pottery, built
his garage” (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).
The sixth criterion deals with operations beyond national borders. Most expert
respondents agreed that tombaroli do not operate outside Italy. In fact, nowadays, with the
police operations against looting, this crime is more difficult to detect as it has gone local
instead of international (Isman, 2009a). As Andrea and Luca put it, Italy is so rich with
cultural heritage and with a market also sponsored by Italian customers that tombaroli do not
need to go to other countries to excavate or to sell pieces (Interview, Rome, 2017).
The literature does not provide many accounts of tombaroli traveling abroad. One of
the few examples of a traveling tombarolo is Luigi Perticarari, who traveled to Switzerland
(curiously, with a female helper, one of the few instances of a tombarola) in order to sell his
pieces there (Perticarari & Giuntani, 1987). Prosecutor Bartolo explained that famous
tombarolo “Pietro Casasanta, who was a lone wolf, often went to Basel [Switzerland], and
tried to make a name for himself, to steal Becchina’s [an antique dealer and famous
tombaroli middleman] activity, but he was too small to succeed” (Interview, Olgiata, 2017).
The commercial structure of even important tombaroli is too limited to succeed in
more complex entrepreneurial ventures. Traveling to a neighboring country like Switzerland
is easy for northern tombaroli, but there are not many cases of these travels. Roberto, the
criminologist, mentioned that in instances where there might be an international client, the
task of operating cross nationally is trusted to people who have a good knowledge of the art
market, such as a middleman (Interview, Rome, 2017).
The final criterion required by the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the
Council of Europe is the exertion of influence over legitimate institutions. The majority of
expert respondents agreed that tombaroli do not have the capacity to influence legitimate
institutions, as they are simply inhabitants of rural areas. Some expert respondents dismissed
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this scenario, claiming that while maybe other players in the supply chain could do so, a
simple tombarolo could certainly not. In fact, none of the tombaroli acknowledged this point.
There is no evidence in the existing literature of tombaroli involved in cases of corruption.
An interesting point confirmed by respondents, however, was how in the past, during
the times of the great raid, as looting is perpetrated in rural areas, everybody knew who the
looters were and turned a blind eye to them, mayors and other politicians included. Andrea
and Luca, the archaeologist and expert who work together at the Ministry of Culture stated:

Maybe the mayor of that place knows perfectly well the past or present of these
people, and while we say, ‘Well, I'm a bit worried because there is a site close to
where that famous tombarolo lives,’ the mayor generally smiles and says ‘But no, he
is a good person.’ Sometimes, they tend to justify it. In short, and luckily, there is no
infiltration of tombaroli in city halls across Italy (Interview, Rome, 2017).

Some of these cases can be found in the literature: for example, Stille (1999) states how in
Sicily

[Vincenzo Cammarata] [p]roudly conducted tours for foreign dignitaries, judges,
prosecutors, and members of parliament; he also loaned pieces to at least three
Sicilian exhibitions. He had recently taken steps to register his antiquities with local
authorities and had begun making plans to create his own museum. Yet for many
years no one seems to have questioned how a private individual with no stable
profession was able to amass such a collection in a country where it is illegal to buy
or sell any artifact that was dug up before 1909 (p. 61).
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Indeed, other expert respondents confirmed that in the north of Italy they had found
mayors and councilmen working either as tombaroli or in collaboration with them at the
Italian town of Cerveteri. They dated this phenomenon to around the 1970s and 1980s, the
heart of the period known as the great raid, when looting was rampant. In any case, no
documentary evidence has been found of tombaroli exerting influence over legitimate
institutions in recent years.
In sum, one of the mandatory criterion is missing: the commission of criminal acts
involving punishment of prison for four years or more. Five of the optional criteria did not
accurately describe the tombaroli. The next section examines yet another point of view:
whether instead of being organized criminals, tombaroli criminals that need to organize.

3. Tombaroli as criminals that are organized
Finckenauer (2005) used four criteria in order to identify criminal organizations. These four
items are criminal sophistication (this category relates to the degree to which criminals plan
their offenses, so their skill and knowledge levels indicate how sophisticated their abilities
are), structure (this category relates to the division of labor within the organization or group,
so highly structured groups will be hierarchical and have defined roles for members where a
boss doles out tasks to lower echelons), self-identification (members of the group or
organization must actually see themselves as members of this group and commonly display
signs of bonding such as uniform clothing, tattoos, or initiation rituals), and authority of
reputation (an organization’s ability to coerce people either through direct or implied threats
relates to the group’s sense of authority and reputation).
According to Finckenauer (2005), criminal organizations can be placed within a
spectrum based on the traits shown in figure 9 below. Some of these traits repeat the criteria
developed by the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe. For
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instance, Finckenauer’s item regarding reputation, relates to the usage of violence and/or
means of intimidation in the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe
criteria.
The selection of Finckenauer’s (2005) theoretical framework for this project is
justified because it captures the full spectrum of organized crime and provides a good
explanation of why some phenomenon cannot be considered organized crime. As such,
Finckenauer’s (2005) point of view allows one to consider whether a certain criminal
phenomenon is merely an instance of criminals who need to organize in order to commit their
crime. Other apparently organized crime activities, such as internationally trafficked stolen
cars (Clarke & Brown, 2003) or drug trafficking (Eck & Gersh, 2000; Natarajan & Belanger,
1998), are not always caused or even facilitated by organized criminals, but can instead be
crimes that are merely organized around criminal opportunities (Clarke & Brown, 2003). In
fact, this particular framework has been used in other studies attempting the same goals as the
present research project, such as wildlife being trafficked in the neotropics (Pires, Schneider
& Herrera, 2016).
Figure 10 charts the responses of the project’s participants in relationship to the
mentioned criteria.
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FIGURE 10: Opinion of respondents about the presence of Finckenauer’s traits in
tombaroli (N = 24).
Source: the author

Three criteria can be easily grouped due to the uniformity of the interviewees’
responses, with the items that produced the most unified responses being the usage of
uniforms, sporting markers such as tattoos, and the fulfillment of rites of initiation.
According to Finckenauer (2005), these items cluster around self-identification. As can be
seen, practically all the expert respondents clearly denied tombaroli wearing any sort of
uniform, getting tattoos, or going through a rite of initiation. Clearly, these elements are not
related to the criminal conduct of tombaroli.
The two remaining criteria were less uniform. The first one referred to the planning of
operations of tombaroli. A majority of respondents agreed that looters plan their activities,
but as looting per se is not a complex task, it does not require complex planning. These
planning operations, according to several expert respondents, follow a logical order: planning
before digging, which mostly implies assessing where to excavate; probing the terrain in
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order to find the tombs; assessing the type of tombs according to the area; excavating and
selling the found items.
The literature provides a trove of accounts on how to prepare for a digging expedition.
An expert tombarolo scouts the terrain to find spots where tombs might exist. With barrels of
water, he humidifies the soil so it becomes softer and then with a spillone, a long metal rod in
form of a spear, probes the terrain looking for stone (the tomb). After the tomb is located, the
team of tombaroli gather in order to excavate the site (Bordo, 1987; Perticarari; 1986;
Tagliaferri & Rupi Paci, 1992; among others).

FIGURE 11. A long spillone, the iron rod tombaroli use to probe the soil in search
of tombs, abandoned at the necropolis of Cerveteri. Interviewed archaeologists
explained that it was so long because the tombs closer to the surface had been looted
during the previous decades, so now looters have to dig deeper.
Source: the author (2017)
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Data obtained through interviews fit with the literature. Carlo, the archaeologist who
works in the Italian Ministry of Culture stated, summarized the methods of excavation of
tombaroli, which he had witnessed so many times:

First you probe and then you bring the team: imagine that you cannot find anything,
what do you do, bring the team? It does not make any sense! The first step is with the
skewer... If you have six hours, what do you do, you spend four hours searching and
what if you cannot find anything? First, look around, find a spot, and then the next
day, or two days later, you dig ... Let's say it's programmed that way (Interview,
Cerveteri, 2017).

Of course, all these actions require a schedule. Alfredo, one of the retired tombarolo, stated
that

Yes, I always tried to plan ahead where to dig. I used to unearth between seventy to
one hundred tombs per year. When I spotted a tomb, then I usually planned to move
digging to Saturday, so I could stay awake all night, as on Sunday I did not have to
work and I could sleep after working the entire night, do you understand? They were
only planned in this way, nothing more (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017).

The last of Finckenauer’s (2005) criteria analyzed in this section refers to the
requirement of a specific skill set for team members. Once again, the majority of respondents
thought a tombaroli team had to possess a specific skill set. As will be seen in the next
chapter, literature written by tombaroli highlights the importance of these skills. For example,
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in the autobiography of Gismondo Tagliaferri (Tagliaferri & Rupi Paci, 1992), the tombarolo
outlined the “Perfect characteristics to be a good looter” which includes the following:

1. The real looter must have a lot of knowledge of the countryside; 2. He must not be
afraid of rain or cold; 3. He must be ready to sacrifice; 4. He must speak little of what
he does; 5. He never must excavate the tomb without anyone carefully watching; 6.
When he finds something interesting, he must take it home on foot; and 7. The real
looter must have a heart of steel or otherwise when his colleagues shout, ‘escape,
escape, the police is arriving’, if he does not have a heart of steel, he dies of fear
inside the tomb (pp. 15-16).

Point number one is by far the most important skill for a tombarolo, since having the ability
to read the terrain and interpret the signals that point towards a buried tomb is the starting
point. In fact, one of the looters interviewed in this research project, Gennaro, confirmed how
reading the terrain is quintessential (Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017). In fact, this point
was confirmed by another retired tombarolo, Alfredo. He also added the skill of knowing
whether the tomb was intact or had been previously looted, in order to save time (Interview,
Montefiascone, 2017).
Carla, the archaeologist from the National Council of Research, gave another example
that her years of roaming the fields and cataloguing damaged sites had taught her was
relevant:

I think that in Apulia they have a great knowledge of the type of terrain because they
know exactly how to identify tombs, delimit the tomb, the perimeter of the tomb that
is three or four meters below, so they have a knowledge of the type of ground. And
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the same here in Lazio, I think they know the goods they can find very well, or at
least those that they are interested in (Interview, Rome, 2017).

Some respondents thought that there is no need for the requirement of a specific skill
set as they thought that everyone could loot. Some sources that trace the evolution of Italian
looting refer to earlier times when everyone excavated. Eventually, these looters became
addicted to archaeology, and people who had never read a book started studying rudimentary
archaeology for themselves (Isman, 2009a; Iannizzotto, 2006). In any case, as the next
chapter will prove, the composition of teams of looters is made up of a juxtaposition of
skilled, seasoned tombaroli and others who are just helpers. As prosecutor Bartolo
summarized:

The expert is the one able to find a tomb, or who can handle a metal detector, or who
knows how to appreciate the economic, juridical and scientific value of a found piece.
They are people whose tradition has been handed down from father to son, especially
in these towns around Rome, for example. Then there is the hard working young man,
who wants to earn fifty euros and works one day. He is the one who will use the hoe,
the picket. Now they dig with bulldozers. Then the hard worker needs also to be
skilled, right? Because if not he does more damage to the tomb. Because they need to
be careful how they dig, in short! (Interview, Olgiata, 2017).

In conclusion, when asked about Finckenauer’s (2005) items, expert respondents have
denied that tombaroli use subcultural markers like tattoos or uniforms. However, respondents
acknowledged that tombaroli must plan their diggings and recruit team members who possess
specific skills. The last section of results covers Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998) framework
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concerning organizational structure, which is applied to teams of tombaroli. The section
provides the results of respondent’s responses concerning this specific issue.

4. The organizational structure of tombaroli
The last element researched and reported in the present chapter refers to the organizational
structure of tombaroli. The classifications of organizational structure used in this project
follow Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998) study of thirty-nine drug trafficking organizations
prosecuted in the city of New York. These categories were adapted from previous
classifications by Curtis (1996) and Johnson, Hamid and Sanabria (1992).
The classifications of organizational structure in Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998)
model are conceptualized as follows: the organization can adopt the form of freelance
individuals (where there is no formal hierarchy or division of labor and there is no
expectation for future transactions), a family business (where an informally defined division
of labor may exist and the activity operates as a family operation), a communal business
(where the division of labor is informal and flexible, but there is a clearly identified boss), or
a corporation (where the division of labor is clearly defined according to a clearly defined
formal structure, and a large number of individuals are involved).
Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998) theoretical framework was selected because it both
complements the previous frameworks by extending the analysis of the figure of the
tombarolo into its structural organization, and it helps explain how looters learn by revealing
how they are organized. This framework thus parallels Kenney’s research (2007). The results
presented and analyzed complement those presented and analyzed in chapter 5. Once again,
this particular framework has been used, combined with Finckenauer’s (2005), in other
studies researching less common trafficked goods such as Pires, Schneider & Herrera’s
(2016) study in trafficked wildlife in the neotropics
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The respondents were shown the different organizational options and were asked to
think about them concerning the present looting scenarios in Italy. Because of the different
geographical realities involved, the respondents could choose more than one option if they

Freelance Family Communal Corporate
structure structure structure structure

wanted to. Figure 12 summarizes their responses.
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FIGURE 12: Opinion of respondents about the organizational structure of tombaroli (N
= 24).
Source: the author

The organizational structure most identified by expert respondents was the freelance
structure. According to many of the experts responded, this best describes the looting
situation in the north of the country. In fact, literature abounds with cases of freelance
tombaroli. A detailed one is given by Silver (1999) depicting the fascinating finding of the
famous Euphronios krater in Cerveteri, the same that was eventually sold in 1972 to the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City for $1 million. As Silver (1999) states,
Giuseppe Montrasto, a thirty-seven year-old tombarolo from the southern region of Calabria
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led a group of three excavators along with two assistants who were to keep watch. As they
were trespassing on private property, eventually Cerveteri native Giovanni Temperi
discovered the team of looters, but joined them in exchange for a cut of whatever they found.
Once a tomb was found, Montrasto enlisted three more men to do the heavy work.
Andrea and Luca defined the freelance organization when applied to tombaroli; it
consists of small groups that are created to achieve a goal, which is unearthing a tomb that
has valuable goods inside (Interview, Rome, 2017). In the case used as an example, a group
of people was progressively assembled to manage to find , unearth, and empty a tomb and to
then sell its contents. The same group never reassembled again, and the members kept
entering and leaving teams as they needed.
After this group, the second most prevalent form of structuring the tombaroli teams
was the familial structure. In many instances the expert interviewees thought that groups of
tombaroli were mostly comprised of family members, so this structure, according to them,
was also suited to define the reality of archaeological looting in Italy. Prosecutor Bartolo
defined this particular structure as follows:

Yes, it is a family division: especially in small centers, such as Cerveteri. Families are
like schools of tombaroli, and the teams are composed of uncles, cousins, and
brothers, and also close acquaintances, too. This is what I have prosecuted the most
(Interview, Olgiata, 2017).

These families are locally based, which implies that most of the inhabitants in rural
areas know who excavates and who does not. In any case, these families cannot be compared
to organized crime families, led by crime bosses. In fact, there are many accounts. Tombarolo
Omero Bordo (1986) explains how his grandfather and father used to find tombs, and how
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even his mother knew about what he did and accepted it. Perticarari, another important
tombarolo, explains how he used to work with his brother, until he tragically died in an
accident inside a tomb, and people such as his wife or his barber also knew about his night
activities as a looter (Perticarari & Giuntani, 1986). As a final example, Thoren van Velzen
(1996) states how “In some places the role of chief tomb robber is remarkably stable and is
passed on within the same family” (p. 112). The following chapter will also deal with the
family as an important source of learning for a looter.
The communal structure was the third most designated by respondents. Although not
all respondents thought that they had seen tombaroli operate following this structure,
literature gives examples of this sort of structure. For instance, Thoden van Velzen (1996)
stated that “Since the 1960s the situation [looting] has stabilized and in all former Etruscan
cities illegal digging is an institutionalized part of community life” (p. 112). The same author
adds, accounts of the looters’ exploits “…provide a unique insight into the relations between
tomb robbers and the communities within which they operate” (p. 111).
Migliore (1991) gave a pertinent example in his ethnography of Sicilian tomb robbers
and explained how in small Sicilian towns

The individuals who actively seek out buried treasure on archaeological sites share
the sentiments of other rural Sicilians. Treasure hunting is viewed as a legitimate,
although potentially dangerous, profession. The individuals who engage in this type
of activity are ordinary members of the community; they have various economic,
social, and kinship ties with other community members (p. 116).

Pietro Casasanta, the famous tombarolo, used this structure when he operated for
sixty years in the north of Italy, in Anguilara Sabazia, near lake Braciano. He would work
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with a fixed team of looters. For example, his long-life friend Carlo Alberto Chiozzi was the
operator in charge of the bulldozer, and other close friends occupied similar positions as
diggers within the team (Isman, 2009a).
Finally, four respondents out of twenty-four thought that in the South, the reality of
looting there adapted better to corporate structures, the least mentioned of the four structural
categories. They also noted, however, that they did not know that for sure, as they did not
have firsthand experience there. As with the communal structure, this specific form of
organization was typical of the period of the great raid. There is scant evidence of this
structure, though, as the literature rarely describes it. Stille (1999) explains how Sicilian
prosecutor Giuseppe Raffiotta “… uncovered a network of more than fifty tombaroli
operating throughout southern Italy” (p. 63), which included “…two Sicilian university
professors, the owner of a major auction house and two local businessmen – all of them
prominent collectors” (p. 61).
All of the five tombaroli, depending on the characteristics of their teams, identified
with one form of structure. In the second field trip to Cerveteri, Alessio described his group
as consisting of freelancers (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017). Giovanni and Patrizio stated they
had family members in their teams (in fact, readers will remember that these two tombaroli
were brothers). Alfredo and Gennaro, the retired tombaroli, linked their experiences to a
communal structure. None of them, however, thought their task to be fit for a corporate
structure.
To conclude, results have shown that the structure of Italian archaeological looting
varies across the country, adapting to several organizational structures that correspond to the
theoretical framework used by Natarajan and Belanger (1992). Throughout Italy, examples
can be found of every structural category in literature. When confronted with these
categories, the expert respondents thought, the freelancers followed by the familial structures
136

were the most prevalent ones. The expert respondents thought that the communal and
corporate structures were less common.

5. Interpretation of findings regarding the relationship between tombaroli and
organized crime
The results garnered from the conducted interviews do not support the notion that organized
crime is involved in archaeological looting in Italy. A sold link between traditional Italian
organized crime and tombaroli has not been found. This result highlights the need to assess
exactly how tombaroli do operate, without fashionable myths that romanticize and
misconstrue reality.
The results point instead to the existence of a highly opportunistic crime that is
largely taken advantage of by locals who do not appear to see their activity as criminal.
Instead, they see their actions as ways to generate an extra, secondary income, as all of the
tombaroli were employed. Their criminal activities provide them with the opportunity to
meet basic living expenses, in a way that does not require a great deal of trouble or
coordination of efforts.

5.1. The relationship between tombaroli and traditional Italian organized crime is
anecdotal
The literature’s evidence of the involvement of organized crime is ambiguous. Some authors
thought that there was no involvement (Chappell & Polk, 2011), whereas others thought that
there was (Melillo, 2008; Nistri, 2008). But there is much anecdotal evidence in the literature
suggesting that organized crime benefits from the looting and subsequent trafficking of
Italian archaeological heritage. The confluence of the relative ease in looting archaeological
heritage and the profit margins obtained when selling pieces to preeminent collectors boosts
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the idea of organized crime being involved in archaeological looting. Also, in recent years,
both the media and members of the Italian criminal justice system furthered this idea by
rashly attaching the label “organized” (Europol, 2011; Morelle, 2014).
This study’s findings, therefore, indicate that Italian archaeological looting is a crime
that is organized rather than a crime that is perpetrated by organized crime. The simplicity of
commercial structures employed nowadays by tombaroli (for example, transporting, selling,
and delivering the pieces to the client without the use of a middleman) means that
archeological looting cannot be related to Italian organized crime, which mostly refers to
large-scale, stable, and structured organizations (Paoli, 2003). Italian organized crime
exercises political dominion over their areas of influence, collects both lawful and unlawful
debts, and regulates legal and illegal markets, among other tasks (Paoli, 2003). According to
Sciarrone (2009), they also use of violence and intimidation in order to enter the legitimate
economy and seek to control the territory (Sciarrone 2009). The nature of these criminal
associations becomes confused when the term is used to describe smaller organized criminal
groups with local significance (Paoli, 2003).
The only connection between the conception of Italian organized crime described by
Paoli (2003) and Sciarrone (2009) and tombaroli is that looters might operate in territories
which are controlled by organized crime groups. Even though interviewees mentioned most
of the groups (Cosa Nostra, Camorra, ‘Ndrangheta, and Sacra Corona Unita), they primarily
referred to Cosa Nostra and Camorra when discussing groups which controlled the territory
and allowed looters to excavate. Experts discard the presence of ‘Ndrangheta and Sacra
Corona Unita as they remain outside this kind of illicit market. Cases where organized
criminal groups have requested the services of tombaroli are anecdotal and do not have a
significant evidence in the press and literature. In news stories that put forward these kind of
theories, reporters merely imply that this form of looting is the product of organized crime
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networks, linking Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra, or the Sacra Corona Unita to the
activities of tombaroli. However, these pieces of news are anecdotal, few in number, and the
evidence given is very feeble, in the opinion of the expert respondents.
In recent years, the academic debate about organized crime’s influence on the illicit
antiquities trade has been raging, even though most of the scholarly literature states that the
involvement of organized crime is not the prevalent dimension of this particular phenomenon
(see, for example, Alderman, 2012; Chappell, 2011; Dietzler, 2013; Mackenzie, 2011c;
Tijhuis, 2006; Visconti, 2015).
Mackenzie (2011b) makes two points about the relationship between organized crime
and looted antiquities. One, he claims that organized criminals are present in the market for
looted antiquities as the market itself is structured through the rapport of different and
interconnected actors (from looters or thieves to buyers) and these market transactions
themselves violate the jurisdiction’s rules. Two, he uses the conventional notion of the term
“organized crime” to mean professional criminal groups using violence and corruption to
attain illegal profits. Mackenzie (2011b) concludes that even though in the illicit market of
looted antiquities traditional organized crime groups can be found, they do not represent an
indispensable element of this market yet. Therefore, eliminating organized crime would not
be sufficient to reduce looting and the subsequent trafficking, .
In a previous study of the antiquities market from the demand point of view,
Mackenzie (2005) found little empirical evidence of the presence of criminal organizations in
the market. However, by taking the approach of Vander Beken (2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b)
and Albanese (1987, 1995, 2008), who use among other indicators the availability of the
product, levels of corruption of the local government, and the nature of the demand of a
particular good in order to assess the levels of risk of opportunities for the infiltration of
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organized crime in legal markets, Mackenzie (2011b) concluded that the antiquities market is
highly prone to this risk.
Chappell and Polk (2011) also shared this point of view. These authors, departing
from the trial of dealer Giacomo Medici, stated that even though there was a clearly depicted
organizational chain, the resemblance with traditional organized crime is problematic, given
the intrinsic characteristics of this particular market. To begin with, selling antiquities, even
when these are illicitly obtained, is legal: sold items have to be properly laundered, an action
that clearly cannot be done with other illicit goods, such as narcotics, which remain illicit as
there is not a legal market for them. A second element is that the elevated cost of the items
sold in the market assures a wealthy clientele, and law enforcement efforts have rarely been
directed towards clients in this type of market.
Proulx (2010) researched the opinions and perceptions of archaeologists regarding the
level of involvement of organized crime in looting worldwide. Her research proved that
archaeologists have an image of organized crime that is reduced to the cultural pattern of
organizations similar to the Italian mafia, which clearly does not reflect the reality of looting.
Manacorda (2011) acknowledge that even though the international trafficking of cultural
heritage generally requires group action and important organized criminal groups pay
attention to the art and antiquities market; however, the author still doubts that major criminal
organizations typically traffic antiquities as they do drugs. In sum, academics mostly doubt
that there is a strong tie between the illicit market of trafficked antiquities and organized
crime (Campbell, 2013; Naylor, 1997, 2002).
Some other authors take opposing perspectives. Campbell (2013) describes the fluid,
non-hierarchical traits of criminal organizations operating in the illicit trafficking of cultural
goods. According to the author, there are networks that connect though provisory
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interactions, a plurality of actors with different roles and degrees of specialization, occupying
different positions along the chain.
Di Nicola and Savona (1998) likewise state that organized crime participates within
the illegal sphere of the art world. As such, and according to these criminologists, organized
crime can bring art and antiquities to collectors, act as the middleman between private
collectors and professional thieves, obtain art and antiquities in connection with drug
trafficking, deal stolen art and antiquities as a form of blackmailing third parties, and obtain
art and antiquities as a form of money laundering.
On the international organizations front, as the United Nations has highlighted, the
trafficking of illicit antiquities is also a problematic area. In 2008 the United Nations hosted
in Italy a conference devoted to the topic, and their conclusions were not as clear-cut. The
final conclusions were threefold: first, the involvement of organized crime in the illicit
antiquities trade depends on what we mean by this term; second, that it does not appear to
involve the Mafia; and third, that there is not enough information to determine the precise
role of organized crime (Manacorda, 2008).
However, unlike the scholarly literature, international organizations tend to agree on
the involvement of organized crime in trafficking cultural heritage. As early as 2004, the
Economic and Social Council approved the Resolution 2004/34, on the Protection Against
Trafficking in Cultural Property, which states that organized criminal groups are involved in
trafficking in stolen cultural property (ECOSOC, 2004). The United Nations General
Assembly also passed the resolution E/RES/2013/31, stating that this international
organization was

… Alarmed at the growing involvement of organized criminal groups in all forms and
aspects of trafficking in cultural property and related offenses, and observing that
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cultural property is increasingly being sold through markets, including in auctions, in
particular over the Internet, and that such property is being unlawfully excavated and
illicitly exported or imported, with the facilitation of modern and sophisticated
technologies (p. 5).

The UNTOC Conference of parties claimed that trafficking in cultural property has
links to organized crime, as it relies on modus operandi used by organized criminal groups; it
satisfies a strong demand and is thus highly lucrative for those participating in the trade; its
complex nature often requires the involvement of many actors, including legal entities and
third parties, who tend to operate in a structured and organized way; and it uses modern and
sophisticated technologies. There is also evidence that transnational trafficking in antiquities
is linked to other illicit activities in which organized criminal groups are involved, including
drugs and arms smuggling, violence, corruption, and money laundering (Borgstede, 2014).
The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
states that organized crime groups have become more deeply involved in the theft and export
of illicit antiquities, among other forms of cultural property (Calvani, 2009). In any case, the
debate of the involvement of organized crime in the art market, whether legal or illegal, is not
yet over, and it will keep expanding as it includes not only traditional notions of organized
crime but also more complex interpretations and resulting criminal policies (Natali, 2015).
Data obtained in the present research project support most of the literature in the field,
as they do not allow for the conclusion that there is a solid relationship between organized
crime and looters. At the same time, data collected also support the results obtained in the
systematic literature review of the present dissertation, where only a few of the analyzed
articles deemed traditional Italian organized crime to have an investment in the traffic of
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illicitly obtained antiquities in Italy, opposed to the vast majority of articles, that did not deny
or support any involvement between tombaroli and Italian organized crime.
The autobiographies of tombaroli echo the testimonies of the looters who agreed to be
interviewed. For example, northern tombarolo Luigi Perticarari (1986) denied the existence
of an onorata organizzazione in the north of Italy where he operated, yet he could not deny
the involvement of organized crime in the south. Practically all tombaroli agreed with this
statement. The same Perticarari (1986) added that he had knowledge that in the region of
Campania one had to pay an organized crime boss in order to be able to dig. Organized
crime’s control of territory has, likewise, been stated by a great number of interviewees.
In sum, the results have not been able to determine a connection between tombaroli
and traditional Italian organized crime groups. The analysis of the interviews of experts, the
existing literature (including autobiographies of tombaroli), the Italian press, and the
conclusions of working groups only enables us to conclude that this specific issue remains
contested as much as the broader topic of the involvement of organized crime in the art
world.

5.2. Tombaroli cannot be labeled organized criminals according to the criteria of the
European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe
Having discarded traditional Italian organized crime from the reality presented by the
collected data, it is worth examining whether tombaroli could be labeled organized criminals
according to the criteria of the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of
Europe. In order to be labeled a criminal association, it is important to remember that these
organs require that all the mandatory criteria and at least two of the optional ones have to be
fulfilled. According to data gathered in this study, tombaroli cannot be labeled organized
criminals due to the fact that one of the mandatory criteria, the suspicion of committing
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serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least four years or a more
serious penalty, does not apply.
The first mandatory criterion tombaroli fulfill refers to the collaboration between
more than two people. This collaboration exists due to the very requirements of
archaeological looting and the subsequent placement of the product. Looting is not a task that
can be done by one person. The results indicated how roles are divided: one individual knows
the terrain well and scouts zones, a team excavates the tomb and, in some instances, if looters
do not know how to sell the looted antiquity, they use middlemen.
The second mandatory criterion, a criminal activity extending over a prolonged or
indefinite period, also applies to the tombarolo. Looting is committed either as long as their
energies allow it or as long as looters have a faithful clientele. However, it seems that there is
a generational shift that will be analyzed in the next chapter. Younger generations do not feel
the passion for archaeology or see the attraction physically excavating a tomb.
The criterion that does not allow labeling tombaroli as organized criminals is the
third: the suspicion of committing serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for
at least four years or a more serious penalty. As some of the experts stated, some
prosecutions aim towards the usage of article 416 with tombaroli, but this article has an
important shortcoming: for organizations whose structure is family-based, familial ties result
in problematic convictions because it is difficult to establish that a family of tombaroli is an
organization.
Even though tomb raising has been a very common crime in recent decades,
legislators seem uninterested in protecting archaeological heritage. The low penalty attached
to the crime leads tombaroli to perceive themselves as non-criminals. All the tombaroli who
were interviewed for this project do not see the activity in which they engage as criminal.
Tombaroli claimed that looting for them is a way of living that is strongly tied to both their
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ancient roots and the land where they have lived since they were born. In fact, tombaroli
think of themselves as descendants of the Etruscan civilization, as a way of justifying ancient
Etruscan items belong to them as their living heirs. In sum, they see their criminal activity
either as a job or a hobby.
Also, Italian tombaroli are passers-by in the Italian criminal justice system. Both
elements, tombaroli not seeing themselves criminals, and their sporadic presence in the
criminal justice system, weaken the preventive capacity of law enforcement. They also,
however, weaken the culture of protecting the territory and the archaeological heritage it
might contain, which is by no means an infinite resource. The latter can be seen in the
justificatory rhetoric of tombaroli, who think that they benefit from whatever archaeological
items “their” land has underneath. Even though they know that archaeological heritage
pertains to the state, the fact that they see it as their property threatens the communal sphere
of cultural heritage.
The fourth mandatory criterion that can be observed in tombaroli is the goal of profit
and/or power. Looters do their work mostly to obtain economic profit. However, it must be
noted that in the market, tombaroli are weak players. There are three reasons for this: the
fragmentation of the territory which produces the high level of competition among the
tombaroli (because they cannot claim the land as their property the tombs can be looted by
other teams of tombaroli); the vital importance of clients, who are badly needed in order to
make a profit; and the lack of power of tombaroli within the art market.
This last issue is an important point that is both raised by the interviewees and
highlighted in the literature: if a dealer acts as a middleman to connect a client with
tombaroli, the looter will not get as much money as the dealer. Dealers who regularly
purchased items from tombaroli would pay them less than 10% of the price of the item
(Isman, 2009a; Watson & Todeschini, 2007). Silver (2009) refers to how
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… News of the million-dollar sale [the sale of the Euphronios krater to the
Metropolitan Museum of art in New York City in November 12, 1972, for the amount
of $1 million] started to trickle back to Cerveteri, where the underpaid tomb robbers
began to think they were the ones who had been ripped off (p. 75).

Still, some tombaroli managed to live very well out of their activities, as they explained in
their autobiographies (Bordo, 1987; Perticarari, 1986).
The lack of presence of the third mandatory criterion precludes further consideration
of whether tombaroli can be labeled organized criminals. They simply cannot be. However, if
this criterion were met, tombaroli could be labeled organized criminals because out of seven
optional criteria, two of these appear in Italian looters, thus fulfilling the (now inapplicable)
second condition. The two mandatory criteria that can be confirmed are the first, the
specialized division of labor, and the fourth, the usage of business-like structures.
The specialized division of labor of tombaroli is eminently horizontal as it lacks,
when compared to other criminal activities, stratification. There are not many roles with
diverse expertise. Concerning role and rapport, tombaroli are few in numbers. Still, they have
certain facets that one tombarolo might have and another not: knowledge about archaeology,
who to approach as a middleman if one is needed, and how to not harm the piece when using
damaging excavating techniques. In relation to the usage of commercial structures, it is
important to mention the relationship of looters with antique dealers, who dictate their needs
to tombaroli so they can manage to find these. The knowledge of dealers about the market
(which type of pieces are in high demand or the prices that these pieces might have) is
superior to that of the looters, as tombaroli only serve particular clients with whom they have
a longstanding rapport.
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The use of measures of discipline and control and the use of violence or other means
of intimidation is rare. The decades of the great archaeological raid perpetrated by tombaroli
saw groups of looters working non-stop in the richest sites. It therefore implied the use of
violence in order to control areas that could result in great economic benefits. However, this
instrumental violence never translated into a code of honor of tombaroli. Thus, this violence,
linked to the control of the territory, is linearly functional to the very looting of the site and
the protection of possible assets.
It is uncommon for tombaroli leave their geographic area, so they do not operate
cross-nationally. They are not able to trafficking antiquities abroad, both because they lack
of means and because they could be easily compromised. Therefore, if their client is abroad,
it indicates a relationship with middlemen and antique dealers who have traffickers, as the
Medici affair or the case against Gianfranco Becchina (both antique dealers with paid
tombaroli at their disposition) proved.
It is also interesting to point out the presence of foreigners who become tombaroli
who have previously emigrated from countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine,
Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, to name a few. These migrants are used to certain levels of
mobility, know rural areas well, and absorb looting as a criminal activity. Since these
activities are physically taxing (the same phenomenon can be observed with the so called
“ortomafia”, devoted to horticultural goods, which also implies a great deal of physical
effort) they are employed as cheap labor. Many interviewees confirmed this point, and
tombaroli do not see these immigrants as real looters but mere helpers. Bell (1964) and later
Ianni (1974) referred to crime as a queer ladder of social mobility. According to this
construct, an entering immigrant group experiences strain and some members react by
innovating in accord with a tradition established by prior entrepreneurs. It will be interesting
to research this case of ethnic succession in the field of archaeological looting and see
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whether these immigrant tombaroli experience success in their criminal activities
(Abadinsky, 2010). In fact, Paoli and Reuter (2008) stated that both blocked opportunities
and the queer ladder may explain participation in organized crime by members of the
immigrant community in Europe. Finally, tombaroli do not have the ability to influence
legitimate institutions, nor is there enough profit involved to require the use of money
laundering techniques.
In conclusion, tombaroli cannot be labeled organized criminals according to the
criteria issued by the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe. The
only missing factor is the suspicion of committing serious criminal offences, punishable by
imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty. The penalties attached to
looting in Italy are weak, never exceeding the required four years of imprisonment. The fact
that one of the four mandatory criteria does not apply to tombaroli precludes the possibility
of labeling looters as organized criminals.

5.3. Tombaroli can be labeled criminals that need organization in order to loot
Having analyzed up to this point the relationship between tombaroli and traditional organized
crime, and whether looters can be labeled organized criminals according to the criteria of the
European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe, it is time to add, in a logical
order, Finckenauer’s (2005) and Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998) frameworks to determine
whether tombaroli can be labeled criminals that require organization in order to commit their
crimes.
The four dimensions that help define organized crime according to Finckenauer
(2005) are criminal sophistication, structure, self-identification, and reputation. Natarajan and
Belanger (1998) utilize a two dimensional framework that explores organized crime by
examining the level of organization and the types of tasks involved in the crime. The
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combination of these two theoretical frameworks along with the data gathered in this
dissertation further supports the idea that tombaroli are criminals that organize themselves in
order to loot, instead of organized criminals.
According to Finckenauer (2005), organized crime deals with activities that require
some type of sophistication, which can be measured by the planning involved, special
technical skills or knowledge, and the longevity of criminal ventures. Archaeological looting
does not require that much sophistication on behalf of the participants. Data so far have
indicated that looters in Italy seem to possess little criminal sophistication and no complex
organizational structure. In the zone where fieldwork was conducted, looting is a common
activity, involving common people who lived in towns nearby the archaeological areas. They
constitute a loosely affiliated network of criminals who coalesce around certain criminal
opportunities, in the words of Finckenauer (2005).
Respondents agreed that the most important piece of knowledge involved successfully
spotting signs that indicate unearthed tombs. Their responses also indicated that there was
little planning. Once the difficult part of finding where a tomb lies is completed, excavating
it is a simple task, albeit a physically difficult one. Some of the respondents referred to using
metal detectors, or more aggressive excavating modes, such as bulldozers, to be faster and
reduce their efforts. It is a given that neither of these methods requires a great deal of special
technical skills, knowledge, or overall sophistication. In sum, there is a small amount of
planning, but it lacks the strategic dimension characteristic of criminal organizations.
The reputation of tombaroli is based on factors such as the quality of their end
product or their timeliness in delivering. There was no indication in any responses that fear or
intimidation was utilized as a way to force purchases on customers or that reputation was
used to instill fear in other competing groups. The reputation of tombaroli is heavily linked to
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standards of quality in the pieces looters find. For example, the products they provide must
meet the consumer’s demands; doing otherwise would jeopardize their extra income.
There are no cultural or subcultural elements present in the sphere of tombaroli.
Looters have no need to use identifying traits such as tattoos, initiation rites, or uniforms.
This is yet another trait that highlights the role of tombaroli as criminals who need to
organize instead of organized criminals. This trait coincides with the literature in the field and
also with the opinions of other tombaroli who published their exploits. Antonio Induno, for
example, stated that they had a code of honor based on loyalty, which could eventually result,
if broken, in retaliation in the form of anonymous calls to the Carabinieri (Ruiz, 2000).
Two of the most agreed upon organizational structures established by Natarajan and
Belanger (1998), freelance and family business, imply loosely affiliated networks of people
involved in a criminal opportunity. Because the vast majority of respondents see tombaroli as
freelance operators, there appears to be no formal organization amongst those looting Italian
archaeological heritage. In other words, tombaroli see themselves as independent contractors.
Freelance operators have no division of labor as they perform the requisite tasks
related to looting, such as spotting the terrain, digging, appraising the goods, and selling
them. Because the work of tombaroli requires no significant leaders and has no need for a
formal division of labor or structure, freelance operators would fall outside the definition of
organized crime, according to Finckenauer (2005). Data demonstrate that family ties do not
seem to play an important role in archaeological looting beyond teaching sons and grandsons
the ropes of becoming a tombarolo. Families that work together to actively loot and sell
archaeological findings also have an informal division of labor and also do not appear to have
an identified leader. Furthermore, these families do not have a structure. Like the independent
operators, family partners do not meet Finckenauer’s (2005) definition of organized crime.
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In sum, even though the relationship between tombaroli and traditional Italian
organized crime has not been substantiated, and while looters cannot be labeled organized
criminals according to the criteria of the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council
of Europe, data indicates that tombaroli can be labeled criminals that need to organize in
opposition to organized criminals. This assumption is based upon the lack of definitional
traits of organized crime established by Finckenauer (2005) and the adopted organizational
structure of tombaroli, according to Natarajan & Belanger (1998). The combination of both
frameworks confirms this conclusion.

6. Conclusions
The chapter began by discussing journalists’ desire to connect organized crime and cultural
heritage crime. It has revealed how, at best, those reports were misleading. Yes, organized
crime might be interested in cultural heritage, but not in looting archaeological items.
As seen in the systematic literature review, the field of Italian archaeological looting
lacks innovative research, particularly criminological research. Though qualitative research is
uncommon, it is necessary to reveal the involved participants and circumvent the lack of
statistical data. The results from this chapter indicate that although Italian archaeological
looting is a crime that is organized, it is not a problem of organized crime. In fact, its
relationship to traditional Italian criminal organizations seems sporadic and anecdotal at best.
Expert respondents who are closely connected to the Italian criminal justice system
revealed that although investigations have often demonstrated a link between mafia
organizations and tombaroli regarding both the monitoring of the territory and the selection
of objectives, no proof has ever been found of an involvement of mafia-type organizations in
the direct and continuing organization of the activities related to the traffic of cultural
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artifacts. Though in some instances there has been an involvement of individuals affiliated
with local mafia-type clans in archaeological looting, this involvement still is anecdotal.
Tombaroli are “organized” in the sense that they need to create teams whose task is to
loot and then find sellers for the found items. Though these teams coordinate their activities,
this does not necessarily denote the involvement of “traditional” criminal associations and
even less so the presence of the mafia.
Furthermore, tombaroli cannot be labeled organized criminals according to both
mandatory and optional parameters designed by the European Commission, EUROPOL, and
the Council of Europe, as they do not fulfill the requirements stated by these organisms. It is
important to highlight the problem of the weak punishments for this form of crime, even
though law enforcement is actively attempting to curb this phenomenon. Because the
penalties are so low, ordinary townspeople are not afraid of illicitly taking archaeological
goods that belong to the state in order to sell them to their own clients.
Applying Finckenauer’s (2005) criteria also did not result in in tombaroli being
categorized as organized criminals, as they lack the sophistication, structure, and selfidentification possessed by true organized criminals. Also, applying Natarajan and Belanger’s
(1998) organizational structures to the looters does not sustain the notion that tombaroli are
organized criminals. The fact that tombaroli organize mostly as groups of freelancers or
family members supports the idea that looters should not be labeled organized criminals.
The myth of the Mafioso trafficking with archaeological heritage has been dispelled.
It is time to turn the attention in the next chapter to the issue of how tombaroli organize,
learn, and adapt to both new challenges that they encounter in their task and to law
enforcement activities that disrupt looting.

152

CHAPTER 5
COME SONO DIVENTATO “IL MAGO”:5 LEARNING TO BE A TOMBAROLO, AND
ADAPTING TO STAY IN THE BUSINESS

I've got a couple of teachers, older than me, and for good or bad I learnt from them. But now,
there is no generational replacement, do you understand? That is my experience: when I
stopped, I did not pass it on to anyone ... Even the guys who were with me, they also stopped
without having a successor.
(Interview, Montefiascone, 2017)

Well-known tombarolo Omero Bordo (1987) explained in his biography that when he was a
little child, during one of the cold winter days after WWII, he decided to build a fire pit. His
father, a farmer, scolded him for the temerity. As a punishment, he left his son for one entire
night in the middle of the Italian fields. As night fell, he tried in vain to seek refuge under a
tree. Omero was sure he would die from exposure to the cold wind blowing. As he could see
the moon rising, he claims that

I thought about all the dark ghosts, invisible and silent, but present everywhere, of
people that have lived in that land. And, as if a superior power were driving me, I
thought about the Etruscans. And those bloody figures painted on the walls of the
tombs occasionally found by my grandfather and my father came alive (pp. 14-15).

The images in the tombs that called upon Omero were made by the Etruscans, also known as
Tyrsenoi or Tyrrheni, who were both historically and artistically the most important of the
5

How I became “the magician.”
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indigenous peoples of pre-Roman Italy. Archaeological remnants of them have been found
from the Alps to the gulf of Salerno (Hornblower & Spawforth, 2003). According to Bordo’s
story, the images made by the Etruscans in the tombs “ordered” him to discover them. Some
chambers in tombs have presented the largest collections of pre-Roman painting in the
classical world; they involve highly naturalistic depictions of banquets, games, hunting, and
other cheerful scenes (Hornblower & Spawforth, 2003). According to Bordo, that night, a
looter was born.
While Omero’s ghost story may be exciting, and though it may be true that tombaroli
enjoy seeing themselves as descendants of the Etruscans, the question remains: how does a
person decide to become a looter? How does a person learn to read the terrain? How does a
looter learn how to interpret a tomb? In order to answer these questions, this chapter
integrates once again both relevant findings from research conducted in Italy and the existing
literature. As in the previous chapter, appendix B provides the reader with a detailed list of all
those who have participated in the present research project and who appear in this chapter.

1. How tombaroli get organized
The previous chapter assessed whether tombaroli fit the traditional understanding

of

organized criminals; it also applied Natarajan and Belanger (1998)’s typology of
organizational structures to determine which structures they adopt in order to loot. The
present chapter takes a deeper look at the topic discussed in the last chapter, providing a more
detailed image of the organization of tombaroli. As the literature demonstrates, the way
tombaroli organize directly impacts how they learning and adapt to adversities, whether these
originate in the actions of law enforcement or not (Kenney, 2007). As chapter 2 noted, the
extant literature does not provide any detailed, empirical analysis of the organization of
looters. Following Michael Kenney’s (2002, 2006, 2007) research project based on the
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organizational learning of narcos and terrorist groups, three descriptive items have been
adopted. As such, this section will examine the issues of looting in groups versus looting
alone, recruitment, and hierarchy.

1.1. Looting in groups versus alone
When Hamblin (1970) interviewed a Sicilian tombarolo she nicknamed Pepe for her book
entitled Pots and Robbers, he claimed that he worked alone. When asked by the journalist
whether he would ever stop being a tombarolo, he answered that he would never stop, as he
loved digging and finding tombs too much. Even though he did not make much money from
what he found, as he had to pay fines when he got caught and bribe guards, Pepe happily
claimed he could not stop. He was, in modern day terminology, a lone wolf looter. His way
of working, all by himself, is very different to the many instances of tombaroli who claim to
work in teams. The first step in this description of the organization of looters is to assess
whether looting is predominantly a group or an individual activity.
An overwhelming majority of the expert respondents thought tomb raiding to be a
group activity. Expert respondents claimed that unearthing a tomb requires great physical
effort (some of the tombs can be located more than six meters below ground), good time
management (being quick is essential when looting a tomb), and someone watching for
intruders, among other factors. Therefore, teams of tombaroli can loot better

than

individuals.
Carlo, the archaeologist and guide in the second field trip, explained how looters need
an entire group in order to excavate a tomb. In fact, he proved his point while standing in
front of a tomb excavated by looters, in order to highlight the tremendous effort:
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So if there is a tomb, there is a team: fewer people are better off because they talk
less, but it depends on the tomb. They know if they need three men or five men to dig
a particular tomb. For certain ones, I think they have not enrolled less than eight
people. I am not bullshitting you, I have pictures. The holes were from seven to eight
meters deep. To make a hole this way in one day, takes at least seven, eight people.
Minimum. So, it depends on how much digging you have to do and so the team
organizes it according to the excavation (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).

In fact, during the first field research, also in Cerveteri, Angelo, the retired tombarolo,
claimed that some of the tombaroli he knew had occasionally worked alone, yet eventually
they thought it to be inconvenient and either joined or created a team.
In these groups the oldest or the most expert member acts as the leader of the group,
and the rest are thought to be brute force. Back in Rome, prosecutor Bartolo stated:

Practicality: they are chosen for their strength, to facilitate work. A group needs an
expert but also the strong guy who will excavate. And that's it. The expert understands
the direction of the tomb and how it is arranged, the value of the tomb’s content; the
others use their muscles to dig, and the tools they have available. The objective is to
obtain as many objects as possible in the shortest possible time (Interview, Olgiata,
2017).

In sum, to be done properly and efficiently, looting must be done in a group.
Tombaroli who operate all by themselves are not as efficient as a team. Yet, if the task is
done by a group of tombaroli, it raises yet another interesting question: who, eventually, ends
up being a member of a team of looters? And how is the recruitment of team members done?
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1.2. Recruitment processes
Omero Bordo, the tombarolo who decided to become a looter because of the supernatural
light he saw when his father abandoned him in the middle of the fields, had a team of looters
at his disposition (Cecchelin, 1987). Giuseppe Perticarari worked with family and friends
(Perticarari & Giuntani, 1986). Tagliaferri had a cadre of people he knew from his town
(Tagliaferri & Rupi Paci, 1992). The list of important tombaroli could go on and on. Some of
these tombaroli decided to register their experiences as looters in (auto)biographies, but they
never directly explained how they formed their teams.
Once again, a majority of expert respondents stated that there is no such thing as
recruiting new members. Moreover, expert respondents described the process of joining a
group of looters as something spontaneous in such a casual setting as in the town’s main bar,
where everybody eventually converges. Lieutenant Rodolfo, from the Carabinieri’s art squad,
who took care of the force’s database of stolen items, gave a description of the recruitment
processes of tombaroli that he observed throughout his career, stating that,

It may happen that they are looking for boys who are willing to work for them, like
smuggling cigarettes in the 1970s. In Naples, the smugglers went to the bars to look
for boys to make cigarette trips for a few hundred thousand lire. They [tombaroli] can
find volunteers anywhere, but usually they are always very closed groups because
when they are going to sell, they do not want many associates and do not want there
to be people who know they excavated a tomb. It is very simple (Interview, Rome,
2017).

The lack of a recruitment process is no substitute for trust; in fact, trust is very
important in admitting new members into a team of looters. Back in Cerveteri, Carlo, the
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interviewed archaeologist who took me on a tour of the necropolis of Cerveteri during the
second field trip, added to the art squad police agent’s description by talking about the
importance of trust:

Certainly, of course, there is the need for trust, when recruiting. Of course, you cannot
find anyone in the street and say, “Come dig up a tomb with me.” Then, many times
there are kinship relationships. I mean, that is how it works in a small village where
everyone knows each other (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).

Because of trust issues, looters usually integrate family members or friends into their
teams. These new tombaroli have grown up with looters in the same town and thus they are
good assets, as they know the surrounding areas where tombs are. However, some expert
respondents also mentioned two groups of people who might be recruited and admitted into
the team even though tombaroli do not know them personally.
The first group is the owners of terrain where looters excavate. Some looters contact
them, as they consider it better to have them on board in their illicit diggings and share with
them their profits, rather than risking these owners denouncing them to the police for
damaging their fields. As Alfredo, one of the two retired tombaroli who were interviewed for
this research project, stated, “In the end, we used to enroll the landowner in the team, but for
convenience. Having a landowner agreeing with us allowed us to handle it [excavating in
search of the tomb] differently; it was more convenient for us” (Interview, Montefiascone,
2017). Readers will remember from chapter four that while the team of looters led by
Giuseppe Montrasto were illicitly excavating in the terrains of a landowner, Giovanni
Temperi, the owner’s watchman, discovered the team of looters, yet decided to join them in
exchange for some money (Silver, 1999). The second group is immigrants from Eastern
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European countries: some tombaroli pay them small amounts of cash (an interviewed
tombarolo mentioned €50 per night [$58]) in order to do the physically challenging task of
digging (Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017). This chapter will consider further the figure of
the Eastern European tombarolo.
Finally, minors can be part of a team, as two interviews uncovered. Andrea and Luca,
from the Italian Ministry of Culture stated,

There were the little boys who were going to the tombs, along with older tombaroli,
obviously. Several times I had to go and testify in a juvenile court because there were
little boys who had been taken by their father to the grave and were arrested
(Interview, Rome, 2017).

Certainly, this is an issue that demands further research, as there is a complete void of
analysis of their role in the literature.
To conclude, recruitment among tombaroli can only be described as informal,
occurring in bars and common spaces shared by small town inhabitants or within a familial
context. The main foundation is trust; thus members of the group know the new recruits. The
only exceptions are owners of terrains and migrants who work digging for a small salary. The
last organizational element to assess is whether the groups are arranged hierarchically or
whether each member shares the same position. Is there a hierarchy in the groups of
tombaroli? Who issues orders? And what happens if orders are not followed?

1.3. Hierarchy issues
The existing literature is unclear about hierarchies inside teams of looters. Because most of
the literature consists of narration of cases, the books and articles dealing with Italian
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archaeological looting tend to name the important tombarolo who would head the group and
identify how many men he would employ. However, these accounts rarely depict

the

hierarchical dynamics in these groups.
The majority of the expert respondents thought that there is some sort of hierarchy
operating within groups of looters. This hierarchy has only one level: one member occupies a
higher position within the team of tombaroli, dictated by mostly being the older member and
possessing valuable experience and knowledge (such as recognizing a piece by the period it
was crafted, or its style, or the artist who produced it, for example). Other valued traits appear
to be charisma and strength. For example, noted tombarolo Luigi Perticarari (1986) explained
how, due to his fame, in his team he was only in charge of probing the terrain, while the rest
of the team, would watch, excavate and, in his own words, “do the hard tasks” (p. 35). At the
same time, he considered himself responsible for the entire team, and so, for example, when
they rested after unearthing the tomb, he would stay awake and watched for them.
Other expert respondents thought that there is no hierarchy whatsoever dividing the
different looters that make up a team. Four of the interviewed tombaroli stated that in their
respective groups there was absolute equality between members. For example, a couple of
active tombaroli, Giovanni and Patrizio, explained that in their group every member was an
equal, be they stronger or weaker (Interview, La Giustiniana, 2017). Gismondo Tagliaferri,
the retired tombarolo who published a book about his experience as a tombarolo along Luisa
Rupi Paci (1992) explained that, as he was tired of working by himself, he formed a team of
four; however, Tagliaferri does not explain how he did this. The tombarolo was nicknamed
“red cricket” (grillo rosso), even though he adds “… not because I wanted to be the boss, but
because it was a name I already had and so I decided to keep it” (p. 14).
Alfredo, the retired tombarolo who lived and operated in the area surrounding Lake
Bolsena, stated that
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No hierarchy, I was like the others. Of course, a final decision was mine to make, but
nothing beyond if we were digging at that point or not, understand? Let's say that the
decision on where to open a hole was up to me. But then, in the end, I was like the
others: I took the same money (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017).

It is worth noting that, in this specific example, Alfredo recalls that a final decision was his to
make, denoting a preeminent role over the rest of the looters, which indicates, alongside the
fact that he was the most experienced member in the group, a certain position of power. In
any case, even though most of the expert respondents thought that there is a more
experienced looter acting as a boss, evidence cannot discard that there could be groups where
all the members work as equals.
However, do orders exist in a context where the hierarchy is not complex? As can be
seen, half of the expert respondents thought that there were no orders being issued. Expert
respondents do not refer to orders but to counsels (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017),
coordination (Tristano, e-mail communication, May 19, 2017), procedures (Interview, Rome,
2017), suggestions (Interview, Rome, 2017), or the act of sharing knowledge (Interview,
Rome, 2017).
In the second field trip, Carlo, the archaeologist working for the Ministry of Culture
introduced three more of his colleagues: Lucia, Leonardo, and Angelo. All of them worked in
the necropolis under the aegis of a non-profit organization, named NUCLEO
ARCHAEOLOGICO ANTICA CAERE Onlus, founded with the intention of educating
locals and other Italian nationals about the area’s Etruscan past, while performing tasks of
maintenance, periodic cleaning, and valorization of these exceptional archeological areas.
After a morning of hard work under the sun, interviews were conducted during
lunchtime. There, Carlo and the three archeologists working for the NUCLEO
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ARCHAEOLOGICO ANTICA CAERE Onlus explained how in this line of work it is very
normal to encounter illicit diggings being performed. Two of the archaeologists, Leonardo
and Angelo, talked about how older, more experienced looters might have an ultimate
decision-making capacity as to what team members should do. They coordinate the work of
the rest of the tombaroli in the group. In the words of both Leonardo and Angelo:

- They do not issue orders. It's just a tip they share with the other members.
- Well, yes, they say: “dig here, dig here.”
- “Dig here, it is a better spot, look, I'm sure you can find it here, it's easier to get in.”
I think those who have more experience are listened to only because of the experience
they have, understood?
- But then, I saw them at work. They come to us during an excavation and there is
always an old tombarolo, or two or three, looking at us and then, like the elderly
worker, eh, at a construction site, they say to us “But look there, there,” (Interview,
Cerveteri, 2017).

In fact, while conducting fieldwork with all of them in the morning, it was observed
how the archaeologists found an exceptionally small perfume vase. The size of the vase
meant that the recovery task took up some hours of the morning. At the same time, as the
archaeologists could see that it was a painted vase (it depicted some sort of sportive
competition), their shouts of joy were heard around the area.
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FIGURE 13. Archaeologists of a non-profit organization, NUCLEO ARCHAEOLOGICO
ANTICA CAERE Onlus, founded with the intention of educating locals and other Italian
nationals about the area’s Etruscan past of the, found this Etruscan perfume bottle with
images of athletes competing.
Source: the author (2017)
These shouts attracted the attention of eventually two old tombaroli (after interviewing five
of them, some living in the area), who separately approached the team of archaeologists and
tried to give directions on how to operate, as if the archaeologists were members of the
tombaroli’s teams. The rapport with the team of archaeologists and each tombarolo was
amicable, as the archaeologists also were from the town and knew them. In any case, they let
the tombaroli speak and kept working, barely acknowledging their presence and their orders.
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The lack of orders does not imply, however, that there are no consequences for unruly
tombaroli. Whether labeled counsels, coordination, or suggestions, these have to be followed,
or the future of an unruly looter might be at stake. If a tombarolo is thought to be
problematic, the chances of being asked to excavate once again diminish. Bartolo, the
prosecutor, stated that

It is clear that if there is a quarrel, if they do not respect certain situations, then that
person is no longer called in the future, in short. And I also had episodes in which the
person who hadn’t been called became an informant. It's all about internal dynamics.
It is a very vindictive and at the same time collaborative environment (Interview,
Olgiata, 2017).

In sum, the literature is unclear about the existence of hierarchies within groups of
tombaroli. It seems from the results obtained in this research project that the predominant
point of view is that generally in groups of tombaroli there is one looter who is older and
more experienced and has a higher status than the others. However, some of the expert
respondents interviewed also point towards groups where all the members are considered
equals. Orders are not an important part of the task of tombaroli. In fact, instead of orders
counsels and suggestions of what to do when looting a tomb are given. Looters who do not
cooperate while at work might be dismissed in future diggings.

2. The learning of tombaroli
The previous section has elaborated on how tombaroli are organized and function internally.
Now it is time to examine how looters learn to perform their tasks. Following the theoretical
framework of organizational learning, and similar research in this field, results presented in
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this section address three specific issues related to learning: the sources where tombaroli
learn; the type of knowledge learnt, classified as metis and/or techné; and the recording,
storage, and frequency of access to information. It is time to ask who is teaching all these
tombaroli to loot.

2.1. Sources of learning
When asked about who teaches tombaroli to loot, expert respondents mostly indicated as
sources either family members, older looters, a friend or, in fewer instances, cases where the
tombarolo learns how to loot by himself. In several responses, more than one source was
indicated. The following chart summarizes the prevalence of every possible response.
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FIGURE 14: Opinions of respondents about the sources of learning for tombaroli
(N = 24).
Source: the author

A family setting was the most mentioned learning source, according to expert
respondents. Many of them stated that fathers played a key role in passing their passion for
looting to their sons, but also uncles to nephews.
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The literature is ripe with examples of families as sources of learning. Pepe, the looter
interviewed by Hamblin (1970), stated how his knowledge on looting was passed on to him
by his father. Pietro Casasanta explained once, when interviewed by Isman (2009a) that he
was acquainted with looting through his grandfather and later his father. Nine years earlier,
when Ruiz (2000) interviewed the tombarolo Antonio Induno, he stated that as a boy, he
learnt to be a looter from his father, and later by working as a henchman for another
tombarolo. But probably the most shocking excerpt can be read from the autobiography of
Luigi Perticarari (1986), who wrote:

I am so proud of my work that I even teach it to my children. And they are proud of
me. In order to gain respect from other friends they do not find anything better to say
than “Watch out, I am the son of the Magician [Perticarari’s self proclaimed
nickname]!”. My youngest daughter, in an essay about her father, wrote: “My father is
a tombarolo and brings home so many Etruscan vases.” I even gave to my children an
ancient object to show it in class. Once, one of them brought a head of Athena, finely
crafted, and the teacher explained it to the kids, and then he took it home to better
study it. Maybe he expected I would lend it to him, but it was too important a
sculpture so he had to give it back to me (pp. 27-28).

Perticarari (1986), in fact, confesses in his autobiography that he brought his son to excavate
tombs, thus fulfilling his promise to teach his labor to his children.
Linda, the investigative journalist, compared how a father instilled becoming a
tombarolo into his son the same way he would teach him to ride a bike. The father/uncle
teaches the new tombarolo what he can or cannot do and what issues he must pay attention to
(Interview, Rome, 2017). Vice-Commandant of the Comando Carabinieri’s art squad Enrico,
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who during his years in the force commanded twelve Carabinieri art police divisions within
Italy, stated, like Linda, that

So many times there is the tradition of father passing the knowledge on to his son, eh.
And so many tombaroli are children of robbers; it is practically family experience, in
some cases. But there is no classroom where they teach you how to be a tombarolo
because when they dig, they devastate. They are more devastators than looters
(Interview, Rome, 2016).

The second most mentioned source by respondents was other tombaroli, acting as
mentors to younger and eager learners and soon-to-be looters. The literature, once again,
abounds with examples. The most relevant is probably, once again, Antonio Induno, who
learnt to be a tombarolo from his father and another looter, yet eventually he became the
professor. As he claims in his interview to Ruiz (2000), he has taught new tombaroli, but also
some of them, while learning the ropes, went to him wanting his help to sell material for a
commission of 10% of the total amount obtained. He even reached the extreme of selling
unopened tombs because, as he claimed, less experienced tombaroli are not as good at
finding tombs, so he points them in the right direction in exchange for a flat fee or a cut of the
profits.
Two of the interviewed tombaroli, Alfredo and Gennaro, claimed to have learned the
ropes through one or more older looters, who had no family relationship with them
(Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017; Interview, Montefiascone, 2017). Alfredo had three
older tombaroli who taught them, and later, when on his own, he always kept learning from
colleagues when chatting with them. However, his knowledge or the knowledge of the other
members of his group was never been transmitted to younger generations (Interview,
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Montefiascone, 2017). By contrast, Gennaro had plenty of trainees to choose from in his
hometown, Montalto di Castro. As his fame grew, Gennaro would regularly be approached
by young boys who would ask him to take them to the fields. Of course, he would take
advantage of this not only to teach them but also to have younger diggers that would take the
most taxing part of the process out of his hands. Younger “pupils” would soon learn about the
different forms of terrain; how to scout and spot tombs; the different types of tombs; how to
excavate them; the usage of the spillone, the rod used to probe the terrain; and superstitions
about how to get rid of ghosts (Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017).
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FIGURE 15. The metal tip of a spillone, the iron rod used by tombaroli once the soil
is properly wet and soft when searching for tombs. Looters insert the rod in the wet
soil in search of a stone surface that might indicate the presence of a tomb.
Source: the author (2017)
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Finally, the last two ways tombaroli learn are through friends and through teaching
themselves. The education of tombaroli who learn from friends followed the same pattern as
those who learn from family members and older looters, but the self-educated tombaroli
teach themselves from books. Tombarolo Omero Bordo considered himself a self-learner.
According to his story, narrated by Cecchelin (1987), two rich gentlemen from a nearby town
went to the bar of the town were he lived and asked him if he knew someone who would loot
tombs for them. Omero volunteered. According to him, “My great occasion was there,
brought to me, and I immediately understood I had to seize it. I remembered the tombs that I
had seen as a child in Monterozzi and left immediately” (p. 24). He went along with his
friend Luciano, took two pickaxes from Omero’s home, and found vases and bronzes in the
area of Monterozzi. A similar story happened to Luigi Perticarari, as explained by himself
and Giuntani (1986). He was a young farmer and while plowing the fields, he found a tomb.
As he stated, “No one taught me to use the furino [a probing rod]. I have learnt all by myself,
stealing one word here and one there. And probing the soil, and by that, little by little, I learnt
so much” (p. 18).
This is the case of three of the interviewed tombaroli, who decided to learn to become
looters all by themselves, by reading books. All of them were younger than the looters who
learnt from other looters, and profited from many sources (biographies of looters,
archaeology books, newspaper articles, among others) to learn. For example, the two
interviewed brothers who looted together in the same team, Giovanni and Patrizio, claimed
they used to go to the Sunday market, buy and read old archaeology books, and then execute
it through trial and error. They started digging when they were fifteen (Interview, Cerveteri,
2017; Interview, La Giustiniana, 2017).
All the respondents claimed that practice was central to learning. As prosecutor
Bartolo stated,
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Well, even when older tombaroli do not share most of the information, eh? The
digger, if he is intelligent, while digging, understands what is the activity of his boss.
Of course, you gain understanding by digging. Because the more you dig, the more
experienced you become. If the digger is stupid, he will gain no experience, but if he
is a person who knows how to look and learn, he gains experience. The beauty of this
form of delinquency is that it is old. It has been conducted this way forever
(Interview, Olgiata, 2017).

In sum, tombaroli might learn to become looters from a variety of sources, but having
a looter in the family or knowing someone inspires many would-be tombaroli to learn.

2.2. Practical and scientific knowledge
Having assessed who teaches newer tombaroli, the question of what is being taught to looters
can now be addressed. According to organizational learning theory, the knowledge being
transmitted to the people integrating the group can be divided in these two concepts: metis,
understood as experimental or intuitive knowledge, and techné, understood as abstract
technical knowledge.
While techné is taught through formal instruction and codified in knowledge-based
artifacts, metis is learnt through the practice of the activity itself and everyday interaction
with other participants. Metis, in this sense, is learned by doing and engaging in the activity
per se. People share metis by communicative interaction between the participants, from older
to younger participants, who gather together in communities of practice, and it different
several skills depending on the task learnt. This distinction leads to the further distinction
between practical knowledge, or the general information and understanding necessary to
carry out every day activities; and scientific knowledge, or the technical and symbolic
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erudition regarding a particular phenomenon, according to Kenney (2007). Practical expertise
is obtained through training and the accumulation of direct experience. On the other hand,
scientific expertise only can be acquired through formal education, extending over a period of
years.
Both expert respondents and the literature provide many examples of what tombaroli
learn. Interviewed expert respondents were asked to classify these examples between metis or
techné, after listening to a definition of each category. Expert respondents agreed that metis
plays a bigger role in the learning processes of tombaroli than techné. Observation and
intuition were the two traits within metis that were most mentioned and valued by looters. All
of the tombaroli recognized that it is very important to be observant and know how to read
the terrain. One must learn to pay attention to the growth of vegetation, which is a good
indicator of the presence of a tomb, as well as the type of soil and the terrain’s patina
(Interview, Cerveteri, 2017; Interview, La Giustiniana, 2017; Interview, Montalto di Castro,
2017; Interview, Montefiascone, 2017). As Prosecutor Bartolo commented, tombaroli acquire
knowledge by digging, and if the looter pays good attention, he can gain experience
(Interview, Olgiata, 2017).
The literature strongly agrees with interviewed looters as do many of the
(auto)biographies of tombaroli. Luigi Perticarari (1986), in his book, explains their task:

How do we do it, when reading the terrain? Easy. We pass and pass again, whether it
is sunny or it rains, to observe any particularity. For those who understand how to do
it and have an eye for it, it is not difficult to understand where the terrain has been
excavated, even in remote times (p. 62).
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Metis clearly makes up much of a tombarolo’s knowledge. The looters consider, it to
be a “fai da te” or a do-it-yourself task. Carla, the archaeologist working at the Consiglio
Nazionale delle Ricerche (the National Council of Research) in Rome, in charge of
documenting instances of archaeological destruction caused not only by tombaroli but also
by construction sites and other agents, summarized the importance of metis in the learning
process of tombaroli as follows:

Thanks to the repetitions, they dig! Then there is always someone who thinks he is
better, and without experience, maybe tries and of course digs but, of course, doubly
fatigues himself compared to others. But I noticed that whoever does it repeatedly
knows where to hit, let's say… you have to understand the woods, see the
undergrowth… there is the important role of intuition. Where do you find a tomb, if
you have no elements that guide you? So there is also a good deal of intuition on their
part (Interview, Rome, 2017).

The interviewed looters who claimed to have learnt the activity by themselves, valued
metis much more than techné. Giovanni and Patrizio, the brothers who dig together explained
that they started digging all by themselves when they were fifteen. Their father worked the
fields with his tractor, and inadvertently unearthed many pieces, that he sadly tended to
discard and destroy. As they stated, they started digging, and once they found a tomb, kept
working by intuition. At first, they did not understand anything, but with time, they kept
learning from both experience and intuition (Interview, La Giustiniana, 2017). For example,
Perticarari (1987) stated that he learnt from all the details a tomb offered him:
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After the joy of the first discoveries, I began to study every tomb, because I wanted to
understand more. I observed every centimeter, every corner. Why is [the tomb] so
long? Why is it so tight? Why is it placed this way? So many questions, whether the
tomb was full or empty; so many problems that I solved all by myself. Every case
presented indeed different problems. And I wanted to understand them. That way,
tomb after tomb, I got my experience (p. 22).

Techné, however, also plays a preeminent role in the learning processes of some
tombaroli. Most of this formal instruction comes from books, which to some tombaroli, are
important when learning particular skills or gaining specific knowledge – knowledge beyond
the one gained while excavating. This particular knowledge mostly refers to possible
discoveries looters might make inside the tombs. Tombaroli interested in archaeology were
able to understand the objects they found better so as to know if they were rare and thus price
them accordingly when selling them. As such, two of the interviewed tombaroli, Gennaro
and Alfredo, had a library in the field of archaeology, and one of them, Alfredo, specifically,
used to have a tiny laboratory devoted to the restoration of the pieces he found (Interview,
Montalto di Castro, 2017; Interview, Montefiascone, 2017).
Some of the interviewed tombaroli, and other important ones that wrote books or gave
interviews, were great aficionados in archaeology, yet none of them had academic degrees.
Some of them know how to identify when the piece was created, how to restore a broken
piece, and how to recognize the different types of tombs. Some have mastered enough
classical history and mythology to recognize the iconography of a particular piece, and some
even own auction house catalogues which they consult to learn the prices of similar pieces.
Andrea and Luca explained the following story of an anonymous tombarolo they
encountered:
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Well, this tombaroli, when he found a pot, at the beginning, he first sold it, but then
he began to look at the books he had, and realized that some pieces were more
important than others, so he began to recognize the painters or the types of painting.
But above all, they must learn the structure of the tombs. You must also know the
different types of tombs, and they must learn it in books (Interview, Rome, 2017).

This is not the only example of a tombarolo who strives to learn more in order to
work more efficiently and make more money. Literature also gives plenty of examples of
tombaroli, like Pietro Casasanta, who did the same. Now dead, Casasanta became one of
Italy’s most notorious tombarolo, to the point that even the Wall Street Journal dubbed him
“the king of tombaroli” in one of those stereotypical accounts that glorifies criminal conduct
just because it is fascinating (Kahn & Crane, 2006). Casasanta learnt from his grandfather, a
farmer in the area of Lazio. He began looting in Anguillara Sabazia, north of Rome, near
Lake Bracciano, an area rich with archaeological remnants.
Casasanta began digging in 1960, and his specialty was to excavate Roman villas, not
tombs. In fact, he claims he found more than one hundred such villas. Casasanta would be
just another looter if it were not for three very important findings: in 1970, he found
L’Inviolata, a large settlement including a temple cult containing sixty-three statues (twentyfive of them life-size); in 1992, he found in a second raid to L’Inviolata the Capitoline Triad,
a six-ton marble statue of Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva; and in 1995, he found an ivory head of
Apollo, which was very valuable due to the fact that ivory sculptures were rare even in
antiquity. He served a year in prison for the second finding.
However, the knowledge possessed by the tombaroli cannot compare to the
knowledge possessed by a real archaeologist. It mostly assesses the importance and value of
the piece. Looters cannot compare their knowledge to that acquired years of rigorous
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academic training by archaeologists or art historians. Isman (2009a) quotes Pietro Casasanta
in his book: “‘a digging is like an open book; and I, 70 years old, have been excavating for
fifty years’” (p. 17). In his recollections about his diggings to Isman (2009a), it can be seen
how his techné is descriptive. He describes the materials of the pieces he found as “agata
fasciata” or “marmo paonazzetto”; he summarizes bits of history with claims like “Under the
fields there was an Etruscan city, sacked by the Orvietani in the 1300s”; and he describes
artistic styles such as when he notes “There were two neogothic statues and an ugly satyr
from the 1780s.”. However, this descriptive knowledge fell far short of the knowledge
possessed by real archaeologists. Watson & Todeschini (2007) refer to Daniela Rizzo, who
became an expert witness at his trial. Daniella Rizzo declared that Casasanta left the sites
where he looted filled with destroyed archaeological remnants. Rizzo also confirmed that
Casasanta did enormous damage where he excavated. In fact, he was too ignorant,
archaeologically speaking, to realize the damage done.
In sum, excavating is learnt through metis, while the connoisseurship of the objects is
mostly learnt with techné. A sensu contrario, a tombarolo does not learn how to excavate
through formal education in books, but through practice. This practice, however, cannot
supply the need for formal learning when a looter tries to ascertain certain elements of the
piece he might have found.

2.3. Ways of storing and accessing information
The final issue relates to whether tombaroli store this information, and if so, how frequently
they access this stored knowledge. Organizational learning theory calls these records
organizational memories (Kenney, 2007) and claims that such information impacts how
groups learn. Accordingly, respondents were asked whether tombaroli documented their
experiences in either paper or electronic records
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If tombaroli decide to store information gathered during the performance of their
activities, they tend to do so on paper. These documents are mostly pictures and, to a lesser
degree, textual information taking several forms. Photographs record what has been found by
tombaroli, but also, and more importantly, offer clients sellable goods without having to
transport them. During the period of the great raid that covered the last decades of the past
century, some looters took Polaroids, as the pictures can be developed without involving a
professional, and are thus known only to those involved in taking them.
In fact in the Medici affaire, Polaroids found in the dealer’s Geneva Freeport
warehouse were one of the main pieces of evidence that led to a conviction. In these
photographs, the antiquities were depicted before an expert took good care of them. Salt and
mud covering the pieces were shown as they appeared after having emerged from the ground,
as described by Gill and Tsirogiannis (2011). Tombaroli who took these pictures might amass
an impressive amount of them. Alfredo explained that he had more than five hundred
pictures, which were seized by the Carabinieri, along with archaeological pieces and other
documents (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017). Nowadays, the age of the Polaroid has passed,
and cellphones are the preferred method to take pictures, as several expert respondents
confirmed, even though this presents two risks: pictures can be duplicated, as the sender loses
control over the photograph and law enforcement agencies can intercept them. According to
these respondents, this is the only electronic form of storing information (Interview,
Cerveteri, 2017; Interview, Rome, 2016; Interview, Rome, 2017).
But tombaroli do not only use photographs to document their findings. Some of them
also write their acquired knowledge and information in a physical format that might include
maps, registries of found items, records, among others. Prosecutor Bartolo explained in detail
the trove of documents seized from both Pietro Casasanta and Giuseppe Evangelisti, two
important tombaroli. As he stated,
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Casasanta's house was a trove of documents, for example. Evangelisti also heavily
documented his findings. For example, he logged all the tombs he found, the design
of the tomb, its typology… he even drew them, carefully detailing where the objects
were found in the grave. We have all these notebooks… ah, they are beautiful
(Interview, Olgiata, 2017).

In fact, when Isman (2009a) interviewed Pietro Casasanta, the looter acknowledged
his self-education from books. Above all, he read the diary of excavations of archaeologist
Rodolfo Lanciani (1845-1929), who Casasanta thought to be “the archaeologist of the great
Roman [archaeological] campaigns” (p. 92), as he created the famous Forma Urbis Romae, a
series of maps about Ancient Rome. Alfredo, the retired tombarolo, explained that he had a
library comprised of archaeology books, Polaroids, and the abovementioned diaries. In these
diaries he kept all his findings: the pieces they had found, the asked prices, the money made.
All of the items were divided by raided tombs, along with their locations. The looter did not
use exact, technical language, in order to willfully make the process of reading them difficult
to others. The tombarolo confessed that he felt sad when they seized the pictures and diaries
because he felt he was losing a part of his own history.
These diaries are now in several boxes marked as evidence in the offices of Daniella
Rizzo, an archaeologist, and Maurizio Pellegrini, a photojournalist turned expert witness in
the field of looted antiquities. Both Rizzo and Pellegrini work at the Italian Ministry of
Culture, where Rizzo oversees, from her offices at the Museum of Villa Giulia, the
department of Goods Control and Circulation with the assistance of Mr. Pellegrini. The
diaries were written in regular school notebooks and documented his activities since 1997.
For example, the diaries state, in poorly handwriting, that in 1998, the looter raided fortyseven tombs, obtaining three hundred and seventy-seven pieces, cashing eighty million lire.
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In 2000, the tombarolo raided sixty-eight tombs, obtaining seven hundred and thirty-seven
pieces, and cashing 164 million lire ($99,995). There were also some crude maps, childishly
drawn, indicating how to arrive at the tombs. Mention of these diaries can be seen in several
sources in the literature, such as Isman (2009a) or Watson and Todeschini (2007).
Another important type of documents is biographies and autobiographies of
tombaroli. In these books, the looter usually not only narrates his life, but also his looting
techniques. Historically, since the late 1980s, tombaroli have sought public attention by
publishing their biographies and appearing on television to present an entirely new image of
themselves. Their depictions include an embellishment of their task, as they are portrayed as
heroes who bring the treasures of the past to the public and boast of an expertise, which
remains unrecognized by official archaeologists.
A careful reading of these stories, however, reveals many issues, which are of
considerable importance to heritage management and archaeological research. These
accounts contain a wealth of information on the identity of the people who loot tombs; their
backgrounds, motivations, and attempts to legitimate their actions. Moreover, they provide a
unique insight into the relations between tomb robbers and the communities within which
they operate.
Biographies of tombaroli, such as Perticarari (Giuntani & Perticarari, 1986), Bordo
(Cecchelin, 1987), Tagliaferri (Tagliaferri & Rupi Paci, 1992) and, more recently, Verrenga
(2016), are filled with adventures that are bound to appeal to a wider audience. Thus the
impact these books can have on a proactive looter should not be discarded. Most inhabitants
of the area are confronted with the archaeological remains on a daily basis and many have
had a taste of the excitement of excavating tombs at an early age.
One of the tombaroli interviewed for this research project, Gennaro, is one of the
authors of this autobiography. Both Gennaro and his coauthor, Gemma, a teacher in Florence,
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accepted to be interviewed. As we talked for an entire day in a little town near Rome, both
explained the process of converting the knowledge of the looter into two books. As they
expressed,

- I wrote twelve notebooks, full of his stories ... I have the notebooks in Florence. I
rewrote them, I filled them with post-its, and then later, I put all of them together ...
These notebooks contain information, mapping ...
- Everything, everything, everything. I gave her everything (Interview, Montalto di
Castro, 2017).

The knowledge of Gennaro was eventually made into several books, where the author recalls
his memories of his life, how he formed his team, how he excavated, and the historical
evolution of looters, among other topics. The tombarolo and teacher have worked on no less
than four books on archaeology.
It must be noted that not all looters keep information. Carabinieri’s Lieutenant
Roberto stated that in fifteen years he had found only a few documents belonging to
tombaroli (Interview, Rome, 2017). This point of view was ratified by the two tombaroli who
are brothers, Giovanni and Patrizio, who commented on how they tried to document their
experiences but eventually desisted, as they had no patience for this task (Interview, La
Giustiniana, 2017). A final element to be reported in this section concerns access and
frequency of this access by participants to this information. The literature provides no insight
on this specific issue, and the majority of expert respondents did not know about these issues.
The rest of responses pointed to the fact that looters do not keep or access the
information they produce, as this information contains incriminating evidence. Many
respondents who lived through and combatted the great raid of Italian archaeological sites
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referred to the pictures, which in many instances became the convicting piece of evidence in
court. This is the sole reason why these damning pieces of evidence were destroyed most of
the time after the selling of the piece had taken place.
The most famous case where the pictures became the Achilles’ heel of an entire
trafficking ring was the one involving antiquities’ dealer Giacomo Medici, whose trove of
pictures of unearthed looted artifacts proved fatal in court. In fact, Maurizio Pellegrini, the
abovementioned photojournalist, was in charge of sorting them out in Geneva, where the
pictures were found. According to Watson and Todeschini (2007), “All the photographs…
were arranged according to type, date, and location where the objects depicted were sold” (p.
87). Pellegrini found that some pictures depicted the unearthed objects as they were found;
others depicted the objects while being restored; while a third type of pictures showed the
objects in the J. Paul Getty Museum’s catalogue. That way, Pellegrini could prove the
sequence of antiquities being looted from Italian soil, transported to Switzerland, and then
sold to an American museum. Another case involved the tombarolo Giuseppe Evangelisti,
who, in a police operation that raided his home, “lost” four hundred pictures of his looted
items which secured his conviction (Isman, 2009a).
Anecdotally, two out of the five tombaroli interviewed, Alfredo and Gennaro, stored
their information and stated that only they had access to it. Two reasons explain why: first,
both thought the material was of a private nature; second, the other members of the team did
not care about this information (Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017; Interview,
Montefiascone, 2017). The only difference between Alfredo and Gennaro was that the former
only occasionally accessed the information due to lack of time, whereas the latter stated that
he often looked at the material because every time he read the journals, he discovered
something new. As Alfredo said, “Maybe in the evening I came back from digging, or the
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next day, and as soon as I had a moment, I remembered what I had found and how I did it,
you understand?” (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017).
To conclude, this section has shown how pictures (then, Polaroids; now, taken with a
cellphone) have been the most common way of storing information by some tombaroli.
These pictures tend to be destroyed, as they can easily become incriminating evidence in
police investigations and subsequent trials. Other sources of storage of information have been
maps, registries of found items, ledgers, books, or diaries, but again, not all tombaroli
compile their gathered knowledge. Only the person that creates them accesses this
information.

3. Adaptations of tombaroli to law enforcement
Kenney (2007) defined competitive adaptation as how criminal organizations learn by
interacting, gathering, and analyzing information in order to change practices while trying to
outsmart police and other opponents in a dynamic interaction. How do tombaroli adapt to
police operations against them? And do tombaroli adapt to unforeseen problems unrelated to
law enforcement?
As seen in chapter two, the literature on looting has never attempted to understand the
activities of tombaroli from a criminological point of view, even though there are numerous
examples of interactions between police officers and looters that will be used to illustrate this
section. The following figure summarizes the experts’ responses about whether tombaroli
adapt their activities in response to perceived or actual threats from law enforcement agents:
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FIGURE 16: Opinions of respondents about adaptations of tombaroli due to the
activity of law enforcement (N = 24).
Source: the author

The majority of respondents (strongly) agreed that tombaroli adapt their way of acting
in response to either real or perceived threats coming from law enforcement. The existing
literature is filled with these sorts of examples of adaptation, and they can be clustered into
four different groups.
The first refers to the operating hours of tombaroli and how their timing has varied.
When Isman (2009) interviewed Pietro Casasanta and asked if his team of looters worked at
night, the famous tombarolo laughed at the journalist. Why work at night, when they can pass
as regular construction workers with the bulldozer during daytime? Casasanta replied to
Isman that his team worked from 6am to 5pm. Graeppler and Mazzei (1996) reported the
same trend in the fields of Puglia, where teams of looters used mechanical methods in broad
daylight to resemble farmers. However, decades earlier the situation was completely
different, as Perticarari and Giuntani (1986) narrate in the autobiography of the tombarolo.
Perticarari explains how he used to work in the morning because the site’s private security
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guards would only occasionally disturb him when looking for tombs. With the creation of the
art squads in the different Italian police forces, he was forced to work at night. The team
would stay in the site up to the early morning so they could blend with people commuting to
work.
A second group of adaptations to law enforcement cluster around the fact that this
crime happens in a rural environment, which historically has played to the advantage of
looters even in times of intense law enforcement activity. Because of the lack of resources
when compared to the vast amount of territory to patrol, looters might choose to operate
undisturbed in one area while agents patrol another. This might lead to the problem of having
to deal with other bands of looters digging in the area, but reaching an agreement with other
tombaroli is safer than corrupting police officials, according to Linda, the investigative
journalist (Interview, Rome, 2017). As Gennaro the tombarolo explained,

There is the chance of encountering surveillance. Before, during the week you went
twice where it was dangerous. Then when you saw that they had spotted you digging,
you did not go there, not for ten days. You went to dig on the other side of the fields,
far away from them (Interview, Montalto di Castro, 2017).

As seen in this account, hostile surveillance of the archaeological site is concealed as a gentle
walk in the forest, in order to locate the most actively patrolled areas by law enforcement.
A rural environment allows looters much liberty to innovate their adaptations. The
literature contains surprising accounts of the measures tombaroli take to get into tombs, such
as the construction of underground passages. Readers might recall the looting of the tomb of
the Medusa, explained in the preface of this research project. The looters managed to
excavate a tunnel from a neighboring vineyard straight to the tomb when the security
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measures became stronger (Graeppler & Mazzei, 1996; Pastore, 2001). Decades later, during
the police operation code-named Pandora, police found a tunnel that began in a garage and
went towards an archaeological area in the town of Vibo Valentia, in the region of Calabria.
The tunnel had carts so the looted items could be transported more quickly (Isman, 2009a).
A third cluster of adaptations concerns the places used as depots or the different ways
of smuggling the looted items out of the country. Concerning the former, Graeppler and
Mazzei (1996) stated that tombaroli in the region of Puglia prefer to use abandoned farms or
isolated buildings. That way, if police find the looted items, they cannot trace them to a
specific looter. In the north, the looted items are hidden in the middle of the forest, in a bush,
brambles, or a pit. Perticarari knew plenty of hideouts depending on the area he was
excavating, and as a norm, he never repeated hideouts. Around 7pm he would drive his car,
and stop pretending that something had happened to the motor; then he would load the looted
items (Perticarari & Giuntani, 1986).
Cars and trucks are the looters’ preferred method of transportation. Archaeological
findings sometimes share space in a truck with vegetables and fruits. The most famous case
of this was the statue of the goddess Aphrodite, illegally excavated in 1979 in the town of
Morgantina, in Sicily. The statue left Italy to Switzerland via Milan and Chiasso in a truck,
purposely broken into three parts to make it easier to smuggle. As Felch and Frammolino
(2011) state, “The smugglers used a carrot truck because the vegetables were transported
loose, rather than in crates, making it difficult for customs agents to dig through piles” (p.
108). Graeppler and Mazzei (1996) also confirmed cases like the one depicted above, as state
controls on trucks carrying food tend to be less restrictive due to the perishability of edible
goods. However, because the area of Puglia has one of the main production centers of
ceramics, Grottaglie, many trucks loaded with newly crafted pots were also used to conceal
looted items to ensure a safe passage through customs.
185

A fourth and final cluster of adaptations relates to the usage of technology.
Nowadays, tombaroli use smartphones, which allow them to communicate photographs of
the finds via Twitter, Facebook, or Whatsapp. And even though communications can be
intercepted, tombaroli can either speak in code or use public phones. Operation Pandora has
provided new examples and a trove of details regarding technological advances employed by
tombaroli to elude police. These looters are considered highly technologically advanced,
even managing to buy some of these gadgets abroad, such as a potent metal detector. In order
to be cautious, they talk in code. If looters use in a phone call the name Pietro and the verb
portare (to bring), as in “Did Pietro bring anything?” it meant the looted items will be in the
agreed upon place; if Pietro is combined with posto (place), a meeting is requested. In the
wiretappings, a looter is scolded because he asked for a specific tool over the phone (in
Italian, un arnese) without using coded language. In any case, coin-operated phone booths
are also employed (Isman, 2009a).
In some instances, these adaptations are mild, as looters and police agents might know
each other from the rural areas where they live. Sometimes there is even a certain rapport
between them. Hamblin (1970) explained how the tombarolo she interviewed, Pepe, used to
play hide-and-seek with police officers and bet 10,000 lire ($16) that they could not catch
him. Migliore (1991), in his study of Sicilian tombaroli, stated that “… certain officials may
ignore or take a less active interest in treasure-hunting activities on minor and/or
uninvestigated sites, in order to preserve friendly relations with members of the community”
(p. 163). In fact, one of the interviewed tombaroli, Alfredo, explained that he had a very good
relationship with the marshal in his town. If when greeting him any given morning, the agent
returned the greeting, Alfredo knew all was fine. However, if he did not, Alfredo knew
something was wrong and then he stopped digging for a week (Interview, Montefiascone,
2017).
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For all these reasons, metis comes in handy when finding a tomb. Some degree of
experimental or intuitive knowledge is required in order to do well and avoid detection and
detention while looting. Marco, a professor of archaeology at the University of Salento
summarizes how metis is really important:

I've seen recordings from Carabinieri who filmed tombaroli while they worked, and
you can tell they feel safe. They have to be cunning, trying to figure out when police
might not appear, because after all, they cannot think and control everything. When
their cunning fails, that is the time when you can arrest them. But I think they are at
least organized enough. The peasant may do it more naively; others, it's clear they
know they are doing it and so they are more alert (Interview, Rome, 2017).

The role of the police officers is to level themselves with the advantages tombaroli
enjoy over their state adversaries. Long gone are the days that Hamblin (1970) talked about
in her book, where a police officer, Colonel Scordino, on his days off used to dress in civilian
clothes, guidebook included, and roam the Etruscan archaeological sites looking for illicit
diggings or sellers of looted items. There would not be enough Colonel Scordinos in Italy to
enforce the great raid. According to all of the interviewed law enforcement respondents,
some of them from the Carabinieri, and one of them from the financial police, tombaroli
clearly adapt to their investigations. Law enforcement agents use snitches (called antenne;
antennas), perform raids, get rival families to testify against a competitor, or request wiretaps
to examining magistrates in order to intercept what is being planned over cellphones
(Interview, Cerveteri, 2017; Interview, Rome, 2016; Interview, Rome, 2017). That is why
Bartolo, the prosecutor specialized in criminal cases against Italian cultural heritage,
explaining that investigations involving tombaroli need to be refined as adaptation certainly
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plays a role in their successes. Evidently, adaptations of tombaroli have to be inserted into the
tactics of the investigations, forcing police to check all these possible sources of data
transmission (Interview, Olgiata, 2017).
Some respondents (strongly) disagreed with the fact that law enforcement has had an
impact on tombaroli, believing that tombaroli do not need to adapt to their possible threats.
The reason is the lack of a severe penalty, which facilitates looters, once caught and (if)
punished, to reoffend. In consequence, when looters start reoffending they keep using the
same methods. According to these respondents, there is no need to adapt to law enforcement.
For example, Andrea and Luca, archaeologist and expert in the field, respectively, did not
think tombaroli care about being caught by police. As with common offenders, police
officers warns them, “Look, I've seen you and if you do something I'll take you,” yet the
tombaroli goes on looting (Interview, Rome, 2017). In fact, the tombaroli brothers (Giovanni
and Patrizio), the youngest of all of the interviewed looters, stated bluntly that they could not
care less about the Carabinieri (Interview, La Giustiniana, 2017). However, the point of view
of these expert respondents is not the predominant view for two reasons. On one hand,
because they mostly refer to the capacity of reoffending of tombaroli, yet their opinions
neither confirm nor deny the capacity of looters to adapt to law enforcement. In fact, the data
provides many examples that show how tombaroli interact and analyze information in order
to change their modus operandi in order to attempt to outsmart police.
In sum, tombaroli, like other types of offenders, are susceptible to competitive
adaptation, and they can change their ways of committing their crimes and learn new modus
operandi. Examples have been given regarding changing of timing when offending, adapting
while working in a rural area, storing and transporting of looted antiquities, and using new
technologies. Therefore, police investigations of tombaroli need to be refined as adaptation
plays a role in their successes.
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4. Interpretation of findings regarding the organization, learning, and adaptation
processes of tombaroli
As previously stated in chapter 2, tombaroli fit the different traits that operationalize the
definition of organizations used in the theoretical framework of this research project.
According to Scott (1998), organizations are collections of participants that, through
behaviors that have been previously patterned, coordinate how they operate.
Porter, Lawler, and Hackman (1975) defined the traits an organization must have: it is
formed by individuals or groups of individuals; these individuals are associated with each
other in order to reach certain goals; these individuals perform different tasks; these
individuals act in coordination and according to a set of rules; and these individuals act with a
certain temporal continuity. Once one sees that tombaroli can be an organization, then one
can understand how they can learn as a collective. The following sections present an analysis
of the results that have been presented up to this moment.

4.1. A simple, traditional way of organizing modeled after centuries of looting
One cannot understand how tombaroli learn until one analyzes their structure, as the latter
affects the former. The literature agrees upon the fact that criminal groups develop more
elaborate norms, hierarchies, and procedures over the years (Curtis & Wendel, 2000). These
routines develop because of the imprint that experience has left (Kenney, 2007).
Paradoxically speaking, probably the oldest group criminal activity is looting; many authors
trace this centuries-old crime to ancient times. See, for example, Fagan (1977), Meyer
(1973), or Waxman (2008), among others. Some ancient accounts in papyri during the reign
of Ramses IX (1142 – 1123 BCE) refer to Egyptian looters.
As looting is eminently based on groups, there is the need for some sort of
organization; some degree of order is required for tombaroli to operate. Even small-scale
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groups like the teams of tombaroli analyzed in this research project require a minimum of
rules and procedures that allow all members to coordinate, while at the same time attempting
to minimize their exposure to law enforcement. These groups of tombaroli are based on
reciprocal support between members of the same team. Thanks to this reciprocal support, a
tomb can be dug faster, and its contents can be more efficiently looted. At the same time, if
the police raid the looters, it is easier for them to break up and flee, which makes it more
difficult to persecute looters. Members can meet afterwards with the looted items, clean
them, and establish a price. Because of all these possible contingencies, this specific form of
organization has been chosen for many decades and even centuries. In fact, the adjective that
best describes this typology of criminals is traditional. The imprint of the passing of time can
still be seen in the operations of looters, scarcely modified. Not even the big police operations
(mostly, motivated by the Medici affaire) that ended the period of the great raid for Italian
tombaroli at the beginning of the twenty-first century have modified the looters’ way of
organizing. At best, these police operations brought to light the devastating harm the looters
cause to Italy’s archaeological heritage. However, these police operations did little to deter
looters.
The literature agrees that small enterprises that supply a single good or service, such
as providing middlemen or buyers with antiquities, feature less role specialization. In fact,
these roles are contingent on individual members who might not stay for long, thus allowing
for a high participant turnover (Kenney, 2006, 2007). The results of the present research are
consistent with all these points contained in the literature, as tombaroli do indeed distribute
their tasks but role specialization is minimal. Also, turnover in these groups is high. Looters
frequently enter and leave the teams. The reasons for turnover among tombaroli are old age,
involuntary expulsion from the group after failing to be up to par with other team members,
and achievement of a certain economic status. For example, in the second field trip, Lucia, an
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archaeologist, explained how a cousin of hers used to spend the money gained from looting
on drugs and alcohol and fell prey to addiction. Eventually, his lifestyle was thought to be
unsuitable to his team of tombaroli, and he was expelled (Interview, Cerveteri, 2017).
This study has found that recruitment is mostly based upon word of mouth which
leads to direct contact between interested parties. This is very easy in closed and small
environments such as towns in rural Italy. There is no need for old members to value the
expertise of new ones, as new looters are not required to possess any experience at all, as
long as they know mostly how to dig. This recruitment can be spontaneous, born in the spur
of the moment, or it can also be family-based. In any case, the nature of recruitment is rooted
in the fact of belonging to a certain territory.
Hierarchy is determined by the skills of the member within the group. The person
who is able to decide the value of the piece, and thus fix a price for it, is the most prestigious
and high-ranking member. He not only has a superior role in comparison to the rest of the
members, but also a major decision-making capacity. After all, he is the person who connects
the discovery to a buyer, attaches a price to the piece, and is therefore is a key player inside
the team of looters. However, this dissertation has also found teams that operate on a totally
equal basis.
When no member of a team of looters has knowledge about the value of the looted
items or where to sell them, they must find a middleman who will do that for them. This
middleman usually has an artistic background and cultural experience, probably with
academic degrees. He will not, in most instances, loot or have close contact with tombaroli,
unless there is an important piece that he has seen and whose safety he wants to assure. In
these cases, the middleman does not have a hierarchical rapport with looters but he conditions
their work.
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Orders do not necessarily need to be followed. As there are no hierarchies in the strict
sense of the word, tombaroli do not give orders but rather counsel the other looters where to
dig or how to proceed in order to avoid law enforcement detection. In any case, these
counsels are commonsensical. As a consequence, because these counsels are not interpreted
as orders, members might disobey them without repercussions.
In sum, tombaroli seem to be firm believers of the adage if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it,
as they have successfully used their simple ways of organizing themselves for generations.
The only change regarding the organization of looters is that some groups of looters have
started using foreigners, whereas in the past membership was dictated mostly by kinship or
friendship ties. This change allows for speculation of whether the presence of foreigners
might lead to a more formally structured organization, which, in turn, might eventually
redefine the form of the crime, from the execution to the final distribution of the goods. A
possible example would be a significant penetration of criminal groups from other countries
(for example, Eastern European). This might result in archaeological looted items eventually
becoming mixed with other goods such as drugs or stolen luxury cars, and being sold
altogether in stock. In any case, the presence of foreigners certainly implies a loss of criminal
professionalization, if these newcomers are to be compared to the old looters that have been
tomb raiding for decades.
This section has discussed the straightforward and simple structure used by tombaroli.
But before assessing how structure has an imprint on learning let’s turn the analysis towards
what is being learnt by tombaroli and who is teaching them.

4.2. Metis for all; techné for some
The learning processes of tombaroli begin mostly with family members. Teams of looters can
consist of fathers, sons, uncles, cousins, and nephews, to cite some examples. Older
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generations in the family play an important role in transmitting their knowledge for looting to
the younger generations. The process is not at all different from other knowledge that might
be passed from the former to the latter. Other mentioned learning sources were older
tombaroli, who had no family ties to the learner; friends and colleagues; and finally, those
looters who have learnt the ropes of raiding tombs all by themselves, mostly by learning all
the required information from books.
The presence of both metis and techné have been clearly established in the task of
looters. There is an ability born directly from the contact with the looted object and the
previous illicit excavation (metis), and a more matured ability where a looter appreciates the
worth of the item and is able to establish an economic value (techné). In order to do so, it is
important to acquire specific knowledge about archaeology and the antiquities market. A
strong rapport with the territory is the foundation for metis, whereas a strong rapport with the
object is the foundation for techné.
Techné has strong ties with the evolution of looting in the twentieth century. People
who lived in rural areas after WWII, mostly devoted to farming and plowing the fields of
Italy, started finding archaeological pieces unearthed by their own human activity, by
landslides, or by other natural causes. As inhabitants of any given rural zone started to notice
these pieces and sold them as a form of subsistence, they realized there was a growing market
in looting antiquities. At that point, farmers turned into looters and started to use farming
tools to excavate tombs; on some occasions, they even created their own specific instruments
in order to avoid destroying valuable pieces. Up to this point, the metis employed by the
farmer to plow the fields was adapted by the tombaroli to loot. The beginning of some sort of
techné is also perceivable in this precise moment of the evolution of looting, as an eagerness
to know more about the looted items started to develop. It all began with the sensitivity that
some looters felt towards not destroying sellable items. This techné, however, was severely
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challenged, as farmers did not have the capacity to learn about archaeology, thus not
acquiring the competences that allowed them to value the most important pieces properly.
With time, techné fully emerged within teams of tombaroli. If no one in the team
acquired this knowledge, as still happens in some groups today, the transactions of the looters
were more quantity-based rather than quality-based. If tombaroli cannot be competent in the
illicit market where they operate, they need someone who has the techné they might not
possess. This factor highlights the continuation, in some instances, of a long chain that keeps
advancing with middlemen, antique shop owners, art historians, and other players who are
connoisseurs of the archaeological object. From the moment any given looter understood that
an item he found in a tomb had some value, he took care of his economic interests. Some
tombaroli tried to learn more technical procedures in order not to damage the piece when
excavating. As this knowledge went beyond basic excavation techniques, it could not be
gathered orally; thus there developed the need for a techné learnt through formal instruction
and codified in knowledge-based artifacts. As previously analyzed, this scientific knowledge
alongside the practical knowledge acquired after years of digging tombs puts any given
tombarolo in a better position inside the teams of looters.
Most of the activities of tombaroli require a great deal of practical knowledge. These
activities involve (roughly) finding a suitable team for the digging of the day (if some team
members have left and more manpower is required), driving to the area, scouting for a
possible spot where a tomb might lie by observing the terrain, wetting and probing the soil,
contacting the owner of the terrain, starting digging, watching for law enforcement officials,
securing the tomb, entering the tomb, raiding the tomb, taking the archaeological goods,
studying them, restoring them, valuing them, showing them to prospective buyers, contacting
(if needed) middlemen, and finally delivering them. The older or more experienced
tombarolo will lead the operations, even though it is worth remembering that hierarchy in
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teams of looters is diluted. In contrast, most of the activities of tombaroli do not require much
scientific knowledge. In fact, the knowledge required is minimal, as driving, watering the
soil, and digging are practical activities that anyone with a little practice can quickly do or
learn. Even the more complicated tasks, which involve a certain amount of archaeological
knowledge, such as identifying the looted goods or valuing them, are pretty rudimentary; the
looter acquires this knowledge without any official training in archaeology. Knowing these
issues, in fact, is not essential, as tombaroli can access people outside their circle (an antique
dealer, for example) who will do that for them. This is the only repercussion from lacking
scientific knowledge.
With this clear-cut distinction between practical and scientific knowledge, it is
evident that not everybody feels inclined or is fit to advance his learning based on the latter.
In order to excavate, everybody needs metis and to learn the basics. Practice is an essential
requirement for learning metis in a physically demanding activity such as looting. Regarding
techné, it is very normal to find in the existing literature the figure of the tombarolo who,
though lacking in formal education, knows a lot about archaeology. This trait has been
confirmed by the interviews on which the present research is based. The reason a looter starts
learning techné-based knowledge is the need to understand which objects need to have time
invested in them and which do not because, for example, there is money required to restore
them.
Tombaroli acquire knowledge and experience based on trial and error. They, for
instance, need to estimate where a centuries-old tomb might be buried, and to spend hours
excavating it in order to see if their guess was worth the time invested or not. Their sources of
knowledge are team members, looters from other groups, outside consultants such as
middlemen, and finally, even archaeologists and law enforcement agents. This information
mostly refers to techniques and practices related to locating tombs, excavating them, raiding
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them, restoring objects, and placing them with a buyer. As an example, during the first field
trip with an old tombarolo, he engaged in an amicable conversation with a retired professor
of archaeology who used to be in charge of the excavations in the middle of a necropolis. The
three talked about the phenomenon from a historical perspective. More relevant, in the
second field trip, a perfume bottle was discovered by a group of archaeologists. While
digging, no less than three old tombaroli came to inquire in different moments what the
archaeologists had found and gave directions to them on how to excavate properly. Both the
archaeologists and tombaroli knew each other and kept a polite conversation, even though
archaeologists did not reveal the importance of the item they had unearthed.
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FIGURE 17. During the first field trip, many illegally excavated tombs were shown
outside the visiting perimeter of the necropolis of Cerveteri. When found, the
archaeological superintendent of the area must secure and assess the damage of the
looted tomb. Sadly, this is a recurring sight in the area.
Source: the author (2017)
As has been seen throughout the chapter, looters seek information to resolve
problematic situations, such as dealing with landowners, covering their tracks by literally
covering the excavation they have performed, avoiding injuring themselves or dying because
of collapsing tombs, among other examples. The exchange of this information is informal and
often takes place in bars and in situ, in the fields where looters operate. Since police
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operations conducted in the late eighties and nineties brought attention to the figure of the
tombarolo, books and news articles have been produced about the tasks and achievements of
looters. These works also have contributed to the dissemination of a relatively simple knowhow (looting) to an Italian audience eager to know more about these looters, whose task is
sometimes even romanticized. However, the lack of looters serving prison time has not made
penitentiary institutions sites for the interchange of knowledge.
The knowledge about how to be a tombarolo is mostly transmitted orally. This is not
to say that no information is ever codified in documents. After all, if there were no
documentation and storage of knowledge and experience, organizational learning could not
occur. Yet codification of information is rare and is mostly devoted to techné rather than
metis. There is no manual for how to be a tombarolo: this is because Italian looting is very
atomized with many teams looting around the fields of Italy, and it is, therefore, very
competitive. In order to prevent other groups from finding the best tombs first, tombaroli
guard their knowledge. They generally do not produce written documents that are easily
accessible to others. For example, most of the excavating techniques are old and are passed
down orally from generation to generation. At the same time, these techniques are not so
complicated that they require written explanation, even though tombaroli who have invented
new techniques have documented them. Finally, existing rules are not formally codified in
documents yet they are widely understood among the cadre of looters due to their simplicity.
In recent times tombaroli have used ledgers, notebooks, maps, books, and pictures to
record and store information. Due to the criminal nature of the business of tombaroli, recordkeeping is risky for those involved. Even though not all tombaroli record their experiences
(some of the interviewed tombaroli stated that they can recall a lot of information, even
though memory per se is fallible), documents and pictures have been recovered in raids. The
result has been looters adapt to these interceptions through the usage of handwritten notes
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with coded information and/or passing the information of found items through Polaroid and
other formats of pictures (nowadays, mostly electronic). Some tombaroli can also document
their financial transactions and even code them.
The goal of having all this knowledge gathered and stored is to, in the words of
Kenney (2007), “…give meaning to the data through retrospective sense making” (p. 156).
Participants share their perceptions and from here construct intersubjective understanding of
what has occurred to them and their surroundings. When unpredictable events occur,
participants in the group are forced to make sense of what happened, share their perception of
problems, and propose a new way of proceeding (see Furden, 2000; Homero, 2000; Restrepo,
2000; Velasquez Romero, 2000).
In sum, the métier and the know-how of looters is passed from one generation of
tombaroli to another, mostly within family members devoted to looting or by other looters
who coexist in the same rural area where looting occurs. The type of information that is being
passed down is eminently practical, even though some tombaroli acquire rudimentary
technical knowledge about archaeology. Although this information is rarely codified, this
research project has highlighted the relationship between means of storing information and
learning to be a looter. The last section analyzes the adaptation processes of tombaroli.

4.3. Looters are adaptable to new challenges
It would certainly be strange that teams of tombaroli, unlike other organizations, would not
change practices and adapt in response to new events, whether these are hostile (law
enforcement-based) or not. In fact, the task of a looter is ripe with challenges; thus
tombaroli’s activities have adapted to improve their efficiency and avoid detection by law
enforcement officials and other problems. Even a relatively simple task like unearthing a
tomb by excavating without any care for the archaeological context requires, as Kenney
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(2007) puts it, a core technology made of the inputs necessary to perform work. In fact, the
greatest changes to looting have been technological ones; over time, more modern techniques
and technologies have been embraced to produce a faster and more efficient process of
excavating a tomb.
Nowadays, alongside the traditional techniques used by tomb raiders (pin, spade and
pickaxe), tombaroli use bulldozers, mechanical diggers, dynamite, metal detectors, power
saws, and drills to complete their task faster. Looting is perpetrated at the expense of the
tomb, as these tools inevitably end up destroying the morphology of the site making it
difficult for scholars to interpret. At the same time, the items found and removed without
scientific criterion lose all the information that is derived primarily from the original context
(Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale, 2008).
The second most important change in the operations of tombaroli concerns
communications. The tombaroli have greatly improved in recent decades at selling their
looted items. Tombaroli nowadays are able to communicate with their middlemen or their
direct clients without having to be exposed. Cellphones allow for these pictures to be sent
with no further danger than losing control of the distribution of the picture once it reaches its
destination. (Decades ago, the Polaroid picture guaranteed secrecy when showing
archaeological goods to clients, as they did not even have to expose their own pictures by
taking them to a studio.). These communications have always been done in coded language to
avoid detection, as wiretapping is a common danger they have to face from law enforcement
agencies. Finally, tombaroli can reach an international clientele by speaking in chat rooms
behind the secrecy of such an easy and widespread technique as a firewall. The researcher
participates in a European Union funded research project entitled “In defense of the integrity
of archaeological heritage” (InDefInArq). In one of the meetings in Granada, in the south of
Spain, a police officer from the National Police’s unit of protection of cultural heritage
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explained how Italian tombaroli attempt to sell their findings around the world in chat rooms
and Internet forums. Spain was a desired destination because of the ease of communication
between buyers and sellers, as Castilian and Italian are Roman languages and the buyer and
the seller can easily understand both languages.
Data include examples of competitive adaptation between looters and police agents
due to law enforcement’s activities. The rural nature of looting helps tombaroli to move their
activities to one area and work undisturbed while agents patrol another. Competitive
adaptation converts the world of tombaroli into a kind of game of cat and mouse played
between police and looters in the Italian fields. Teams of looters have to reassess
continuously whether the territory where they operate is risky due to law enforcement patrols.
Certainly, there has been an evolution in the role of law enforcement regarding the
patrolling of rich archaeological areas. However, there is a huge difficulty to surmount,
which is the vast quantity of terrain to patrol (the so-called concept of Italy being an open-air
museum), when compared to the available resources. Both the Carabinieri and the Guardia di
Finanza have a steadier presence in the territory and can guarantee a more intense control
than during the previous decades of the great raid of Italian archaeological heritage. The
safeguarding of the security of archaeological areas also needs technical means that can
expand the reach of human surveillance, which are slowly being implemented, such as
drones, cameras, and other technological devices, even though their reach is still limited
when compared to the mobility of the teams of tombaroli.
In conclusion, tombaroli have changed little with the passing of time - the activities
involved in looting a tomb are straightforward and consequently do not require much change.
In any case, tombaroli have adapted mostly to technological advances and to law
enforcement action.
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5. Coda: Italian archaeological looting, nowadays
After a few decades of police operations against tombaroli, middlemen, dealers and the
abusive purchasing practices of private collectors and international museums, there is a
consensus within the Italian criminal justice system and other experts that the period known
as grande razzia, the great raid, is over (Isman, 2009). Because of these operations, the
supply chain of looted antiquities in Italy seems, if not broken, appreciably damaged. Gone
are the days when dealers like Giacomo Medici and Gianfranco Becchina could thrive selling
antiquities to wealthy clients abroad. But this dissertation has proven that tombaroli still exist
and operate nowadays. Can it be said that the situation has improved? Are the days of the
great raid really over yet? What is the situation of Italian archaeological looting, today? This
last section completes an up-to-date criminological analysis of contemporary Italian tomb
raiding. The interviews concluded by asking the expert respondents’ opinion about whether
the problem of looting in Italy remains the same, the phenomenon has grown worse or has
lessened.
The majority of expert respondents thought that the situation concerning
archaeological looting in Italy is nowadays better than in the past. Expert respondents
believed that big police operations had (and still have) an impact on curbing this
phenomenon, alongside the seizures conducted by the Italian Culture Ministry. In fact,
official statistics by Carabinieri shown in the introduction of this research project indicated
that looting has drastically diminished from 216 detentions in 2006 to 58 detentions in 2016
(Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio Culturale, 2016). These expert respondents agreed
with the statement that the period of la grande razzia is finished and the days of frenetic
activity of tombaroli are over.
These police operations targeted not only tombaroli but also the market, in order to
shut down demand of Italian looted antiquities by museums and private collectors. Probably
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the most notorious case was the one involving Marion True. True was an American curator
who, because of her job as head of the antiquities department at the J. Paul Getty Museum in
Malibu, California, was in regular contact with dealers of illicit antiquities Giacomo Medici
and Gianfranco Becchina. She was charged with conspiracy to receive illegally excavated
and exported Italian antiquities along with the abovementioned dealers. True stood trial for
five years in an Italian court, and was not convicted as the case expired due to the statute of
limitations in late 2010. Her reputation never recovered from the sustained damage and True
became a pariah in the art world (Felch & Frammolino, 2011; Lervik & Balcells, 2014;
Watson & Todeschini, 2007). But True’s case is only the tip of the iceberg of much
repatriation yet to come. Cases like this have had an impact on the incentive to become or to
keep being tombaroli, as their activities are not only riskier, but also now yield less profit
than before. As this dissertation has shown, many looters no longer work full time as they
used to before the 2000s, but rather keep doing it as a way of enhancing their meager salaries
in other jobs.
Years ago, in the area of Cerveteri and Vulci, every day a truck left filled with looted
items; entire containers were filled with archaeological goods. These are trends from the past.
In a necropolis like Cerveteri, for example, today rarely more than one team can be seen
looting it, whereas in the past up to eighteen teams could be involved (Isman, 2009).
Tombaroli who keep looting are not so worried about finding great pieces that might cash
them a lot of money, but rather they aim to find a steady flow of average items of a lesser
economic value that do not that do not attract so much attention and/or that are easier to sell.
With less important pieces, tombaroli require the participation of middlemen or antique
dealers even less; they can sell these pieces by themselves. This is the equivalent of what is
labeled in the field of art theft as “headache art.” Instead of targeting big institutions with big
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names, art thieves devote themselves to homes and lesser-known painters that do not call for
media attention or big police operations (Knelman, 2011).
An important result discovered by this dissertation that is worth remembering, as a
contributing factor to the improvement of the looting scenario in Italy, is the lack of cultural
transmission between older and younger generations of tombaroli. Many respondents thought
that young people living in towns where there is an active looting culture do not participate in
it. Their passion for archaeology has waned in favor of more recent activities; young people
do not want to engage in such a physically taxing task. As a result, many expert respondents
are starting to consider that looting, for the first time, might become a thing of the past, as old
tombaroli will not be able to pass on their knowledge to new looters. The weakening of
cultural transmission has an impact on knowledge and experience. Being an eminently oral
and learnt-by-doing activity, the information can disappear when the transmitters die. At the
same time, the risk of forgetting the information is high if knowledge remains dormant for a
long period of time or there is low productivity, according to scholars (Benkard, 1999; Buell,
2000).
All of the interviewed tombaroli thought that it was more difficult to loot today than
in the past. According to the looters, the frequent police operations and important court cases
have damaged their activities badly. Their responses represent the other side of the coin when
compared to the ones by respondents that thought that the situation is now better in Italy.
Alfredo claimed that even though illicit diggings keep occurring, they have been reduced, by
approximately 85 percent. Tombaroli nowadays, he claimed, are not professionals but
vandals who just need some sense of adventure in their lives (Interview, Montefiascone,
2017). Alessio thought along similar lines regarding the lack of proficiency of new
generations of tombaroli; he also said that the market is no longer what it used to be. Now he
thinks it is smaller because prospective clients are afraid of buying illicit antiquities
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(Interview, Cerveteri, 2017). Along the same lines, Giovanni and Patrizio thought that there
was less money to be made because there are fewer tombs (and consequently, it takes more
work to find an object). They stated that the market, in any case, is not international anymore
but highly local (Interview, La Giustiniana, 2017). Their statement agrees with the literature.
Finally, a small group of expert respondents thought that the looting has not changed
since the early 2000s. They thought that although the tombaroli have adopted more modern
methods, the rate of looting remains the same as it was decades ago. As one expert
respondent stated,

The situation unfortunately is still drastic. We are able to intervene and move to the
most critical areas. You know that we also have these monitoring systems with
helicopters, drones, etc. However, the phenomenon is difficult to stem, difficult to
stem because archaeological heritage today is huge and, of course, so much goes on
(Interview, 2016, Rome).

Looting, according to some participants, is still rampant, very hidden, and the new
batch of tombaroli are Eastern migrant laborers. These immigrants are being paid to do the
heavy, physical work, and they easily integrate with the local Italian populations, while at the
same time they know the territory. The fact that other groups from other nationalities
progressively absorb this criminal activity indicates a weakening of Italian contemporary
tomb raiding, even in a moment when tombaroli tend to be more efficient thanks to
technology. This is where the future of looting might lie and where the real cultural
transmission might happen, as many old tombaroli are dying and not all of them have people
who will continue their looting legacy.
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In conclusion, as official statistics from the Carabinieri indicate a substantial decline
in arrests of tombaroli, Italy may be witnessing a change of paradigm concerning
archaeological looting. Italian looting had been characterized by being a criminal activity that
was highly territorialized: small town looters knew the terrain because they grew up playing
in the fields. Also, looting used to be a highly trans-generational criminal activity. The métier
and knowledge of tombaroli passed for centuries from generation to generation of looters.
But times have changed, and looting along with them. Nowadays, looting has been
weakened not only due to a progressive abandonment of rural areas in favor of cities but also
because of less interest among younger generations in archaeology and looting. At the same
time, widely publicized court cases concerning looted antiquities have not only impacted
policy acquisitions of cultural institutions, but also might have impacted the sensitivity of
younger generations of buyers.
Until recently, looters and buyers were in mutual agreement about the need for
discretion, interlocking themselves in a functional synergy based on the fact that the buyer
could obtain a valuable good that could not be obtained, due to Italian legislation, by any
other means. However, today buyers are more aware of the phenomenon of looting. It is not
only that younger generations of buyers might be afraid of a possible punishment, but that
they are less inclined towards buying illicit antiquities, as they may be more aware that it is
not the right thing to do. Have Italian collectors matured enough to understand that buying
looted antiquities has very negative consequences for us all? Time will tell.

6. Conclusions
Omero Bordo, the tombarolo who claims he became a looter in the middle of the night
because of supernatural forces is a very good storyteller. His story has all elements of a
successful biography, but as the present chapter has proven, the way of becoming a
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tombarolo is very different. Looting, an eminently group activity, is mostly perpetrated in
teams. These groups perfectly fit the definition, albeit simply, of organizations. As such,
tombaroli can learn as a whole group from the interactions between its members. The
organization of tombaroli has undergone few changes over the centuries, and when compared
to other criminal organizations, the organization of looters is extremely simple. For example,
recruitment is minimal and hierarchies are extremely simple, dictated only by age,
experience, or both. Even given orders can be disobeyed, and many looters interpret them as
counsels rather than mandates.
Tombaroli mostly learn from family members who were looters themselves, or from
other tombaroli or friends, in a closed, rural environment. There is a great deal of practical
knowledge that is being learnt by practice which is orally shared, as opposed to scientific
knowledge, which is only learnt by some who eventually lead the teams due to their
archaeological know-how. However, this scientific knowledge is amateurish, and not
comparable with having a formal education in archaeology or art history.
Even though the know-how of tombaroli is mainly oral, it is also compiled in some
instances in physical documents such as maps, ledgers, pictures, and other forms of storing
information. Their use and importance is confined to the recollection of memories or
commercial goals, such as, what was sold, for how much was it sold, and related questions.
Because of its nature, the access to this information is not widespread, but eminently private.
Tombaroli has been seen to adapt and learn new knowledge, in response to the action
of law enforcement. Tombaroli change their ways of committing their crimes and learn new
modus operandi, such changing the timing of offenses, taking advantage of the ability to
move throughout rural areas, changing the storage and transportation of looted antiquities,
and using new technologies. A final, closing section will deal with the situation of looters
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today, pointing towards what seems to be an alleviation of the problem that had plagued
archaeology in Italy up to now.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE ITALIAN GREAT RAID OF ARCHAEOLOGY

We are able to intervene and move to the most critical areas; you know that we also have
these monitoring systems, helicopters, etc., only that the phenomenon is difficult to stem,
because the heritage today, let's say archaeological, under ground, underwater, is still huge
and of course it is ... Let's say ... So much goes on, so much goes on.
(Interview, Cerveteri, 2017)

Once the great raid of Italian archaeological looting ended in the early 2000s, tombaroli’s
activity slowed down. Indeed, in the decades from the 1970s to the beginning of the twentyfirst century, archaeological looting in Italy was a real industry. However, the fact that the
activities of tombaroli slowed down did not mean that it halted, but rather that it mutated.
The interviews in this research project have shown how tombaroli keep operating, yet in a
safer and more reserved environment.
Law enforcement, examining magistrates, prosecutors, among many others, helped
put an end to the great raid. Their investigations and court cases highlighted great museums
and private collectors who were buying looted archaeology without scruples; at the same
time, they targeted Italian dealers to cut the chain that linked them to the tombaroli. Italian
archaeological looting is now a local, instead of an international phenomenon, catering to
average clients, instead of wealthy collectors. As a consequence, there has also been a
gradual decrease in the number of clandestine excavations discovered. According to police
statistics, the numbers of such excavations have dwindled from a peak of more than one
thousand per year, in the 1980s and 1990s, to barely 58 in 2016(Comando Carabinieri Tutela
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Patrimonio Culturale, 2017). Despite this good news, the fact remains that this type of crime
continues to be serious and that Italian archaeological heritage is still at risk.
This chapter summarizes the problem of archaeological looting and presents the key
findings that this dissertation has uncovered concerning the contested relationship with
traditional Italian organized crime, the question of whether tombaroli are organized
criminals, their learning processes, and how they have competitively adapted. More
importantly, however, this chapter presents some policy recommendations to help curb Italian
archaeological looting in the new era after the great raid.

1. A brief summation of the problem of vanishing archaeological heritage
First, let’s revisit the issue that gave rise to this dissertation: the work of archaeological
looters in Italy, also known as tombaroli. This section aims to briefly remind the reader why
Italian archaeological looting is a problem; what problems the existing literature has raised
about this issue; and why it was necessary not only to conduct a criminological analysis of
this problem but also to adopt a qualitative angle.

Italian looting as a criminal activity
Looters have preyed on Italian archaeological heritage for centuries. After WWII, the
dimension of this criminal phenomenon grew larger, as looting became highly profitable.
There was not only a national market boosted by Italian elites (lawyers and doctors, among
others) who felt the desire to have an archaeological piece decorating their offices, but also a
booming, expanding international market. As with any other criminal and illicit trade, the
economics of looting was important. When the market increased due to a larger demand,
there was the need for a corresponding rise in the supply side. Tombaroli, who up to the first
half of the twentieth century had looted the fields in order to boost their meager income as
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rural workers, became more proactive towards the illicit extraction of archaeological heritage
in the second half, using more aggressive and destructive means of looting tombs. Looters
worked full-time to enrich themselves while depleting necropolises and the tombs located in
them at alarming rates. Many Italian provinces have suffered because of looting, though the
size of that destruction varied depending on the quantity of the province’s archaeological
remains.
Looters obtain these archaeological items using methods that are very different from
those used by the archaeologists. After walking carefully around the chosen area and reading
of the terrain, looters water the land to soften it, probe the soil with a metal spike, and wait
for the moment that the rod hits the hard, stone surface which indicates the presence of a
tomb. Then the looters dig, quickly and carelessly, until the entrance of the tomb is located.
Finally, they raid the tomb’s contents, destroying forever the artifacts’ context due to the
damage inflicted on the tomb.
To conclude, looting in a western country such as Italy is a criminal activity that
allows the actors to gain money through the destruction of archaeological sites. Tombaroli
are experts in attacking archaeological heritage. Since this activity has happened for
centuries, tombaroli have destroyed much evidence of the ancient history that archaeological
remains reveal, and by extension, the ability of experts to decipher ancient history.

Problems derived from inconsistent literature
Even though there is no doubt archaeological looting is a crime, criminological literature in
the field has only been gaining traction in recent times, motivated by the rise of the field of
art/cultural heritage crime research. The literature on both archaeological looting in general
and Italian looting in particular has been extensively developed by other disciplines, mostly
archaeology. In spite of this body of literature, the number of studies discussing issues related
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to tombaroli is minimal, and the criminological contribution is nonexistent. The analysis of
forty-six articles in this study revealed deficiencies in these studies and showed how
understudied the topic is. Up to this moment the literature that has dealt with tombaroli
includes studies that examine their activities, motivations, and justifications; the broader topic
of trafficking of cultural heritage; the relationship with organized crime; and the prevention
of looting in Italy.
These articles, however, had some serious problems, including an excessive tendency
towards descriptive studies over exploratory or explanatory research and the total absence of
evaluation studies. Further, most of these studies lack a methods section that would allow the
reader to understand how the research was conducted. Moreover, most of the research was
outdated and sensationalistic, thus romanticizing tombaroli. The fact that most of these
studies came from different disciplines generated a difficulty in harmonizing results.
This dissertation is a response to the lack of criminological analysis focusing on the
supply of antiquities. This dissertation is the first criminological analysis concerning of
tombaroli. Specifically, after analyzing important gaps in the literature, the project aimed to
explain the nature of the relationship between tombaroli and organized crime and the way
tombaroli learn and adapt during their careers. These topics have been misrepresented by the
media, which tends to romanticize the activities of looters, and have only been sporadically
dealt with in the existing literature.
In conclusion, the literature in the field of Italian archeological looting, albeit existent,
is small and needs to be updated with more recent information and needs to move towards
more exploratory and explanatory research and evaluation studies. There is a need for more
analysis of the supply side of antiquities trafficking, a need that the empirical science of
criminology can help satisfy. This dissertation is a first step towards fulfilling these
inconsistencies and gaps in the literature.
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The usage of a qualitative approach
A qualitative study was required to gain an inside knowledge of such the hidden phenomenon
of Italian contemporary tomb raiding. Quantitative methods would not be able to bring the
rich data necessary to address the problem of Italian archaeological looting. In fact, looting is
a very difficult crime to quantify, as it is not possible to know exactly how many items are
stolen annually. Some statistics are gathered by Italian archaeologists working mainly in
academia, while others refer to the recoveries of artifacts or arrests made by law enforcement
officials, but this represents only the tip of the iceberg. By contrast, quantitative methods can
provide a general picture of associations, relationships, and trends
Therefore, the fundamental assumptions and key features that distinguish what it
means to proceed from a qualitative stance fit well with this study. The idea for this
dissertation was to undertake a qualitative research that would involve getting to the core of
the problem not only by accessing a sample made up of archaeologists, police officers,
prosecutors, journalists, and other experts in looting, but also by interviewing tombaroli
themselves.
Finding tombaroli, however, is a complicated task, not only because of their secretive
trade, but also because the Italian legal system rarely sentences these offenders to prison. In
fact, criminologists have not yet achieved direct access to tombaroli, forcing them to rely on
other participants within the illicit antiquities trade like archaeologists or dealers. As such,
this research project is the first criminological foray into the suppliers of Italian
archaeological items.
In sum, this research project adopts a qualitative approach with the intention of
providing rich descriptions of the problem of contemporary archaeological looting in Italy.
Disperse quantitative data from various sources reflects the difficulties of not only
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quantifying the prevalence and incidence of this criminal phenomenon, but also of producing
an accurate image of it.

2. Conclusions of the study
After having briefly summarized the problem with Italian archaeological looting; the
inconsistencies in the literature about this issue; and the reason why it was necessary to
conduct a qualitative, criminological analysis of this problem, this section presents the
conclusions of this research project by summarizing its results concerning the nature of the
relationship between tombaroli and organized crime and its conclusions about how tombaroli
learn and adapt.

Data did not support any relationship between tombaroli and traditional Italian
organized crime groups beyond anecdotal and sporadic cases
The first specific research question referred to the nature of the relationship between
tombaroli and traditional Italian organized crime groups such as Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta,
Sacra Corona Unita, or the Camorra. This question is important, as the systematic literature
review proved that there is a significant lack of agreement regarding the relationship between
tombaroli and traditional Italian organized crime. The first major finding of this research is
that nowadays there is not much evidence of organized crime in this sector; rather,
archaeological looting is done by local populations who only loot occasionally and who
either sell the items to middlemen or sell them by themselves. Contemporary Italian
archaeological looting does not fit the description of the reality of Italian organized crime,
which mostly refers to large-scale, stable, and structured organizations.
Data obtained in the present dissertation were not able to assess the existence of
collection centers for looted antiquities or even the mafia groups’ interest in archaeological
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heritage. Consequently, the findings from respondents interviewed have not found evidence
of omertà (a law of silence), a concentration of antiquities in foreign mafia offices, or even a
direct connection between tombaroli and organized criminals. Apart from anecdotal, nonsignificant evidence in the press, cases of organized criminal groups requesting the services
of tombaroli remain hidden. The few stories in the press are veiled in secrecy, statistically
non-significant, and suffer serious problems of validity, reliability, and generalizability.
Interviewed looters denied this relationship, and their version sided with the information
appearing in biographies of well-known tombaroli. At the same time, this specific issue in
Italy reflects the troubles in other geographical areas, where the same question resonates with
doubt, as proven by existing scholarly literature that considers the involvement of organized
crime to be not prevalent in this particular illicit business.
To conclude, despite the fact that some news outlets have often referred to a link
between mafia organizations, no support has been found for the involvement of traditional
Italian organized crime in criminal activities related to archaeological looting beyond the
monitoring of the territory. Ties with individuals affiliated with local mafia-type clans are
weak, and in most instances the mafia’s interest in art trafficking is devoted to other attacks
on cultural heritage, such as art theft or vandalism.

Tombaroli themselves cannot be labeled organized criminals
The findings related to the second research question also rejected the argument that tombaroli
have a status of organized criminals. The criteria used to arrive at this conclusion are the ones
developed by the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe. According
to these agencies, in order to label a criminal group organized crime, all of the four
mandatory criteria (the group must be a collaboration of more than two people, the group
must act for a prolonged or indefinite period of time, the group’s criminal acts must be
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punished with imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty, and the group’s
central goal must be profit and/or power) and at least two of the seven optional criteria (using
a specialized division of labor; exercising measures of discipline and control; employing
violence or other means of intimidation; employing commercial, business-like structures;
participating in money laundering processes; operating across borders; and exerting influence
over legitimate social institutions) must apply to them.
However, one of the four mandatory criteria does not apply to tombaroli. The data
reveals that the commission of serious criminal offences by tombaroli, punishable by
imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty, does not occur. The Italian
criminal code punishes looting with arrest up to a year and a fine from €319 to €3,099 ($380
to $3693). The absence of this mandatory criterion precludes further consideration of whether
tombaroli can be labeled organized criminals. Were this criterion to be fulfilled, however,
tombaroli could be deemed organized criminals because Italian looters meet two out of the
seven optional criteria, and tombaroli thus satisfy the second part of the definition. The two
mandatory criteria that have been confirmed through the interviews and other data sources
are the first (the specialized division of labor) and the fourth (the usage of business-like
structures).
In conclusion, tombaroli cannot be labeled organized criminals according to the
criteria issued by the European Commission, EUROPOL, and the Council of Europe. The
only missing factor is the suspicion of committing serious criminal offences, punishable by
imprisonment for at least four years or a more serious penalty. The penalties attached to
looting in Italy are weak, never exceeding the required four years of imprisonment. The fact
that one of the four mandatory criteria does not apply to tombaroli precludes the possibility
of labeling looters as organized criminals.
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Tombaroli are offenders who need to organize in order to loot
Applying Finckenauer (2005) and Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998) frameworks to the
tombaroli reveal that the tombaroli are criminals who organize themselves, but not organized
criminals. Looters operate in loosely affiliated teams of tombaroli who can easily provide
desired items either to buyers or to middlemen. At the same time, the tombaroli’s modus
operandi does not require a great deal of special technical skills, knowledge, or overall
sophistication. Further, the tombaroli do not use cultural or subcultural markers; such as
identifying traits such as tattoos, initiation rites or uniforms.
Moreover, the interviews reveal that tombaroli are most commonly organized groups
of freelancers or as family business. Though freelancers perform the requisite tasks related to
looting, such as spotting the terrain, digging, appraising the goods, and selling them, they
have no division of labor Because the work of tombaroli requires no significant leaders and
has no need for a formal division of labor or structure, freelance operators would fall outside
the definition of organized crime. The same is true of family structures. Families that work
together to actively loot and sell archaeological findings may have an informal division of
labor, but they do not appear to have an identified leader or a structure. Therefore, the data
also helps dispel the myth of looters being organized criminals.
In sum, neither Finckenauer (2005) nor Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998) criteria
revealed the tombaroli to be organized criminals. The tombaroli lacked the sophistication,
structure, and self-identification required by Finckenauer’s (2005) criteria. Moreover,
Natarajan and Belanger’s (1998) also does not sustain the notion that tombaroli are organized
criminals. The fact that tombaroli organize mostly either as groups of freelancers or groups
with a family base supports the fact that looters cannot be labeled organized criminals.
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The organizational structures employed by tombaroli are simple
Tombaroli can be labeled organizations, as their teams are formed by groups of individuals
who associate among themselves in order to loot pieces and sell them. In order to do so,
looters perform different tasks among themselves by acting in a coordinated fashion and
according to a set of informal rules. Finally, these individuals act with temporal continuity.
Results indicate that the organization of tombaroli is simplistic by nature, as can be seen in
most of their traits. At the same time, they have adopted the same organizational structure for
decades. The only changed noted in the results was that the teams of looters increasingly
include Eastern European citizens.
This conclusion can be seen throughout the different organizational items that are
present in teams of tombaroli. For example, role specialization is minimal, and recruitment is
very informal, as looters use word of mouth to find people who will join them. Old members
do not need to value the expertise of new ones, as new looters are not required to possess any
experience whatsoever, as long as they know how to dig. Hierarchy is not based on ranking
or authority but rather on expertise and old age; and consequently, tombaroli do not give
orders but rather commonsensically counsel the other looters where to dig or how to proceed
in order to avoid law enforcement detection. Failure to follow these orders does not entail
punishment.
To conclude, looting is a group activity, as it is mostly perpetrated in teams. These
groups perfectly fit the definition of organizations, albeit simple ones. The organization of
tombaroli has undergone few changes over the centuries, and when compared to other
criminal organizations, the organization of looters is extremely simple, as results have shown.
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Tombaroli learn mostly metis from family members or other looters, and information is
sparingly codified in documents
A simple form of organizing also simplifies organizational learning among tombaroli. This
learning occurs mostly, as results have indicated, among families and other looters. These
results are a consequence of the structures that tombaroli choose, whether these are family or
freelance. Most of the activities of tombaroli require a great involvement of practical
knowledge (metis), such as scouting the terrain and finding possible locations where the tomb
might be; on the other hand, most of these activities require little scientific knowledge
(techné); watering the soil in order to prepare it for probing or digging are practical activities
that even though they require a certain amount of knowledge, this is knowledge that anyone
with a little practice can acquire quickly.
Thus, techné only involves the more complicated tasks of tombaroli, such as those
which involve a certain amount of archaeological knowledge, like identifying or valuing the
looted goods. Still, these tasks are pretty rudimentary as the looter acquires this know-how
without any official training in archaeology. In fact, having this knowledge is not essential,
and there might be teams of looters that entirely lack this knowledge, as tombaroli can find
people outside their circle (an antique dealer, for example) who will do these tasks for them.
Therefore, all tombaroli acquire metis, but and only some learn particular techné. Metis is
mostly learnt through trial and error and continuous practice, whereas techné, in the case of
tombaroli, is learnt through rudimentary study.
Know-how is codified in documents, which are mostly pictures and textual
information which take several forms, such as books, maps, or notes. Photographs serve to
record what has been found by tombaroli, but also, and more importantly, to offer clients
sellable goods without having to transport them. Nowadays, cellphones are the preferred
method for taking pictures, as one police officer confirmed, even though it presents two risks:
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pictures can be duplicated against the sender’s wishes and law enforcement agencies might
intercept the message. Diaries help looters log the pieces they have found, where they were
found, and how much money they were worth. In order to make the process of interpreting
messages difficult for law enforcement agencies, looters avoid exact, technical language.
Finally, both autobiographies and biographies of tombaroli contain a wealth of information
about the identity of the people who loot tombs, their backgrounds, their motivations, and
their ways of rationalizing their actions. Not only do these books appeal to a wider audience,
they also serve as textbooks for proactive looter. Finally, tombaroli do not often access this
information, and when they do, the access is restricted and not open to every member of the
team. Two concurring reasons play a role. First, as the material was created by a particular
looter, it was seen as personal. As such, the tombarolo does not allow others to access this
information not because it is forbidden, but out of a basic sense of property. Second, most
other members of the team do not generally care about this information.
In sum, tombaroli mostly learn from family members who were looters themselves, or
from other tombaroli or friends, in a closed, rural environment. There is a great deal of
practical knowledge that is learnt by practice and which is orally shared, as opposed to
scientific knowledge, which is only learnt by someone who eventually lead the teams due to
their specific know-how in archaeology. Even though the know-how of tombaroli is mainly
oral, it is also compiled in some instances in physical documents such as maps, ledgers, and
pictures, among other forms of storing information. Their use and importance is
circumscribed to the recollection of memories or commercial goals, for example, what was
sold, for how much money, and other items. Because of its nature, this information is kept
private.
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Tombaroli have the ability to adapt to law enforcement threats and to new challenges
The task of a looter is ripe with challenges. Thus tombaroli adapt to improve their efficiency
and avoid detection by law enforcement officials and other challenges. This adaptation to
new challenges involves mostly both technical and technological changes. More modern
techniques and technologies have produced faster and more efficient excavations. The second
most important change in the operations of tombaroli concerns communications. Tombaroli’s
ability to sell their looted items has greatly improved over the centuries due to technological
advances such as standard telephones, phone booths, the cellphones, and cameras.
Finally, competitive adaptation (that is, the one involving looters and police agents
due to law enforcement’s activities) also occurs. To avoid law enforcement detection,
tombaroli have altered their hours of operation; moved their activities to different areas; used
safe houses as depots for looted antiquities; discovered new ways to smuggle items; and
embraced new technology.
To conclude, change within groups of tombaroli has been analyzed in the form of
adaptation and the subsequent creation and learning of new knowledge in relation to the
action of law enforcement. Tombaroli change their ways of committing their crimes and learn
new modus operandi, such as changing when they offend, taking advantage of the multiple
work sites available to them in rural areas changing the storage and transportation of looted
antiquities, and using of new technologies.

3. Strengths and limitations of the study
It is important to point out both the strengths and inevitable limitations of this study.
Throughout the chapters it has been acknowledged that a criminological analysis of the figure
of the tombarolo has never been conducted, and probably the most important asset of this
dissertation is to bring a criminological perspective to Italian contemporary archaeological
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looting, in the hopes that this attention on tombaroli will stimulate more studies on them. In
fact, in strengthening the extant body of knowledge on Italian archaeological looting, this
study has established a methodological foundation for future research endeavors. Tombaroli
might not be the most complex, powerful, or dangerous offenders within the Italian criminal
justice system, but their actions cannot be easily dismissed. Also, unlike most studies, this
study has centered on the supply side of the illicit trafficking of antiquities.
More importantly, the study has not only brought to the criminological stage the
figure of the tombarolo but has also shed light on their involvement in Italy as active
offenders. For the first time a criminologist has reached out to tombaroli and asked them
about their criminal activities with the intention of analyzing their responses and obtaining
scholarly knowledge from them that is devoid of the sensationalism that often impregnates
the discourse on tombaroli in the media. In fact, research has demonstrated once again that a
qualitative approach to criminology allows researchers to reach hidden populations and
gather information from them. At the same time, there are limitations in the present research
project. To begin with, while one of the strengths of this study is its exploratory nature,
though this can also be viewed as a limitation. As chapter two proved, there is a notable lack
of criminological research, which, per se, is a theoretical limitation of this study. Going
where no criminologist has gone before is not devoid of risks. For example, the tiny amount
of previous literature, and its methodological flaws, has made it difficult to compare the
findings obtained during this research with pre-existing publications.
When respondents were asked to share their opinion about the generalizability of their
answers, most of them thought that their experiences where linked to the area where they
lived, in the province of Lazio, Northern Italy. A limitation of this project is that respondents
were from a particular area, and different results might have been obtained if the respondents
were located in other areas. When permission to interview different officials in different
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provinces in the south of Italy was requested to the central office of Carabinieri, access was
denied. This inability to interview other police officers from the south of Italy meant that not
only did the option of purposive sampling and later snowballing in the south get blocked, but
also a trove of interesting data that might have pointed toward geographical variations was
lost.
Specifically asking available respondents about the situation in the south of Italy
circumvented this lack of help. Other data sources in the form of documents and news
searches did not provide results that were different from the ones stated by respondents or
better chances to assess these differences. However, this limited this research project’s ability
to assess the collaboration between tombaroli and traditional Italian organized crime. Even
though it deems this relationship anecdotal, this dissertation cannot rule out its existence and
further research needs to be done.
In conclusion, it is important to highlight this dissertation’s contribution to providing
the first criminological analysis of the Italian tombarolo. This dissertation hopes to become a
first step towards a growing, criminological body of knowledge concerning looters and
suppliers of illicitly obtained antiquities in Italy. A qualitative approach that allows
researchers to access looters and other experts active in the field as a primary source will be
needed to shed light on many other areas still existing in the issue of contemporary Italian
archeological looting. This growing body of research will help flesh out the scant
experimental and exploratory literature in the field. At this point, the number of studies
discussing issues related to tombaroli is minimal, which is an important limitation.

4. What should be done?
On July 5, 2007, The Washington Post ran a story titled “Crackdown Curbs Italy’s Tomb
Raiders” (David, 2007). The author interviews several people, among the most important, are
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noted tombarolo Pietro Casasanta and General of the Carabinieri Giovanni Nistri. The latter
claims that the action of law enforcement has curbed the phenomenon of looting in Italy.
Likewise, statistics culled in this dissertation showed a steady decline in reported cases of
looting, from over 216 in 2006 to 58 in 2016 (Comando Carabinieri Tutela Patrimonio
Culturale, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). The repatriation of looted antiquities from
abroad back to Italy has also sent a powerful message to buyers. The targeting of the demand
side by the Italian criminal justice system has meant that dealers, collectors, and institutions
double-check the nature of the antiquity before buying it, thus reducing a possible pool of
buyers of tombaroli’s products.
All in all, the David’s (2007) article summarizes the success story of the so-called
“Italian model” in policing the arts. As Rush and Benedettini Millington (2015) described it,
“The Italian model proposes examples for every aspect of saving cultural heritage: academic
partnership, law enforcement, application of international law, investigation techniques,
military deployment capability, protection of archaeological sites, collections security, public
outreach and successful repatriation” (p. 175). In fact, Italy was the first country in the world
to have a law enforcement agency with an entire department devoted to the protection of
cultural heritage, created in 1969 (Pastore, 2001). Other police forces in Italy replicated this
model. Still, a modest proposal concerning both police and tombaroli can be advanced based
on the results obtained in this research study.

4.1. Policing antiquities looting within a problem-oriented policing stance
This dissertation has shown that there is no evidence of organized crime being involved in
archaeological looting perpetrated by tombaroli. Rather, data suggests that this form of crime
is largely a product of rural inhabitants, who need to organize in order to loot tombs from
time-to-time and sell them to middlemen or clients. However, newspaper articles imply that
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Italian archaeological looting is a product of traditional Italian organized crime groups,
indicating that mafia-type groups that are highly organized and structured are behind this
illicit business. This dissertation has been able not only to find evidence supporting one side
of one of the most important contradictions in the literature, but has also highlighted the fact
that the media tends to perpetuate a misconception that is not based on solid facts.
Knowing how tombaroli organize has implications for the tactics law enforcement use
to disrupt looters. When targeting looters, Italian law enforcement agencies should continue
using flexible and prompt intervention strategies such as wiretaps, quick arrests, and seizures.
Because looters are not connected to organized crime, there is no need to use costly, longterm strategies used against organized groups such as amassing as much evidence as possible
before making arrests (Kleemans, 2007). Therefore, law enforcement agencies should
approach tombaroli differently from they way they approach organized crime.
The techniques used by Italian police to stop tombaroli over the decades have been
based on flexible prompt intervention strategies, which work better against loosely organized
criminal groups such as tombaroli. There are many examples of such police operations. The
previous chapter discussed Operation Pandora, where Carabinieri from Bari wiretapped a
team of tombaroli for two years (Isman, 2009a), which allowed police to capture them in
action. To cite some other examples, Operation Iphigenia seized 3000 amphorae and 23
funerary urns from a necropolis in Perugia. It all began when a person who was well known
to the art squad of the Carabinieri attempted to sell eight sarcophagi and a travertine marble
head. An expert at the Roman university of Tor Vergata attested that the items came from the
Etruscan tombs in an archaeological area of Peruggia. Having narrowed down the perimeter,
surveillance began and in February 2013, five individuals were charged with the crime of
illegal excavation (Corvino, 2013; Povoledo, 2013; Rush & Benedettini Millington, 2015).
Finally, after the Carabinieri unit in Rome noticed the presence of archaeological items
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looted from the province of Caserta in the market, Operation RoViNa ended in Naples in
2011 with the arrest of 12 people, the reporting of 51, and the investigation of 37. In this
operation, a law enforcement unit surveyed and identified tombaroli by using infrared
cameras and managed to seize no less than 520 looted archaeological items (Cecere, 2011;
Rush & Benedettini Millington, 2015).
During the years of the great raid, police investigations amassed an astonishing
amount of data from different police operations that helped curb archaeological looting.
These investigations brought names, surnames, places, collaborations, enmities, and safe
houses to light and showed how looters, middlemen, dealers, and buyers operate. All this
information became a sort of unofficial database that has become a necessary tool for law
enforcement agents. Even though the great raid is over and the situation of archaeological
looting in Italy has drastically changed (clients are now local and the selling of looted items
is more secretive) when compared to a decade ago, law enforcement agencies should still
compile data from scattered cases of looting in order to describe the newly mutated looting
scenario, reassessing new mechanisms and opportunities employed by tombaroli. In this new
scenario, law enforcement should be taking a more problem-oriented policing stance, as
devised by Clarke and Eck (2005) and analyze the re-occurrence of looting after the great
raid, identifying specific areas which are especially prone to looters. Also, this point of view
allows for better allocation of resources to be implemented in strategic interventions (Braga,
2005). These models of policing have never been studied from a cultural heritage protection
angle, and this fact opens up a new avenue for further research.

4.2. Keeping up the pace with tombaroli’s adaptations
Another finding of this dissertation has been that looters competitively adapt to police. If the
area is isolated, police officers must follow the cars of tombaroli at a certain distance, but
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then looters abandon them and go to the tombs on foot. In some instances, police have had to
observe looters from trees, as there were no viable observation posts. When police officers
install tracking devices in the looters’ cars, looters defeat this surveillance by changing cars
under a canopy of trees. These are just some examples encountered in the literature
(Graeppler & Mazzei, 1996; Isman, 2009a; among others).
Even though preventing looting in a vast, open terrain where tombaroli act at ease
seems a lost battle from a situational crime prevention perspective, law enforcement agencies
should look at the data in the greatest detail possible and assess risks of sites while at the
same time establishing a presence in those frequently looted territories. Law enforcement
units perform scheduled periodical inspections on foot, riding horses or driving cars, and
nowadays they can expand their surveillance areas thanks to technological advances such as
helicopters, drones, or even satellite imaging (Interview, Rome, 2017). This recommendation
pairs the angle of problem-oriented policing with situational crime prevention. By itself,
situational crime prevention is complicated in open areas. However, as Grove and Pease
(2014) recommend, ranking the vulnerability of different parts of a heritage site alongside
data concerning which areas have been targeted should provide an idea about the correct
distribution of preventive measures. For example, in 2011 Carabinieri noticed the presence of
tombaroli in the ancient city of Arpi. The combined surveillance between units of Foggia and
Bari managed to catch three looters red handed, even sneaking undetected past the looters
that served as a lookout. Both units coordinated their moves rapidly to avoid not only the
fleeing tombaroli, but to seize them with their tools, which would later serve as an
incriminating piece of evidence (Rush & Benedettini Millington, 2015).
This dissertation has shown how the organization of tombaroli has undergone few
changes over the centuries and how the organization of looters is extremely simple. Even
though competitive adaptation has mostly applied to important organizational structures like
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Colombian drug traffickers or Al-Qaeda terrorists (Kenney, 2007), the underlying results in
those instances sought to “level the playing field of competitive learning games” between the
advantages trafficking enterprises enjoy over their law enforcement adversaries (p. 255).
Concerning the simpler case of tombaroli, law enforcement agencies should check three
specific angles in order to assess whether these police units can properly compete with the
fluid and elusive teams of tombaroli.
First, law enforcement agencies should consider whether their hierarchy is flexible
enough when it comes to lower ranking agents taking decisions on the spur of the moment
and giving them discretion to operate without constraints. In other words, law enforcement
agencies should enable the police officers to function more like tombaroli. The combination
of proper surveillance with hierarchical flexibility should allow agents to stake out at-risk
archaeological areas, highlighted due to problem-oriented policing tactics, and to arrest
looters.
Second, law enforcement agencies in Italy should consider whether their personnel
turnover affects the efficiency of the group. According to law enforcement regulation, police
officers must rotate from division to division (in fact, staying in one division for longer than
expected is frowned upon) in order to gain experience while avoiding staying too long in one
sole area of expertise. For example, some of the interviewed expert respondents in the field of
law enforcement came from sections devoted to organized crime or drugs (Interview,
Cerveteri, 2017; Interview, Rome, 2016).
Third, and related to the second recommendation, law enforcement bodies should
assess the need for requiring specific degrees in archaeology and/or art history, instead of
specific and proper training on the issue, and evaluate whether turnover and education has a
positive impact on their preventive and investigative work. It must be highlighted how
members of law enforcement agencies are first and foremost police officers. As an example,
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candidates that integrate the ranks of the Carabinieri art squad can have (but it is not
required) degrees in architecture, archaeology, art history, or law, among many other
humanistic disciplines. Their personal interests might play a role in being selected by the art
squad, such as fine arts, history, and sacred art or similar (Rush & Benedettini Millington,
2015; Tiberi, 2008).
Failing to organize law enforcement units so that they are structurally similar to the
offenders they seek to deter will inevitably lead to failure, as Kenney (2007) pointed out in
his analysis of antidrug agencies in Colombia, which failed to appreciate the effect of police
organization on their ability to disrupt the organizations of drug traffickers. Law enforcement
forces in Italy, albeit successful in curbing archaeological looting, should keep track of the
situation and competitively adapt to it.

4.3. Deterrence versus persuasion
What to do with tombaroli, though? An important finding of this dissertation has been that
the penalty attached to their criminal conduct prevents looters from meeting the four
mandatory organized crime criteria established by the European Commission, EUROPOL,
and the Council of Europe. If the penalties for looting were stronger, tombaroli, according to
these parameters, could be labeled organized criminals, as they would fulfill the rest of the
requirements. The punishment for looting is contemplated in article 175.a of the Italian law
devoted to Cultural Heritage and Landscape, approved in 2004. The article states that people
performing archaeological research without concessions or without complying with the
requirements of the administration will be punished with arrest of up to one year and a fine
between € 310 and € 3,099 ($380 to $3693) (Carabinieri, 2008; Iannizzotto; 2006).
Even though the police and courts, along with other experts, have done their job in
ending the great raid of Italian archaeological heritage, some dissenting voices still consider
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that sanctions established by the criminal justice system are an insufficient response to the
obligation to protect Italy’s cultural heritage, as they fail to deter tombaroli. For example,
Pastore (2001) and Isman (2009a) both note that the theft of archaeological heritage from the
subsoil is punished as simple theft, which is less serious than theft from a supermarket or
stealing a pair of jeans.
Iannizzotto (2006) stated that juridical protection of archaeological heritage remains
underdeveloped, as Italian laws offer less protection to the former than to private property.
Up to 2004, with the passing of the new penalties, this underdevelopment was caused by a
blatant lack of criminal policies concerning looting and the absence of commitment due to
lack of familiarity with the historical importance of archaeological heritage. In fact, in the
first sixty-five years since the first law was passed to protect cultural heritage in Italy (Law
1089/1939), only five thousand sentences have been dictated in relation to cultural heritage
crimes. Therefore, based on a joint proposal by the Minister of Justice Andrea Orlando and
the Minister of Culture, Dario Franceschini, Italy's Council of Ministers approved a bill that
is being discussed in Parliament in order to give the government a mandate for the reform of
the country's rules on penalties for offences against cultural heritage. If approved by Italy's
parliament the reform is designed to, among other things, introduce imprisonment of up to
fifteen years for those who devastate and plunder archaeological sites and monuments, along
with more severe penalties for tombaroli who cannot justify the possession of a metal
detector or ground surveying tools. The project of law also highlights the devastation caused
by looting when it affects archaeological areas and restitutes aggravating factors for the crime
of looting in archaeological sites (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, 2016).
However, criminological research clashes with this sort of reform and future policies
that might take this direction. Criminologists that have studied the role of deterrence related
to antiquities looting consider that it is a problematic strategy for curbing the looting problem
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(Alder & Polk, 2002; 2005). The approach, according to these authors, is to target market
demand for looted antiquities, thus eliminating the motivations for looters. Moreover, Polk
(2002) considers that the three characteristics of deterrence theory (certainty, severity, and
celerity of punishment) per se are not enough and adds the requirement of an association in
the mind of the offender between the prohibited action and the likelihood of punishment.
Moreover, Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activities theory suggests that one of the three
factors that need to converge in space and time for crime to happen is a motivated offender.
According to this theory, employing target-hardening measures could reduce the suitability of
archaeological sites, and the presence of law enforcement and private security could trump
the absence of a capable guardian (Mackenzie, 2005). But what can be done about the
motivations of tombaroli? Alder & Polk (2005) in fact agree with Braithwaite (2002) when
they state that, even though there is a place for criminal sanction in eliminating the illicit
antiquities trade, the focus should instead be placed on training, education, negotiation, and
persuasion. Mackenzie (2005) agreed with these three criminologists and stated that a
deterrence-oriented way of curbing looting is inadequate, thus once again advocating an
educational approach.
In this research, it has been seen how the legal arena is not seen as relevant by
tombaroli to the act of looting. Interviewed tombaroli often stated that looters never cared or
felt threatened by the legally established sanctions. Alfredo even called archaeological
looting a reato d’acqua di rose, a rosewater-scented crime (Interview, Montefiascone, 2017).
Tombaroli have kept justifying their activities, even when acknowledging they know they are
committing a crime, only because they know what they are doing is not comparable to more
serious offences in their criminal code. In other words, looters ignore prohibitions, directions,
and sanctions prescribed in the law because tombaroli do not foresee a certain, severe, or
quick punishment. Even with the passing of a new law establishing a harsher punishment for
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looters, the sole threat of punishment keeps failing to protect archaeological sites from being
attacked by looters. As the Italian police themselves recognized that fines and court orders
could never be enough (Rush & Benedettini Millington, 2015).
As this dissertation has found, nowadays, even though the terrible proportions of this
phenomenon have been reduced, there are some looters who need the money and
occasionally loot. It is very difficult to achieve educational measures towards the suppliers of
looted antiquities that might eventually impact on the market. These educational measures are
described in the literature referring to looting as those strategies embodied in international
conventions, such as the UNESCO 1970 Convention or the Unidroit Convention; codes of
practice such as the ones issued by the International Council of Museums or the UNESCO
Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property; and the measures geared towards the
education of dealers and/or source populations. Some of these educational measures will
come through government initiatives while others will come from academia, the media, and
private initiatives (Mackenzie, 2005).
The problem with education at the supply level is that tombaroli have incentives to
keep looting: zero or low punishment, an extra source of income, low risk of detection that
leads to a mild competitive adaptation, and a cultural atmosphere that leads to communal
understanding in the rural areas that they inhabit. An insurmountable level of education is
required to persuade looters to change attitudes; this difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that
they consider themselves as amateur archaeologists who are doing nothing wrong and are
thus being persecuted unjustly. In the words of Mackenzie (2005), it is terribly difficult to
achieve an effect on the market through education targeted at source populations.
Even though this dissertation has focused on the supply side of the illicit antiquities
spectrum, results have touched upon the existence of a major sensitivity in younger
generations of buyers, impairing the mutual agreement of supply and demand. Nowadays
232

buyers are more aware of the phenomenon of looting and might be less inclined towards
buying illicit antiquities. At least it seems that the widespread fashion of decorating houses
and offices with archaeological items or presenting these as gifts to others is declining. This
fashion encouraged individuals who were not important collectors to possess illicit goods that
originated in unsanctioned diggings or chance findings.
The genesis of archaeological looting is the degeneration of the idea of considering
archaeological remains as artworks instead of objects of science. Collectors who see a
recently looted object as art, as nothing else than a beautiful thing to own, are motivated by
an intrinsically selfish and personal motivation. The collector does not even consider that
they are committing an act of illegal appropriation. Instead, it is necessary to develop
approaches to appreciating art that place aesthetic value on understanding the object’s context
and meaning, which would help bridge this divide. The artistic dimension of the
archaeological piece transmits emotions to the viewer; and its scientific dimension
encapsulates a historical memory that is safeguarded so it can deliver its symbolic message to
future generations while at the same time it holds a way of interpreting the past. Research has
acknowledged the value of training local populations to care for their cultural heritage.
Cultural heritage carries an intrinsic value, as it is a part of these populations’ history, but it
also carries an extrinsic, economic value that can be commercially exploited in better ways
than looting it. Nobody can deny the appeal of Italy for the lovers of archaeology who will
pay and visit sites and museums, thus benefitting entire communities (Mackenzie, 2005;
Renfrew, 2000). Therefore, Italian institutions in and out of the criminal justice system
should continue educational measures towards the general population and potential national
buyers of looted art, not only as a direct form of instilling a national ethic of respect for the
arts, in the words of Rush and Benedettini Millington (2015), but to target the action of
looters. There is a vast catalogue of educational measures in Italy that ranges from virtual
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education of games for children, school programs, internet visibility of Italian archaeological
looting, exhibitions of seized archaeological items, public presentations, public outreach, and
partnership with the arts for outreach, among others (Rush & Benedettini Millington, 2015).
However, at the moment there is no specific literature about the effects of these examples on
the Italian public.
Even though this research has verified that the situation in Italy concerning
archaeological looting has ameliorated, the results stemming from this dissertation can offer
new ways of proceeding and reinterpreting older ones. Whether the tombaroli’s
archaeological looting will eventually fade or spike again remains an open question for
criminological research to monitor, along with the success or demise of proposed and old
policies concerning both the supply and the demand side of the illicit antiquities trade
spectrum.

5. Implications of the study
This dissertation’s use of a criminological standpoint related to the figure of the tombarolo, a
group not usually central to criminological research or crime agendas worldwide, makes this
an original study and the first of its kind within the field of art and cultural heritage crime. As
such, it is hoped that this dissertation might benefit law enforcement agencies, policy makers,
archaeologists, NGOs, civil society actors, and scholars. It is expected that this study and its
recommendations might potentially fields such as archaeology, criminology, and policing, by
offering in-depth insights about tombaroli, one of the most important risks archaeologists
have to face in order to protect their future discoveries.
This dissertation has also recommended that law enforcement officials follow specific
polies Police are encouraged to pursue both preventive and investigative ends, tailored after
the results of the dissertation, in terms of the tombaroli’s relationship with organized crime
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and their learning techniques (for example, higher or lower degrees of adaptation shown by
tombaroli) and adaptation processes. Furthermore, this research might help police to have a
research-based, criminological insight into the resiliency of tombaroli as they hone and alter
their activities in response to information and experience accumulated, choosing the path that
might lead them to achieve their goals. In sum, understanding about this particular
information can help law enforcers counteract or stop tombaroli more efficiently. This
research might also be relevant to pinpoint practical problems faced by the Italian
government and law enforcement agencies, such as the weakness of laws (lack of or soft
punishment) or procedural issues (slow processes, difficulty in gathering evidence to convict,
among others).
NGOs and society in general might also benefit from the results of this research.
Connoisseurs, whether they are archaeologists, art historians, dealers, collectors and/or
museum curators whose careers or professional interests are directly affected by the outcome,
dominate the debates surrounding cultural heritage. Disseminating results from the
dissertation might lead to an opportunity to engage NGOs and civil society actors in a debate
that belongs to everybody. This research has also contributed to scholarship by analyzing
these criminal activities within an existing theoretical framework that has successfully
assessed these particular elements for other forms of crime, such as drug trafficking and
terrorism. It is also expected that findings from the dissertation can help future research
expand the theoretical development of this criminal phenomenon to other areas (for instance,
concerning looters from different backgrounds,) and inform further intervention development
from both a theoretical and practical point of view.
Moreover, this dissertation aims to help scholars better understand the interaction
between the global and local dynamics of this particular instance (Italy) of antiquities
trafficking. In that sense, this dissertation can be placed alongside research done by other
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scholars in order to produce a more complete and evidence-based picture of the contemporary
global trade in looted cultural objects from different parts of the world. Also, because this
investigation analyzes at the less frequently researched supply side, the people conducting the
diggings, it complements other research projects which are more focused on the demand side
of the illicit antiquities trafficking.
In sum, the rationale of the present study is to apply the figure of the tombarolo to the
existing body of literature, from a criminological lens. Hopefully, this will help a plethora of
groups (scholars, archaeologists, law enforcement agents, to name a few of them) gain an
updated picture of the phenomenon of archaeological looting in Italy. At the same time, this
dissertation seeks to fill the aforementioned research gaps, and to formulate further questions
that future research can answer.

6. Future research avenues
This dissertation is a first step towards understanding the supply side of looted antiquities
from a criminological standpoint. In fact, the possibilities for further research abound
precisely because of the limited existing literature on archaeological looting in Italy
perpetrated by tombaroli. This initial criminological study on tombaroli and the questions
raised in it can serve as a point of comparison for further research on this issue. Some of the
findings in this dissertation recommend further studies to be conducted in order to develop a
larger database of information to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the
phenomenon of contemporary archaeological looting perpetrated by tombaroli in Italy.
Because criminological interest in this topic is so recent, the research still has so many
facets to explore. After a systematic literature review, this dissertation has paid attention to
two very important topics that required research to try to elucidate. However, the topic of
tombaroli is not completely researched. As with many other multifaceted criminal
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phenomena, more issues can be brought to light concerning looters: their culture and cultural
environment; the role played by status; the differences between older and new tombaroli; and
individual/economic decisions that affect looting, among others. Both criminology and
tombaroli still have much to offer one another.
The most obvious research avenue that needs to be followed concerning the
relationship between organized crime and tombaroli is the coexistence in the same
geographical areas of southern Italy of organized criminals and tombaroli. Access to southern
police officers, archaeologists, and more importantly, tombaroli, might yield results that
proxies used in this dissertation as substitutes for them have not been able to reveal. If the
accounts that allege collaboration between tombaroli and organized criminals turn out to be
true, then it is imperative to describe that relationship between these two groups. It will also
be important in order to establish the differences between looting dynamics in the north and
in the south.
Beyond this important void, there are many other issues that this dissertation has
opened and that can be studied in a more detailed fashion, within the realm of studies of
organized crime. All of the items used in this dissertation in order to ascertain whether
tombaroli were organized criminals deserve single studies devoted to gaining a deeper
understanding of them, such as the issue of commercial structures employed by tombaroli
and the planning of their operations, to cite two of the many examples available. Another
important area of study is the nature of the tombaroli’s looting organizations, big and small,
and the creation of a two dimensional typology of tasks and organizational structure that
analyzes how a group’s structure connects to their activities. A research project building on
this dissertation’s discoveries regarding the tombaroli’s organizational typologies might
analyze which form of organizing is preferred and is more effective with regard to looting
specific tasks.
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This dissertation has also opened many further research avenues related to learning
and adaptation. A deeper understanding of organizational issues such as recruitment or
hierarchy requires a study. This research avenue can be linked, like many of the
abovementioned projects, to the one researching dynamics between northern and southern
Italy. A research project analyzing whether the absence of further cultural transmission to
younger generations might encourage immigrants to become tombaroli will also be needed to
prevent this sort of illicit activity from getting worse.
Another important issue to be further researched within the organizational aspects of
the teams of tombaroli is the permeation of the trade by Eastern European citizens. As has
been stated, this has been the biggest change regarding membership in the last few decades
within teams of tombaroli. As such, this is a reality that urgently requires study not only from
the learning and organizational angles, but also from the organized crime one, as it is
important to assess a hypothetical takeover of looting by looters from other countries who
exploit Italy’s richness of archaeological heritage. The study of minors working as tombaroli,
another of the findings of this dissertation, should also receive full attention by researchers.
There are many aspects related to metis, techné, and adaptation that require further
research, mostly in order to see the usage of new forms of technology in the act of looting.
For example, within archaeology there is a growing body of literature devoted to metal
detectors. Most of these articles are descriptive by nature and usually confront the description
of the dynamics of metal detectorists of a given area with the existing legislation. However,
analyzing the activities of looters using metal detectors from a criminological perspective not
only provides a fresh interpretative angle but also allows for new knowledge and policy
recommendations. Also, this dissertation has only addressed competitive adaptation from the
point of view of the offender. It would, therefore, be interesting to research the interlocking
of law enforcement adaptations with tombaroli, to be able to compare them and see how
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police organizations in Italy learn, and thus contribute to a complete picture of this specific
issue.
The whole of the dissertation also can be replicated with different theoretical angles,
providing alternative theoretical explanations. Organized crime is a very fluid concept, and
research projects that use different definitions could arrive at different conclusions. The same
thing can be said about the learning and adaptation part of this dissertation. Even though it
was decided to analyze tombaroli as a group, other theories can be used to interpret how a
tombarolo learns, such as Sutherland’s differential association theory or Aker’s social
learning theory, to cite two of the most important ones. Both theories can provide innovative
insight into social norms present in Italian rural communities where looting is rampant, thus
changing the scope from the tombaroli to the communities they live in. At the same time,
these theories can highlight the important role of social structures in the determination of the
criminal behavior of looters through social learning processes such as differential social
organization, differential location, theoretically defined structural variables, or differential
social location (Akers, 1998).
Tombaroli are just the starting point of a trafficking chain that is transnational in
nature, as the beginning of this dissertation proved. It is worth remembering that up to this
moment, every scholarly article, chapter, or book dealing with the Italian situation has only
tangentially dealt with the people who find the illicit antiquities. Future studies that aim to
understand the scope of the phenomenon of the trafficking of illicitly obtained archaeological
items cannot disregard the importance of the supply side. The study of tombaroli will be
important to assess routes, methods of trafficking, and other issues studied in other
transnational crimes, such as drugs, weapons, or organs, to name a few.
In chapter two, this dissertation called attention to the total absence of evaluation
studies. This is another important avenue of research that needs to be explored. This research
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project highlighted the lack of severity of punishing looters, yet at the same time, as it was
being written, there were talks within political parties to elevate the punishment regarding
cultural heritage crimes. As such, it is time for scholars to evaluate how the criminal justice
system deals with looters and how this impacts recidivism. There is also the need to evaluate
whether targeting demand, instead of supply, has curbed looting and whether creating a new
culture based on education and respect for cultural heritage will prove to be effective at
combating looting.
In sum, it is important to highlight the need for a new body of knowledge within
criminology concerning tombaroli. It makes no sense that we have so little information about
a group that has been damaging archaeological heritage for centuries. It is time criminology
started paying attention to this phenomenon, and it is time bridges of knowledge between
disciplines were built so that the depletion of our common heritage is not lost forever to
unscrupulous private collectors.

7. Epilogue
Centuries have passed, and tombaroli, like the vestiges of the ancient civilizations they prey
on, continue to loot. The great raid, the golden era of tombaroli, has also passed, and even
though their activity has changed considerably, looters thrived, survived, and adapted. This
dissertation has shown that their activities are now more secretive and their clientele more
local, but tombaroli’s actions are as damaging as ever. It is impossible to estimate the amount
of pieces that they have carelessly stolen, and the amount of potential archaeological
knowledge that they have destroyed. At this moment in time, law enforcement agencies,
examining magistrates, prosecutors, and archaeologists, to name a few, still combat these
looters. The end of tombaroli and Italian archaeological looting remains elusive, and all of
those invested in stopping it know that. Even with all of the gains law enforcement has made
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since the great raid, there is still much room for improvement. This chapter has proposed
possible improvements that could be implemented.
Just as all those involved in stopping this awful business still have a lot of work to do,
so do those involved in scholarly research. Since previous phases of the activity of tombaroli
have been documented, it will be important to assess what happened after the great raid and
see how this form of criminal activity evolves. This task needs to be done not only by
archaeologists and law scholars, as it has been up to now, but also by criminologists, who
have a virtually unexplored world to empirically analyze. This dissertation has not only
focused on the relationship of tombaroli with traditional Italian organized crime but also on
the conceptual debate surrounding this sort of criminal and the way they learn as a group.
However, it could have focused on completely different topics concerning looters.
Archaeological looting is a field ripe with opportunities for criminological research.
Hopefully, this dissertation has raised as many questions as it has provided answers.
Criminological analysis needs to take a preeminent position in order to better understand
dynamics of the supply side of illicit trafficking in looted antiquities. Any theoretical point of
view may help understand better this blight against archaeological heritage and help
formulate practical solutions.
The archaeological remains of past civilizations in Italy are vast, yet they are non
renewable. The destruction of this heritage in Italy will not stop while scholars keep debating;
on the contrary, Italy’s archaeological resources will keep disappearing. As such, it is
imperative for criminologists to contribute. Tombaroli might be now in decline and for the
first time in their history their activity might be dying out due to a lack of continuity between
generations, but some of the interviewed looters stated that they have no intention of
stopping. Even though looting will probably never be as profitable as it was during the great
raid, there are many archaeological remains still to be found in Italy, and this treasure still
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motivates tombaroli. Although David’s (2007) Washington Post article referred to the demise
of tombaroli, she still chose to end her piece with the tombarolo Pietro Casasanta’s words:
“‘The interest in archaeology never fades… We’ll be back’”. In fact, as this dissertation has
proved, tombaroli never left.
Whether Italy’s archaeological treasures are to be discovered by tombaroli or
archaeologists cannot be predicted. However, readers should now be sure that the ideal
scenario for those pieces is to rest peacefully in their tombs until a trained archaeologist
excavates and preserves them for posterity.
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APPENDIX A
IDENTIFICATION, SCREENING, ELIGIBILITY AND INCLUSION OF ARTICLES IN
THE SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW6

Records identified through
database searching
(n = 107)

Additional records identified
through other sources
(n = 120)

Records screened
(n = 227)

Records excluded
(n = 159)

Full-text articles assessed
for eligibility
(n = 68)

Full-text articles excluded,
with reasons
(n = 22)

Studies included in
qualitative synthesis
(n = 46)

6

Adapted from Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J. & Altman D.G. (2009).
243

APPENDIX B
RESPONDENT DATA

Name of respondent
(pseudonym)
Alfredo
Carlo
Roberto
Linda
Rodolfo
Tristano
Gennaro
Gemma
Giorgio
Giovanni
Patrizio
Maffio
Riccardo
Enrico
Alessio
Andrea
Luca
Lucia
Leonardo
Angelo
Carla
Figaro
Bartolo
Giuseppe
Angelo7

7

Date of interview

Place of interview

Type of respondent

6/30/2017
7/22/2017
6/30/2017
4/12/2017
3/28/2017
4/18/2017
4/24/2017
4/24/2017
5/22/2017

Montefiascone
Cerveteri
Rome
Rome
Rome
Naples (via email)
Montalto di Castro
Montalto di Castro
Cerveteri
La Giustiniana

Tombarolo
Archaeologist
Criminologist
Journalist
Police officer
Archaeologist
Tombarolo
Writer
Police officer
Tombarolo

La Giustiniana

Tombarolo

Rome
Rome
Rome
Cerveteri
Rome
Rome
Cerveteri
Cerveteri
Cerveteri
Rome
Rome
Olgiata
Rome
Cerveteri

Police officer
Police officer
Police officer
Tombarolo
Archaeologist
Expert
Archaeologist
Archaeologist
Archaeologist
Archaeologist
Archaeologist
Prosecutor
Journalist
Tombarolo

3/29/2017
3/29/2017
2/10/2017
2/10/2017
12/21/2016; 2/10/2017
7/1/2017
1/27/2017
1/27/2017
7/22/2017
7/22/2017
7/22/2017
3/28/2017
4/10/2017
1/19/2017
12/28/2016
5/22/2017

The old tombarolo was not interviewed, as his understanding of the questions was severely
impaired due to age and education.
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APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE USED WITH TOMBAROLI

List of interview questions – tombaroli

Introduction
1. Could you tell me about your social and professional background?
2. How would you describe the current state of archaeological looting perpetrated by
tombaroli in Italy?

Organized crime
3. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “There is a relationship
between traditional Italian organized crime and tombaroli”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

Please comment on your answer.
4. Have you worked with or witnessed any relationship between tombaroli (yourself or
others) and
4a. Cosa Nostra?
4b. Camorra?
4c. ‘Ndrangheta?
4d. Sacra Corona Unita?
4e. Smaller, lesser-known groups (such as Stidda, smaller clans…)?
4f. In case the interviewee has witnessed any kind of relationship, can he/she provide
data (news, court case….)?
5. Do you share/agree you possess the following traits?
Mandatory criteria

Yes/No

Collaboration among more
than two people
Extending over a prolonged
or indefinite period
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Cases

Suspected of committing
serious criminal offences,
punishable by imprisonment
for at least four years or a
more serious penalty
Central goal of profit and/or
power
Optional criteria
Specialized division of labor
Exercising measures of
discipline and control
Employing violence or other
means of intimidation
Employing commercial
business-like structures
Participating in money
laundering
Operational across national
borders
Exerting influence over
legitimate social institutions
6. Continuing with the same question, do you share/agree you possess the following traits?
Item

Yes/No

Planning of their operations
Skills and knowledge needed
Uniforms
Tattoos
Initiation rituals
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Cases

7. Which of these structures would you consider describe better the organization of
tombaroli?
Freelance

Family business

Communal
business

Corporations

Organizational elements
8. Do you work by yourself or are you organized with other tombaroli?
8a. If so, how do you usually organize?
8b. What made you choose this particular form of organization?
8c. Has it always been like this or has the organization morphed over the years?
8d. If it has morphed, has it been due to past experience, new information/mistakes or
to perceived or actual threats from law enforcement agents?
9. Did someone recruit you? Do you perform recruiting functions? How does recruiting
work?
10. What type of position do you hold relative to other members?
10a. How many levels of hierarchy exist within the organization?
10b. Do subordinates operate by following orders or are these just suggestions passed
between friends/colleagues?
10c. Are orders generally disregarded or obeyed?
11. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “These responses are
generalizable to tombaroli around Italy”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

Organizational learning and information gathering
12. What do you know about apprenticeships within new tombaroli? Do they exist?
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13. Which tasks would you consider require an experimental or intuitive knowledge, and
which ones you would consider require an abstract technical knowledge?
Task

Metis

Techné

14. How do you obtain, record, and store information?
14a. What is the format used to do so?
14b. Do all participants in the group have access to this information?
14c. If there is one person managing the group, does he use this information?
14d. How often is this information accessed?
Adapting
15. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “Tombaroli adjust their
behavior in response to past experience or new information/mistakes”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

Can you cite specific examples?
16. Following up from the last question, to what extent would you agree with the following
statement: “Tombaroli just react to events in a random, haphazard fashion”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

17. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “Tombaroli adapt their
activities in response to perceived or actual threats from law enforcement agents”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent
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Agree Strongly agree

N/A

18. If you adjust your behavior in response to experience or information, do you store this
new information? How?
19. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “Tombaroli are more
efficient in their task nowadays than they were in the past”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

Conclusion
20. Is there anything not discussed during the interview that you consider is important to be
considered and included in this research?
21. Could you name which cases, in your opinion, constitute the most important operations
against tomb raiding in your country?

Snowball sampling recruitment
22. Can you suggest anyone else whom you think it would be useful for me to talk to about
this topic?
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APPENDIX D
QUESTIONNAIRE USED WITH OTHER RESPONDENTS

List of interview questions – police officers, magistrates, prosecutors,
archaeologists and journalists
Introduction
1. Could you tell me about your professional background?
2. How would you describe the current state of archaeological looting perpetrated by
tombaroli in Italy?
Organized crime
3. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “There is a relationship
between traditional Italian organized crime and tombaroli”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

NA

4. Have you witnessed any relationship between tombaroli and
4a. Cosa Nostra?
4b. Camorra?
4c. ‘Ndrangheta?
4d. Sacra Corona Unita?
4e. Smaller, lesser-known groups (such as Stidda, smaller clans…)?
4f. In case the interviewee has witnessed any kind of relationship, can he/she provide
data (news, court case….)?
5. Have you observed in tombaroli the following traits?
Mandatory criteria

Yes/No

Collaboration among more
than two people
Extending over a prolonged
or indefinite period
Suspected of committing
serious criminal offences,
punishable by imprisonment
for at least four years or a
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Examples/Comments

more serious penalty

Central goal of profit and/or
power
Optional criteria
Specialized division of labor
Exercising measures of
discipline and control
Employing violence or other
means of intimidation
Employing commercial
business-like structures
Participating in money
laundering
Operational across national
borders
Exerting influence over
legitimate social institutions
6. Continuing with the same question, have you observed in tombaroli the following traits?
Item

Yes/No

Planning of their operations
Skills and knowledge needed
Uniforms
Tattoos
Initiation rituals
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Examples/Comments

7. Which of these structures would you consider describe better the organization of
tombaroli?
Freelance

Family business

Communal
business

Corporations

Organizational elements
8. Based on your experience, do you consider that tomb raiding is an individual task or an
organized one?
8a. If so, and in your experience, how do tombaroli organize?
8b. Based on your experience, what circumstances made them choose that particular
form of organization?
8c. Has it always been like this, or has the organization morphed over the
years?
8d. If it has morphed, has it been due to past experience, new
information/mistakes, or to perceived or actual threats from law enforcement
agents?
9. Do you have any insights about forms of recruitment? Who does perform recruiting
functions? How does recruiting work?
10. Do hierarchies exist within the group of tombaroli? How many?
10a. Do subordinates operate by following orders or are these just suggestions passed
between friends/colleagues/equals?
10b. Are orders generally disregarded or obeyed?
11. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “These responses are
generalizable to tombaroli around Italy”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

Organizational learning and information gathering
12. What do you know about apprenticeships within tombaroli? Do they exist?
13. Which tasks would you consider require an experimental or intuitive knowledge and
which ones you would consider require an abstract technical knowledge?
Task

Metis
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Techné

Task

Metis

Techné

14. How do tombaroli obtain, record, and store information?
14a. What is the format used to do so?
14b. Do all participants in the group have access to this information?
14c. If there is one person managing the group, does he use this information?
14d. How often is this information accessed?
Adapting
15. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “Tombaroli adjust their
behavior in response to past experience or new information/mistakes”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

Can you cite specific examples?
16. Following up from the last question, to what extent would you agree with the following
statement: “Tombaroli just react to events in a random, haphazard fashion”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

17. To what extent would you agree with the following statement: “Tombaroli adapt their
activities in response to perceived or actual threats from law enforcement agents”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

18. If tombaroli adjust their behavior in response to experience or information, do you think
they store this new information? How?
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19. To what extent would you agree about the following statement: “Tombaroli are more
efficient in their tasks nowadays than they were in the past”?
Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neutral/Indifferent

Agree Strongly agree

N/A

Conclusion
20. Is there anything not discussed during the interview that you consider it is important to be
considered and included in this research?
21. Could you name which cases, in your opinion, constitute the most important operations
against tomb raiding in your country?
Snowball sampling recruitment
22. Can you suggest anyone else within the legal (a colleague) or illegal sphere (tombaroli)
that you think it would be useful for me to talk to about this topic?
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